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Message-ID: <3655551d-b881-4f2b-8419-03efe4d3aca7@suse.com>
Date: Tue, 14 Jan 2025 22:51:10 +0800
From: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@...e.com>
To: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>, Liebes Wang <wanghaichi0403@...il.com>,
jack@...e.com, linux-ext4@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
syzkaller@...glegroups.com, Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@...ux.alibaba.com>,
ocfs2-devel@...ts.linux.dev
Subject: Re: WARNING in jbd2_journal_update_sb_log_tail
Hi Ted,
On 1/14/25 21:38, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 14, 2025 at 02:25:21PM +0800, Heming Zhao wrote:
>>
>> The root cause appears to be that the jbd2 bypass recovery logic
>> is incorrect.
>
> Heming, thanks for taking a look.
>
> I'm not convinced the root cause is what you've stated. When
> jbd2_journal_wipe() calls jbd2_mark_journal_empty(), s_start gets set
> to zero:
Actually, ocfs2 calls jbd2_journal_wipe() with 'write=0' (hard coded),
so jbd2_mark_journal_empty() isn't called during the ocfs2 mount
phase. This means the following deduction won't apply in this case.
-- Heming
>
> sb->s_start = cpu_to_be32(0);
>
> This then gets checked in jbd2_journal_recovery:
>
> if (!sb->s_start) {
> jbd2_debug(1, "No recovery required, last transaction %d, head block %u\n",
> be32_to_cpu(sb->s_sequence), be32_to_cpu(sb->s_head));
> journal->j_transaction_sequence = be32_to_cpu(sb->s_sequence) + 1;
> journal->j_head = be32_to_cpu(sb->s_head);
> return 0;
> }
>
> I suspect that there is something else wrong with jbd2's superblock,
> since this normally works in the absence of malicious fs image
> fuzzing, such that when jbd2_journal_load() calls reset_journal()
> after jbd2_journal_recover() correctly bypasses recovery, the WARN_ON
> gets triggered.
>
> I'd suggest that you enable jbd2 debugging so we can see all of the
> jbd2_debug() message to understand what might be going on.
>
> By the way, given that this is only a WARN_ON, and it involves
> malicious image fuzzing, this is probably a valid jbd2 bug, but it's
> not actually a security bug. Sure, someone silly enough to pick up a
> maliciously corrupted USB thumb drive dropped in a parking lot and
> insert it into their desktop, and the distribution is silly enoough to
> allow automount, the worse that can happen is that the system to
> reboot if the system is configured to panic on a WARNING. So feel
> free to prioritize your investigation appropriately. :-)
>
> Cheers,
>
> - Ted
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