linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 19/19] perf: Make perf_pmu

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <20241217115219.GH12500@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net>
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2024 12:52:19 +0100
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
To: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@....com>
Cc: "mingo@...nel.org" <mingo@...nel.org>,
	"lucas.demarchi@...el.com" <lucas.demarchi@...el.com>,
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	"willy@...radead.org" <willy@...radead.org>,
	"acme@...nel.org" <acme@...nel.org>,
	"namhyung@...nel.org" <namhyung@...nel.org>,
	"mark.rutland@....com" <mark.rutland@....com>,
	"alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com" <alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com>,
	"jolsa@...nel.org" <jolsa@...nel.org>,
	"irogers@...gle.com" <irogers@...gle.com>,
	"adrian.hunter@...el.com" <adrian.hunter@...el.com>,
	"kan.liang@...ux.intel.com" <kan.liang@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 19/19] perf: Make perf_pmu_unregister() useable

On Tue, Dec 17, 2024 at 10:12:16AM +0100, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> 
> 
> Oh sorry, I seem to have missed this email :/
> 
> On Mon, Nov 25, 2024 at 09:40:28AM +0530, Ravi Bangoria wrote:
> > Hi Peter,
> > 
> > > @@ -6507,6 +6540,7 @@ static void perf_mmap_close(struct vm_ar
> > >  	unsigned long size = perf_data_size(rb);
> > >  	bool detach_rest = false;
> > >  
> > > +	/* FIXIES vs perf_pmu_unregister() */
> > >  	if (event->pmu->event_unmapped)
> > >  		event->pmu->event_unmapped(event, vma->vm_mm);
> > 
> > I assume you are already aware of the race between __pmu_detach_event()
> > and perf_mmap_close() since you have put that comment. 
> 
> That comment was mostly about how we can't fix up the whole
> ->event_unmapped() thing and have to abort pmu_unregister for it.
> 
> > In any case, below sequence of operations triggers a splat when
> > perf_mmap_close() tries to access event->rb, event->pmu etc. which
> > were already freed by __pmu_detach_event().
> > 
> > Sequence:
> > 
> >     Kernel                       Userspace
> >     ------                       ---------
> >     perf_pmu_register()
> >                                 fd = perf_event_open()
> >                                 p = mmap(fd)
> >     perf_pmu_unregister()
> >                                 munmap(p)
> >                                 close(fd)
> 
> Right, let me go have a look. Thanks!

Bah, that's a right mess indeed, however did I miss all that.

The easiest solution is probably to leave the RB around on detach, but
now I need to remember why I did that in the first place :/

Oh.. I think I mostly that to serialize against perf_mmap(), which
should reject creating further maps. But we can do that without actually
detaching the RB -- we only need to acquire and release mmap_mutex.

Ah, there's that perf_event_stop() inside of ring_buffer_attach(), that
must not happen after detach, obviously. So that must be dealt with.

Hmm, also if we leave ->rb around, then we need to deal with
perf_event_set_output(), someone could try and redirect their things
into our buffer -- which isn't technically broken, but still weird.

Something like the below.

How did you test; perf-fuzzer or something?

--- a/include/linux/perf_event.h
+++ b/include/linux/perf_event.h
@@ -1742,7 +1742,7 @@ static inline bool needs_branch_stack(st
 
 static inline bool has_aux(struct perf_event *event)
 {
-	return event->pmu->setup_aux;
+	return event->pmu && event->pmu->setup_aux;
 }
 
 static inline bool has_aux_action(struct perf_event *event)
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -5409,7 +5409,6 @@ static void _free_event(struct perf_even
 	security_perf_event_free(event);
 
 	if (event->rb) {
-		WARN_ON_ONCE(!event->pmu);
 		/*
 		 * Can happen when we close an event with re-directed output.
 		 *
@@ -12023,7 +12022,10 @@ static void __pmu_detach_event(struct pm
 	 */
 	scoped_guard (mutex, &event->mmap_mutex) {
 		WARN_ON_ONCE(pmu->event_unmapped);
-		ring_buffer_attach(event, NULL);
+		/* 
+		 * Mostly an empy lock sequence, such that perf_mmap(), which
+		 * relies on mmap_mutex, is sure to observe the state change.
+		 */
 	}
 
 	perf_event_free_bpf_prog(event);
@@ -12823,6 +12825,9 @@ perf_event_set_output(struct perf_event
 		goto unlock;
 
 	if (output_event) {
+		if (output_event->state <= PERF_EVENT_STATE_REVOKED)
+			goto unlock;
+
 		/* get the rb we want to redirect to */
 		rb = ring_buffer_get(output_event);
 		if (!rb)