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Message-Id: <20241223070650.2810747-2-luogengkun@huaweicloud.com>
Date: Mon, 23 Dec 2024 07:06:49 +0000
From: Luo Gengkun <luogengkun@...weicloud.com>
To: peterz@...radead.org
Cc: mingo@...hat.com,
acme@...nel.org,
namhyung@...nel.org,
mark.rutland@....com,
alexander.shishkin@...ux.intel.com,
jolsa@...nel.org,
irogers@...gle.com,
adrian.hunter@...el.com,
kan.liang@...ux.intel.com,
tglx@...utronix.de,
bp@...en8.de,
dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com,
x86@...nel.org,
hpa@...or.com,
will@...nel.org,
paul@...l-moore.com,
jmorris@...ei.org,
serge@...lyn.com,
rostedt@...dmis.org,
mhiramat@...nel.org,
mathieu.desnoyers@...icios.com,
stephen.smalley.work@...il.com,
omosnace@...hat.com,
linux-perf-users@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-trace-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
selinux@...r.kernel.org,
luogengkun@...weicloud.com
Subject: [PATCH linux-next 1/2] perf: Remove unnecessary parameter of security check
It seems that the attr parameter was never been used in security
checks since it was first introduced by:
commit da97e18458fb ("perf_event: Add support for LSM and SELinux checks")
so remove it.
Signed-off-by: Luo Gengkun <luogengkun@...weicloud.com>
---
arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/events/intel/core.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/events/intel/p4.c | 2 +-
drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c | 4 ++--
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 +-
include/linux/perf_event.h | 10 +++++-----
include/linux/security.h | 5 ++---
kernel/events/core.c | 14 +++++++-------
kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c | 4 ++--
security/security.c | 5 ++---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +-
11 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c
index 8f78b0c900ef..485a09d61adf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c
@@ -559,7 +559,7 @@ static int bts_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
* to the user in a zero-copy fashion.
*/
if (event->attr.exclude_kernel) {
- ret = perf_allow_kernel(&event->attr);
+ ret = perf_allow_kernel();
if (ret)
return ret;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
index 103ee41907c7..3b65df32daee 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/core.c
@@ -4150,7 +4150,7 @@ static int intel_pmu_hw_config(struct perf_event *event)
if (x86_pmu.version < 3)
return -EINVAL;
- ret = perf_allow_cpu(&event->attr);
+ ret = perf_allow_cpu();
if (ret)
return ret;
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/p4.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/p4.c
index 844bc4fc4724..78d78b8a1530 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/p4.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/p4.c
@@ -776,7 +776,7 @@ static int p4_validate_raw_event(struct perf_event *event)
* the user needs special permissions to be able to use it
*/
if (p4_ht_active() && p4_event_bind_map[v].shared) {
- v = perf_allow_cpu(&event->attr);
+ v = perf_allow_cpu();
if (v)
return v;
}
diff --git a/drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c b/drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c
index fd5b78732603..a55d10956ff6 100644
--- a/drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c
+++ b/drivers/perf/arm_spe_pmu.c
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ static_assert((PERF_EVENT_FLAG_ARCH & SPE_PMU_HW_FLAGS_CX) == SPE_PMU_HW_FLAGS_C
static void set_spe_event_has_cx(struct perf_event *event)
{
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PID_IN_CONTEXTIDR) && !perf_allow_kernel(&event->attr))
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PID_IN_CONTEXTIDR) && !perf_allow_kernel())
event->hw.flags |= SPE_PMU_HW_FLAGS_CX;
}
@@ -746,7 +746,7 @@ static int arm_spe_pmu_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
set_spe_event_has_cx(event);
reg = arm_spe_event_to_pmscr(event);
if (reg & (PMSCR_EL1_PA | PMSCR_EL1_PCT))
- return perf_allow_kernel(&event->attr);
+ return perf_allow_kernel();
return 0;
}
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index e2f1ce37c41e..e349e585cc07 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bpf_token_capable, const struct bpf_token *token, int cap)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, locked_down, enum lockdown_reason what)
#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
-LSM_HOOK(int, 0, perf_event_open, struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, perf_event_open, int type)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, perf_event_alloc, struct perf_event *event)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, perf_event_read, struct perf_event *event)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, perf_event_write, struct perf_event *event)
diff --git a/include/linux/perf_event.h b/include/linux/perf_event.h
index 8333f132f4a9..5d2ec4283ebf 100644
--- a/include/linux/perf_event.h
+++ b/include/linux/perf_event.h
@@ -1672,22 +1672,22 @@ static inline int perf_is_paranoid(void)
return sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1;
}
-int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr);
+int perf_allow_kernel(void);
-static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
+static inline int perf_allow_cpu(void)
{
