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Message-ID: <1dddb237-1460-8122-7caf-f0acd7c91b5c@igalia.com>
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2024 17:01:17 +0530
From: Bhupesh Sharma <bhsharma@...lia.com>
To: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@...lia.com>,
 Bhupesh <bhupesh@...lia.com>
Cc: linux-ext4@...r.kernel.org, tytso@....edu, kernel-dev@...lia.com,
 linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, revest@...gle.com, adilger.kernel@...ger.ca,
 syzbot+b244bda78289b00204ed@...kaller.appspotmail.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] fs/ext4/xattr: Check for 'xattr_sem' inside
 'ext4_xattr_delete_inode'

Hi Cascardo,

Thanks for looking at the patch.

On 12/12/24 11:05 PM, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo wrote:
> On Thu, Dec 12, 2024 at 12:23:31PM +0530, Bhupesh wrote:
>> Once we are inside the 'ext4_xattr_delete_inode' function and trying
>> to delete the inode, the 'xattr_sem' should be unlocked.
>>
>> We need trylock here to avoid false-positive warning from lockdep
>> about reclaim circular dependency.
>>
>> This fixes the following KASAN reported issue:
>>
>> ==================================================================
>> BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all+0xb8c/0xe90
>> Read of size 4 at addr ffff888012c120c4 by task repro/2065
>>
>> CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 2065 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.13.0-rc2+ #11
>> Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
>> Call Trace:
>>   <TASK>
>>   dump_stack_lvl+0x1fd/0x300
>>   ? tcp_gro_dev_warn+0x260/0x260
>>   ? _printk+0xc0/0x100
>>   ? read_lock_is_recursive+0x10/0x10
>>   ? irq_work_queue+0x72/0xf0
>>   ? __virt_addr_valid+0x17b/0x4b0
>>   print_address_description+0x78/0x390
>>   print_report+0x107/0x1f0
>>   ? __virt_addr_valid+0x17b/0x4b0
>>   ? __virt_addr_valid+0x3ff/0x4b0
>>   ? __phys_addr+0xb5/0x160
>>   ? ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all+0xb8c/0xe90
>>   kasan_report+0xcc/0x100
>>   ? ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all+0xb8c/0xe90
>>   ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all+0xb8c/0xe90
>>   ? ext4_xattr_delete_inode+0xd30/0xd30
>>   ? __ext4_journal_ensure_credits+0x5f0/0x5f0
>>   ? __ext4_journal_ensure_credits+0x2b/0x5f0
>>   ? inode_update_timestamps+0x410/0x410
>>   ext4_xattr_delete_inode+0xb64/0xd30
>>   ? ext4_truncate+0xb70/0xdc0
>>   ? ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea+0x1d20/0x1d20
>>   ? __ext4_mark_inode_dirty+0x670/0x670
>>   ? ext4_journal_check_start+0x16f/0x240
>>   ? ext4_inode_is_fast_symlink+0x2f2/0x3a0
>>   ext4_evict_inode+0xc8c/0xff0
>>   ? ext4_inode_is_fast_symlink+0x3a0/0x3a0
>>   ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x53/0x8a0
>>   ? ext4_inode_is_fast_symlink+0x3a0/0x3a0
>>   evict+0x4ac/0x950
>>   ? proc_nr_inodes+0x310/0x310
>>   ? trace_ext4_drop_inode+0xa2/0x220
>>   ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x1a/0x30
>>   ? iput+0x4cb/0x7e0
>>   do_unlinkat+0x495/0x7c0
>>   ? try_break_deleg+0x120/0x120
>>   ? 0xffffffff81000000
>>   ? __check_object_size+0x15a/0x210
>>   ? strncpy_from_user+0x13e/0x250
>>   ? getname_flags+0x1dc/0x530
>>   __x64_sys_unlinkat+0xc8/0xf0
>>   do_syscall_64+0x65/0x110
>>   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0x6f
>> RIP: 0033:0x434ffd
>> Code: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 8
>> RSP: 002b:00007ffc50fa7b28 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000107
>> RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc50fa7e18 RCX: 0000000000434ffd
>> RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000240 RDI: 0000000000000005
>> RBP: 00007ffc50fa7be0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
>> R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001
>> R13: 00007ffc50fa7e08 R14: 00000000004bbf30 R15: 0000000000000001
>>   </TASK>
>>
>> The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888012c12000
>>   which belongs to the cache filp of size 360
>> The buggy address is located 196 bytes inside of
>>   freed 360-byte region [ffff888012c12000, ffff888012c12168)
>>
>> The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
>> page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x12c12
>> head: order:1 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
>> flags: 0x40(head|node=0|zone=0)
>> page_type: f5(slab)
>> raw: 0000000000000040 ffff888000ad7640 ffffea0000497a00 dead000000000004
>> raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000100010 00000001f5000000 0000000000000000
>> head: 0000000000000040 ffff888000ad7640 ffffea0000497a00 dead000000000004
>> head: 0000000000000000 0000000000100010 00000001f5000000 0000000000000000
>> head: 0000000000000001 ffffea00004b0481 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000
>> head: 0000000000000002 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
>> page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
>>
>> Memory state around the buggy address:
>>   ffff888012c11f80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>>   ffff888012c12000: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>>> ffff888012c12080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>>                                             ^
>>   ffff888012c12100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc
>>   ffff888012c12180: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>> ==================================================================
>>
>> Reported-by: syzbot+b244bda78289b00204ed@...kaller.appspotmail.com
>> Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=b244bda78289b00204ed
>> Signed-off-by: Bhupesh <bhupesh@...lia.com>
>> ---
>>   fs/ext4/xattr.c | 16 +++++++++++++++-
>>   1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/fs/ext4/xattr.c b/fs/ext4/xattr.c
>> index 7647e9f6e190..e1d29aa76165 100644
>> --- a/fs/ext4/xattr.c
>> +++ b/fs/ext4/xattr.c
>> @@ -2926,7 +2926,20 @@ int ext4_xattr_delete_inode(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
>>   	struct ext4_iloc iloc = { .bh = NULL };
>>   	struct ext4_xattr_entry *entry;
>>   	struct inode *ea_inode;
>> -	int error;
>> +	int error = 0;
>> +
>> +	/*
>> +	 * We are the only ones holding inode reference. The xattr_sem should
>> +	 * better be unlocked! We could as well just not acquire xattr_sem at
>> +	 * all but this makes the code more futureproof. OTOH we need trylock
>> +	 * here to avoid false-positive warning from lockdep about reclaim
>> +	 * circular dependency.
>> +	 */
>> +	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!down_write_trylock(&EXT4_I(inode)->xattr_sem)))
>> +		return error;
>> +
>> +	if (!EXT4_I(inode)->i_file_acl)
>> +		goto cleanup;
>>   
> This is ignoring the case where attributes are all in the inode, not in the
> separate ACL block.
>
> That's why this apparently fixes the problem. ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all
> is never called anymore.


Ok, I got your point, I will try to use existing inode checking 
functions instead, to check for the 'attributes present in inode' case.

However, as we were discussing on irc, I think it would make sense still 
to have the 'EXT4_I(inode)->xattr_sem' held while we delete the inode 
inside '

ext4_xattr_delete_inode'. Please let me know in case you have other ideas.

I will send two patches then - one fixing the inode attribute issue and the other for holding the xattr_sem while we are inside the critical region deleting the inode.

Thanks,
Bhupesh


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