Message-Id: <20250112072925.1774-1-tanyaagarwal25699@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 12 Jan 2025 12:59:27 +0530
From: Tanya Agarwal <tanyaagarwal25699@...il.com>
To: casey@...aufler-ca.com,
	takedakn@...data.co.jp,
	penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp
Cc: john.johansen@...onical.com,
	paul@...l-moore.com,
	jmorris@...ei.org,
	serge@...lyn.com,
	zohar@...ux.ibm.com,
	roberto.sassu@...wei.com,
	dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com,
	eric.snowberg@...cle.com,
	mic@...ikod.net,
	gnoack@...gle.com,
	stephen.smalley.work@...il.com,
	omosnace@...hat.com,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	apparmor@...ts.ubuntu.com,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
	skhan@...uxfoundation.org,
	anupnewsmail@...il.com,
	Tanya Agarwal <tanyaagarwal25699@...il.com>
Subject: [PATCH V2] security: fix typos and spelling errors

From: Tanya Agarwal <tanyaagarwal25699@...il.com>

Fix typos and spelling errors in security module comments that were
identified using the codespell tool.
No functional changes - documentation only.

Signed-off-by: Tanya Agarwal <tanyaagarwal25699@...il.com>
---
Thanks Günther, for catching this error.
The irony of having a spelling mistake in a patch that fixes spelling
mistakes is not lost on me :) 

I've fixed it in V2 of the patch. Thank you for the careful review!

V2: fix spelling mistake - s/beeen/been/ 

 security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c      | 6 +++---
 security/apparmor/domain.c          | 4 ++--
 security/apparmor/label.c           | 2 +-
 security/apparmor/lsm.c             | 2 +-
 security/apparmor/policy.c          | 4 ++--
 security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 2 +-
 security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c   | 2 +-
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c   | 6 +++---
 security/landlock/ruleset.c         | 2 +-
 security/selinux/avc.c              | 2 +-
 security/smack/smack.h              | 2 +-
 security/smack/smack_access.c       | 4 ++--
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c          | 6 +++---
 security/smack/smackfs.c            | 2 +-
 security/tomoyo/domain.c            | 2 +-
 15 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index 2c0185ebc900..0c2f248d31bf 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
  * The interface is split into two main components based on their function
  * a securityfs component:
  *   used for static files that are always available, and which allows
- *   userspace to specificy the location of the security filesystem.
+ *   userspace to specify the location of the security filesystem.
  *
  *   fns and data are prefixed with
  *      aa_sfs_
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ static struct file_system_type aafs_ops = {
 /**
  * __aafs_setup_d_inode - basic inode setup for apparmorfs
  * @dir: parent directory for the dentry
- * @dentry: dentry we are seting the inode up for
+ * @dentry: dentry we are setting the inode up for
  * @mode: permissions the file should have
  * @data: data to store on inode.i_private, available in open()
  * @link: if symlink, symlink target string
@@ -2244,7 +2244,7 @@ static void *p_next(struct seq_file *f, void *p, loff_t *pos)
 /**
  * p_stop - stop depth first traversal
  * @f: seq_file we are filling
- * @p: the last profile writen
+ * @p: the last profile written
  *
  * Release all locking done by p_start/p_next on namespace tree
  */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index 5939bd9a9b9b..d959931eac28 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -755,7 +755,7 @@ static int profile_onexec(const struct cred *subj_cred,
 		/* change_profile on exec already granted */
 		/*
 		 * NOTE: Domain transitions from unconfined are allowed
-		 * even when no_new_privs is set because this aways results
+		 * even when no_new_privs is set because this always results
 		 * in a further reduction of permissions.
 		 */
 		return 0;
@@ -926,7 +926,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	 *
 	 * NOTE: Domain transitions from unconfined and to stacked
 	 * subsets are allowed even when no_new_privs is set because this
-	 * aways results in a further reduction of permissions.
+	 * always results in a further reduction of permissions.
 	 */
 	if ((bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS) &&
 	    !unconfined(label) &&
diff --git a/security/apparmor/label.c b/security/apparmor/label.c
index 91483ecacc16..8bcff51becb8 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/label.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/label.c
@@ -1456,7 +1456,7 @@ bool aa_update_label_name(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label, gfp_t gfp)
 
 /*
  * cached label name is present and visible
- * @label->hname only exists if label is namespace hierachical
+ * @label->hname only exists if label is namespace hierarchical
  */
 static inline bool use_label_hname(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label,
 				   int flags)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 1edc12862a7d..04bf5d2f6e00 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -2006,7 +2006,7 @@ static int __init alloc_buffers(void)
 	 * two should be enough, with more CPUs it is possible that more
 	 * buffers will be used simultaneously. The preallocated pool may grow.
 	 * This preallocation has also the side-effect that AppArmor will be
-	 * disabled early at boot if aa_g_path_max is extremly high.
+	 * disabled early at boot if aa_g_path_max is extremely high.
 	 */
 	if (num_online_cpus() > 1)
 		num = 4 + RESERVE_COUNT;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
index d0244fab0653..5cec3efc4794 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ static struct aa_policy *__lookup_parent(struct aa_ns *ns,
 }
 
 /**
- * __create_missing_ancestors - create place holders for missing ancestores
+ * __create_missing_ancestors - create place holders for missing ancestors
  * @ns: namespace to lookup profile in (NOT NULL)
  * @hname: hierarchical profile name to find parent of (NOT NULL)
  * @gfp: type of allocation.
@@ -1068,7 +1068,7 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_ns *policy_ns, struct aa_label *label,
 		goto out;
 