if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 0 && !perfmon_capable())
return -EACCES;
- return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_CPU);
+ return security_perf_event_open(PERF_SECURITY_CPU);
}
-static inline int perf_allow_tracepoint(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
+static inline int perf_allow_tracepoint(void)
{
if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1 && !perfmon_capable())
return -EPERM;
- return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT);
+ return security_perf_event_open(PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT);
}
extern int perf_exclude_event(struct perf_event *event, struct pt_regs *regs);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 980b6c207cad..a3b35a699256 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -2324,14 +2324,13 @@ struct perf_event_attr;
struct perf_event;
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
-extern int security_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type);
+extern int security_perf_event_open(int type);
extern int security_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event);
extern void security_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event);
extern int security_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event);
extern int security_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event);
#else
-static inline int security_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr,
- int type)
+static inline int security_perf_event_open(int type)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index b2bc67791f84..f2cb450eb134 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -4883,7 +4883,7 @@ find_get_context(struct task_struct *task, struct perf_event *event)
if (!task) {
/* Must be root to operate on a CPU event: */
- err = perf_allow_cpu(&event->attr);
+ err = perf_allow_cpu();
if (err)
return ERR_PTR(err);
@@ -12488,7 +12488,7 @@ static int perf_copy_attr(struct perf_event_attr __user *uattr,
}
/* privileged levels capture (kernel, hv): check permissions */
if (mask & PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_PERM_PLM) {
- ret = perf_allow_kernel(attr);
+ ret = perf_allow_kernel();
if (ret)
return ret;
}
@@ -12745,12 +12745,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
return err;
/* Do we allow access to perf_event_open(2) ? */
- err = security_perf_event_open(&attr, PERF_SECURITY_OPEN);
+ err = security_perf_event_open(PERF_SECURITY_OPEN);
if (err)
return err;
if (!attr.exclude_kernel) {
- err = perf_allow_kernel(&attr);
+ err = perf_allow_kernel();
if (err)
return err;
}
@@ -12770,7 +12770,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
/* Only privileged users can get physical addresses */
if ((attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_PHYS_ADDR)) {
- err = perf_allow_kernel(&attr);
+ err = perf_allow_kernel();
if (err)
return err;
}
@@ -13603,12 +13603,12 @@ const struct perf_event_attr *perf_event_attrs(struct perf_event *event)
return &event->attr;
}
-int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
+int perf_allow_kernel(void)
{
if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1 && !perfmon_capable())
return -EACCES;
- return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL);
+ return security_perf_event_open(PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(perf_allow_kernel);
diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c b/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c
index 3ff9caa4a71b..a6bb7577e8c5 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ static int perf_trace_event_perm(struct trace_event_call *tp_event,
/* The ftrace function trace is allowed only for root. */
if (ftrace_event_is_function(tp_event)) {
- ret = perf_allow_tracepoint(&p_event->attr);
+ ret = perf_allow_tracepoint();
if (ret)
return ret;
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ static int perf_trace_event_perm(struct trace_event_call *tp_event,
* ...otherwise raw tracepoint data can be a severe data leak,
* only allow root to have these.
*/
- ret = perf_allow_tracepoint(&p_event->attr);
+ ret = perf_allow_tracepoint();
if (ret)
return ret;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 1db835c05a78..ad9655aa1322 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -5885,16 +5885,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_bdev_setintegrity);
#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
/**
* security_perf_event_open() - Check if a perf event open is allowed
- * @attr: perf event attribute
* @type: type of event
*
* Check whether the @type of perf_event_open syscall is allowed.
*
* Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
*/
-int security_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type)
+int security_perf_event_open(int type)
{
- return call_int_hook(perf_event_open, attr, type);
+ return call_int_hook(perf_event_open, type);
}
/**
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index a503b8fd6611..14c7d331c3b6 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -7040,7 +7040,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
};
#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
-static int selinux_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type)
+static int selinux_perf_event_open(int type)
{
u32 requested, sid = current_sid();
--
2.34.1
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