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Message-ID: <20241219175128.GA25477@willie-the-truck>
Date: Thu, 19 Dec 2024 17:51:28 +0000
From: Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>
To: Douglas Anderson <dianders@...omium.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>, linux-arm-msm@...r.kernel.org,
Jeffrey Hugo <quic_jhugo@...cinc.com>,
Julius Werner <jwerner@...omium.org>,
linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
Roxana Bradescu <roxabee@...gle.com>,
Trilok Soni <quic_tsoni@...cinc.com>,
bjorn.andersson@....qualcomm.com, stable@...r.kernel.org,
James Morse <james.morse@....com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/6] arm64: errata: Assume that unknown CPUs _are_
vulnerable to Spectre BHB
On Fri, Dec 13, 2024 at 04:52:02PM -0800, Douglas Anderson wrote:
> The code for detecting CPUs that are vulnerable to Spectre BHB was
> based on a hardcoded list of CPU IDs that were known to be affected.
> Unfortunately, the list mostly only contained the IDs of standard ARM
> cores. The IDs for many cores that are minor variants of the standard
> ARM cores (like many Qualcomm Kyro CPUs) weren't listed. This led the
> code to assume that those variants were not affected.
>
> Flip the code on its head and instead list CPU IDs for cores that are
> known to be _not_ affected. Now CPUs will be assumed vulnerable until
> added to the list saying that they're safe.
>
> As of right now, the only CPU IDs added to the "unaffected" list are
> ARM Cortex A35, A53, and A55. This list was created by looking at
> older cores listed in cputype.h that weren't listed in the "affected"
> list previously.
There's a list of affected CPUs from Arm here:
https://developer.arm.com/Arm%20Security%20Center/Spectre-BHB
(obviously only covers their own designs).
So it looks like A510 and A520 should be unaffected too, although I
didn't check exhaustively. It also looks like A715 is affected but the
whitepaper doesn't tell you what version of 'k' to use...
> Unfortunately, while this solution is better than what we had before,
> it's still an imperfect solution. Specifically there are two ways to
> mitigate Spectre BHB and one of those ways is parameterized with a "k"
> value indicating how many loops are needed to mitigate. If we have an
> unknown CPU ID then we've got to guess about how to mitigate it. Since
> more cores seem to be mitigated by looping (and because it's unlikely
> that the needed FW code will be in place for FW mitigation for unknown
> cores), we'll choose looping for unknown CPUs and choose the highest
> "k" value of 32.
I don't think we should guess. Just say vulnerable.
> The downside of our guessing is that some CPUs may now report as
> "mitigated" when in reality they should need a firmware mitigation.
> We'll choose to put a WARN_ON splat in the logs in this case any time
> we had to make a guess since guessing the right mitigation is pretty
> awful. Hopefully this will encourage CPU vendors to add their CPU IDs
> to the list.
Hmm. We shouldn't have to guess here as the firmware mitigation is
discoverable. So if it's unavailable and we're running an a CPU which
needs it, then we're vulnerable.
Will
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