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Message-ID: <3545a38326a5d3dff28b1089ab2149f1662a641b.camel@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 14 Jan 2025 09:20:39 -0500
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
To: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...weicloud.com>, viro@...iv.linux.org.uk,
brauner@...nel.org, jack@...e.cz, dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com,
eric.snowberg@...cle.com, paul@...l-moore.com, jmorris@...ei.org,
serge@...lyn.com
Cc: linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 3/7] ima: Ensure lock is held when setting iint
pointer in inode security blob
On Thu, 2024-11-28 at 11:06 +0100, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
>
> IMA stores a pointer of the ima_iint_cache structure, containing integrity
> metadata, in the inode security blob. However, check and assignment of this
> pointer is not atomic, and it might happen that two tasks both see that the
> iint pointer is NULL and try to set it, causing a memory leak.
>
> Ensure that the iint check and assignment is guarded, by adding a lockdep
> assertion in ima_inode_get().
-> is guarded by the ima_iint_cache_lock mutex, ...
>
> Consequently, guard the remaining ima_inode_get() calls, in
> ima_post_create_tmpfile() and ima_post_path_mknod(), to avoid the lockdep
> warnings.
>
> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>
> ---
> security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c | 2 ++
> security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
> 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
> index dcc32483d29f..fca9db293c79 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_iint.c
> @@ -97,6 +97,8 @@ struct ima_iint_cache *ima_inode_get(struct inode *inode)
> if (!iint_lock)
> return NULL;
>
> + lockdep_assert_held(&iint_lock->mutex);
> +
lockdep_assert_held() doesn't actually "ensure" the lock is held, but emits a warning
when the lock is not held (if debugging is enabled). Semantically "ensure" gives the
impression of enforcing.
Mimi
> iint = iint_lock->iint;
> if (iint)
> return iint;
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> index 05cfb04cd02b..1e474ff6a777 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> @@ -705,14 +705,19 @@ static void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> if (!must_appraise)
> return;
>
> + ima_iint_lock(inode);
> +
> /* Nothing to do if we can't allocate memory */
> iint = ima_inode_get(inode);
> - if (!iint)
> + if (!iint) {
> + ima_iint_unlock(inode);
> return;
> + }
>
> /* needed for writing the security xattrs */
> set_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags);
> iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
> + ima_iint_unlock(inode);
> }
>
> /**
> @@ -737,13 +742,18 @@ static void ima_post_path_mknod(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
> struct dentry *dentry)
> if (!must_appraise)
> return;
>
> + ima_iint_lock(inode);
> +
> /* Nothing to do if we can't allocate memory */
> iint = ima_inode_get(inode);
> - if (!iint)
> + if (!iint) {
> + ima_iint_unlock(inode);
> return;
> + }
>
> /* needed for re-opening empty files */
> iint->flags |= IMA_NEW_FILE;
> + ima_iint_unlock(inode);
> }
>
> /**
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