linux-kernel - Re: [PATCHv3 2/2] x86/mm: Make memremap(MEMREMAP

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Message-ID: <ff8daeb1-4839-b070-dd94-a7692ac94008@amd.com>
Date: Tue, 14 Jan 2025 10:54:53 -0600
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>
To: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
 Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
 x86@...nel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
 Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Albert Ou <aou@...s.berkeley.edu>,
 Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>, Andrea Parri <parri.andrea@...il.com>,
 Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
 Eric Chan <ericchancf@...gle.com>, Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...pe.ca>,
 Kai Huang <kai.huang@...el.com>, Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@...wei.com>,
 Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@...ux.dev>,
 Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@...osinc.com>,
 Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@...ive.com>,
 Russell King <linux@...linux.org.uk>,
 Samuel Holland <samuel.holland@...ive.com>,
 Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@...gle.com>, Yuntao Wang <ytcoode@...il.com>,
 linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
 linux-riscv@...ts.infradead.org, stable@...r.kernel.org,
 Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@....com>, "Maciej W. Rozycki" <macro@...am.me.uk>
Subject: Re: [PATCHv3 2/2] x86/mm: Make memremap(MEMREMAP_WB) map memory as
 encrypted by default

On 1/14/25 09:06, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> On 1/14/25 08:44, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
>> On Tue, Jan 14, 2025 at 08:33:39AM -0600, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>>> On 1/14/25 01:27, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
>>>> On Mon, Jan 13, 2025 at 02:47:56PM -0600, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>>>>> On 1/13/25 07:14, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
>>>>>> Currently memremap(MEMREMAP_WB) can produce decrypted/shared mapping:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> memremap(MEMREMAP_WB)
>>>>>>   arch_memremap_wb()
>>>>>>     ioremap_cache()
>>>>>>       __ioremap_caller(.encrytped = false)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In such cases, the IORES_MAP_ENCRYPTED flag on the memory will determine
>>>>>> if the resulting mapping is encrypted or decrypted.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Creating a decrypted mapping without explicit request from the caller is
>>>>>> risky:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>   - It can inadvertently expose the guest's data and compromise the
>>>>>>     guest.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>   - Accessing private memory via shared/decrypted mapping on TDX will
>>>>>>     either trigger implicit conversion to shared or #VE (depending on
>>>>>>     VMM implementation).
>>>>>>
>>>>>>     Implicit conversion is destructive: subsequent access to the same
>>>>>>     memory via private mapping will trigger a hard-to-debug #VE crash.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The kernel already provides a way to request decrypted mapping
>>>>>> explicitly via the MEMREMAP_DEC flag.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Modify memremap(MEMREMAP_WB) to produce encrypted/private mapping by
>>>>>> default unless MEMREMAP_DEC is specified.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Fix the crash due to #VE on kexec in TDX guests if CONFIG_EISA is enabled.
>>>>>
>>>>> This patch causes my bare-metal system to crash during boot when using
>>>>> mem_encrypt=on:
>>>>>
>>>>> [    2.392934] efi: memattr: Entry type should be RuntimeServiceCode/Data
>>>>> [    2.393731] efi: memattr: ! 0x214c42f01f1162a-0xee70ac7bd1a9c629 [type=2028324321|attr=0x6590648fa4209879]
>>>>
>>>> Could you try if this helps?
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/memattr.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/memattr.c
>>>> index c38b1a335590..b5051dcb7c1d 100644
>>>> --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/memattr.c
>>>> +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/memattr.c
>>>> @@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ int __init efi_memattr_apply_permissions(struct mm_struct *mm,
>>>>  	if (WARN_ON(!efi_enabled(EFI_MEMMAP)))
>>>>  		return 0;
>>>>  
>>>> -	tbl = memremap(efi_mem_attr_table, tbl_size, MEMREMAP_WB);
>>>> +	tbl = memremap(efi_mem_attr_table, tbl_size, MEMREMAP_WB | MEMREMAP_DEC);
>>>
>>> Well that would work for SME where EFI tables/data are not encrypted,
>>> but will break for SEV where EFI tables/data are encrypted.
>>
>> Hm. Why would it break for SEV? It brings the situation back to what it
>> was before the patch.
> 
> Ah, true. I can try it and see how much further SME gets. Hopefully it
> doesn't turn into a whack-a-mole thing.

Unfortunately, it is turning into a whack-a-mole thing.

But it looks the following works for SME:

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
index 3c36f3f5e688..ff3cd5fc8508 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
@@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(iounmap);
 
 void *arch_memremap_wb(phys_addr_t phys_addr, size_t size, unsigned long flags)
 {
-	if (flags & MEMREMAP_DEC)
+	if (flags & MEMREMAP_DEC || cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
 		return (void __force *)ioremap_cache(phys_addr, size);
 
 	return (void __force *)ioremap_encrypted(phys_addr, size);


I haven't had a chance to test the series on SEV, yet.

Thanks,
Tom

> 
> Thanks,
> Tom
> 
>>
>> Note that that __ioremap_caller() would still check io_desc.flags before
>> mapping it as decrypted.
>>