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Message-ID: <20250107233056.235536-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Date: Tue, 7 Jan 2025 15:30:56 -0800
From: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
To: dave.hansen@...el.com,
bp@...en8.de
Cc: christina.schimpe@...el.com,
dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com,
hpa@...or.com,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
luto@...nel.org,
mingo@...hat.com,
peterz@...radead.org,
rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com,
tglx@...utronix.de,
x86@...nel.org,
stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2] x86: Check if shadow stack is active for ssp_get()
The x86 shadow stack support has its own set of registers. Those registers
are XSAVE-managed, but they are "supervisor state components" which means
that userspace can't touch them with XSAVE/XRSTOR. It also means that
they are not accessible from the existing ptrace ABI like the FPU register
or GPRs. Thus, there is a new ptrace get/set interface for it.
The regset code that ptrace uses provides an ->active() handler in
addition to the get/set ones. For shadow stack this ->active() handler
verifies that shadow stack is enabled via the ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK bit in the
thread struct. The ->active() handler is checked from some callsites of
the regset get/set handlers, but not the ptrace ones. This was not
understood when shadow stack support was put in place.
As a result, both the set/get handlers can be called with
XFEATURE_CET_USER in its init state, which would cause get_xsave_addr() to
return NULL and trigger a WARN_ON(). The ssp_set() handler luckily has an
ssp_active() check to avoid surprising the kernel with shadow stack
behavior when the kernel is not read for it (ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK==0). That
check just happened to avoid the warning.
But the ->get() side wasn't so lucky. It can be called with shadow stacks
disabled, triggering the warning in practice, as reported by Christina
Schimpe:
WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 1773 at arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c:198 ssp_get+0x89/0xa0
[...]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? show_regs+0x6e/0x80
? ssp_get+0x89/0xa0
? __warn+0x91/0x150
? ssp_get+0x89/0xa0
? report_bug+0x19d/0x1b0
? handle_bug+0x46/0x80
? exc_invalid_op+0x1d/0x80
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1f/0x30
? __pfx_ssp_get+0x10/0x10
? ssp_get+0x89/0xa0
? ssp_get+0x52/0xa0
__regset_get+0xad/0xf0
copy_regset_to_user+0x52/0xc0
ptrace_regset+0x119/0x140
ptrace_request+0x13c/0x850
? wait_task_inactive+0x142/0x1d0
? do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x90
arch_ptrace+0x102/0x300
[...]
Ensure that shadow stacks are active in a thread before looking them up
in the XSAVE buffer. Since ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK and user_ssp[SHSTK_EN] are
set at the same time, the active check ensures that there will be
something to find in the XSAVE buffer.
Fixes: 2fab02b25ae7 ("x86: Add PTRACE interface for shadow stack")
Reported-by: Christina Schimpe <christina.schimpe@...el.com>
Tested-by: Christina Schimpe <christina.schimpe@...el.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>
Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
---
v2:
- Incorporate log feedback from Dave here:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/81d3af8f-bad8-4559-8a0f-3271dd7f0abc@intel.com/
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c
index 6bc1eb2a21bd..887b0b8e21e3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c
@@ -190,7 +190,8 @@ int ssp_get(struct task_struct *target, const struct user_regset *regset,
struct fpu *fpu = &target->thread.fpu;
struct cet_user_state *cetregs;
- if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK))
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK) ||
+ !ssp_active(target, regset))
return -ENODEV;
sync_fpstate(fpu);
--
2.47.1
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