 	/* ensure that profiles are all for the same ns
-	 * TODO: update locking to remove this constaint. All profiles in
+	 * TODO: update locking to remove this constraint. All profiles in
 	 *       the load set must succeed as a set or the load will
 	 *       fail. Sort ent list and take ns locks in hierarchy order
 	 */
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
index 7c06ffd633d2..a5e730ffda57 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode,
 }
 
 /*
- * Dump large security xattr values as a continuous ascii hexademical string.
+ * Dump large security xattr values as a continuous ascii hexadecimal string.
  * (pr_debug is limited to 64 bytes.)
  */
 static void dump_security_xattr_l(const char *prefix, const void *src,
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index 377e57e9084f..0add782e73ba 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ static int is_unsupported_hmac_fs(struct dentry *dentry)
  * and compare it against the stored security.evm xattr.
  *
  * For performance:
- * - use the previoulsy retrieved xattr value and length to calculate the
+ * - use the previously retrieved xattr value and length to calculate the
  *   HMAC.)
  * - cache the verification result in the iint, when available.
  *
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 9b87556b03a7..cdb8c7419d7e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -983,9 +983,9 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 	}
 
 	/*
-	 * Both LSM hooks and auxilary based buffer measurements are
-	 * based on policy.  To avoid code duplication, differentiate
-	 * between the LSM hooks and auxilary buffer measurements,
+	 * Both LSM hooks and auxiliary based buffer measurements are
+	 * based on policy. To avoid code duplication, differentiate
+	 * between the LSM hooks and auxiliary buffer measurements,
 	 * retrieving the policy rule information only for the LSM hook
 	 * buffer measurements.
 	 */
diff --git a/security/landlock/ruleset.c b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
index a93bdbf52fff..c464d1f84792 100644
--- a/security/landlock/ruleset.c
+++ b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ create_rule(const struct landlock_id id,
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 	RB_CLEAR_NODE(&new_rule->node);
 	if (is_object_pointer(id.type)) {
-		/* This should be catched by insert_rule(). */
+		/* This should have been caught by insert_rule(). */
 		WARN_ON_ONCE(!id.key.object);
 		landlock_get_object(id.key.object);
 	}
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index 1f2680bcc43a..4b4837a20225 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -936,7 +936,7 @@ static void avc_flush(void)
 
 		spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag);
 		/*
-		 * With preemptable RCU, the outer spinlock does not
+		 * With preemptible RCU, the outer spinlock does not
 		 * prevent RCU grace periods from ending.
 		 */
 		rcu_read_lock();
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index dbf8d7226eb5..ca38e145f364 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
 
 /*
  * This is the repository for labels seen so that it is
- * not necessary to keep allocating tiny chuncks of memory
+ * not necessary to keep allocating tiny chunks of memory
  * and so that they can be shared.
  *
  * Labels are never modified in place. Anytime a label
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index 585e5e35710b..5c17aee5dd78 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ int smk_tskacc(struct task_smack *tsp, struct smack_known *obj_known,
 	}
 
 	/*
-	 * Allow for priviliged to override policy.
+	 * Allow for privileged to override policy.
 	 */
 	if (rc != 0 && smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
 		rc = 0;
@@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ int smk_curacc(struct smack_known *obj_known,
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
 /**
- * smack_str_from_perm : helper to transalate an int to a
+ * smack_str_from_perm : helper to translate an int to a
  * readable string
  * @string : the string to fill
  * @access : the int
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 0c476282e279..85ec288eefe7 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1950,7 +1950,7 @@ static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
 	 */
 	file = fown->file;
 
-	/* we don't log here as rc can be overriden */
+	/* we don't log here as rc can be overridden */
 	blob = smack_file(file);
 	skp = *blob;
 	rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, NULL);
@@ -4211,7 +4211,7 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		/*
 		 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end
 		 * be able to write here. Read access is not required.
-		 * This is the simplist possible security model
+		 * This is the simplest possible security model
 		 * for networking.
 		 */
 		rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
@@ -4717,7 +4717,7 @@ static int smack_post_notification(const struct cred *w_cred,
  * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
  *
  * Prepare to audit cases where (@field @op @rulestr) is true.
- * The label to be audited is created if necessay.
+ * The label to be audited is created if necessary.
  */
 static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule,
 				 gfp_t gfp)
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index 1401412fd794..432e2d094e35 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ static int smk_cipso_doi_value = SMACK_CIPSO_DOI_DEFAULT;
 #define SMK_LOADLEN	(SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_ACCESSLEN)
 
 /*
- * Stricly for CIPSO level manipulation.
+ * Strictly for CIPSO level manipulation.
  * Set the category bit number in a smack label sized buffer.
  */
 static inline void smack_catset_bit(unsigned int cat, char *catsetp)
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/domain.c b/security/tomoyo/domain.c
index aed9e3ef2c9e..9a1928be707d 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/domain.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/domain.c
@@ -913,7 +913,7 @@ bool tomoyo_dump_page(struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned long pos,
 #ifdef CONFIG_MMU
 	/*
 	 * This is called at execve() time in order to dig around
-	 * in the argv/environment of the new proceess
+	 * in the argv/environment of the new process
 	 * (represented by bprm).
 	 */
 	mmap_read_lock(bprm->mm);
-- 
2.39.5

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