linux-kernel - [PATCH v16 06/13] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests

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Message-ID: <20250106124633.1418972-7-nikunj@amd.com>
Date: Mon, 6 Jan 2025 18:16:26 +0530
From: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@....com>
To: <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, <thomas.lendacky@....com>, <bp@...en8.de>,
	<x86@...nel.org>
CC: <kvm@...r.kernel.org>, <mingo@...hat.com>, <tglx@...utronix.de>,
	<dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, <pgonda@...gle.com>, <seanjc@...gle.com>,
	<pbonzini@...hat.com>, <nikunj@....com>, <francescolavra.fl@...il.com>
Subject: [PATCH v16 06/13] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests

Secure TSC enabled guests should not write to the MSR_IA32_TSC(10H)
register as the subsequent TSC value reads are undefined. For AMD platform,
MSR_IA32_TSC is intercepted by the hypervisor. MSR_IA32_TSC read/write
accesses should not exit to the hypervisor for such guests.

Accesses to MSR_IA32_TSC needs special handling in the #VC handler for the
guests with Secure TSC enabled. Writes to MSR_IA32_TSC should be ignored
and flagged once with a warning, and reads of MSR_IA32_TSC should return
the result of the RDTSC instruction.

Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@....com>
---
 arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
index 00a0ac3baab7..f49d3e97e170 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
@@ -1428,6 +1428,34 @@ static enum es_result __vc_handle_msr_caa(struct pt_regs *regs, bool write)
 	return ES_OK;
 }
 
+/*
+ * TSC related accesses should not exit to the hypervisor when a guest is
+ * executing with Secure TSC enabled, so special handling is required for
+ * accesses of MSR_IA32_TSC.
+ */
+static enum es_result __vc_handle_secure_tsc_msrs(struct pt_regs *regs, bool write)
+{
+	u64 tsc;
+
+	/*
+	 * Writes: Writing to MSR_IA32_TSC can cause subsequent reads of the TSC
+	 *         to return undefined values, so ignore all writes.
+	 *
+	 * Reads: Reads of MSR_IA32_TSC should return the current TSC value, use
+	 *        the value returned by rdtsc_ordered().
+	 */
+	if (write) {
+		WARN_ONCE(1, "TSC MSR writes are verboten!\n");
+		return ES_OK;
+	}
+
+	tsc = rdtsc_ordered();
+	regs->ax = lower_32_bits(tsc);
+	regs->dx = upper_32_bits(tsc);
+
+	return ES_OK;
+}
+
 static enum es_result vc_handle_msr(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
 {
 	struct pt_regs *regs = ctxt->regs;
@@ -1437,8 +1465,17 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_msr(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
 	/* Is it a WRMSR? */
 	write = ctxt->insn.opcode.bytes[1] == 0x30;
 
-	if (regs->cx == MSR_SVSM_CAA)
+	switch (regs->cx) {
+	case MSR_SVSM_CAA:
 		return __vc_handle_msr_caa(regs, write);
+	case MSR_IA32_TSC:
+		if (sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_TSC)
+			return __vc_handle_secure_tsc_msrs(regs, write);
+		else
+			break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
 
 	ghcb_set_rcx(ghcb, regs->cx);
 	if (write) {
-- 
2.34.1