linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 12/16] KVM: TDX: Inhibit APICv for TDX guest

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <Z4mGNUPy53WfVEZU@google.com>
Date: Thu, 16 Jan 2025 14:37:11 -0800
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
To: Kai Huang <kai.huang@...el.com>
Cc: Chao Gao <chao.gao@...el.com>, Rick P Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>, 
	"linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, 
	"binbin.wu@...ux.intel.com" <binbin.wu@...ux.intel.com>, Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@...el.com>, 
	Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@...el.com>, Yan Y Zhao <yan.y.zhao@...el.com>, 
	Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@...el.com>, "kvm@...r.kernel.org" <kvm@...r.kernel.org>, 
	"pbonzini@...hat.com" <pbonzini@...hat.com>, 
	"tony.lindgren@...ux.intel.com" <tony.lindgren@...ux.intel.com>, Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@...el.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 12/16] KVM: TDX: Inhibit APICv for TDX guest

On Thu, Jan 16, 2025, Kai Huang wrote:
> On Thu, 2025-01-16 at 06:50 -0800, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > On Thu, Jan 16, 2025, Kai Huang wrote:

...

> > > Looking at the code, it seems KVM only traps EOI for level-triggered interrupt
> > > for in-kernel IOAPIC chip, but IIUC IOAPIC in userspace also needs to be told
> > > upon EOI for level-triggered interrupt.  I don't know how does KVM works with
> > > userspace IOAPIC w/o trapping EOI for level-triggered interrupt, but "force
> > > irqchip split for TDX guest" seems not right.
> > 
> > Forcing a "split" IRQ chip is correct, in the sense that TDX doesn't support an
> > I/O APIC and the "split" model is the way to concoct such a setup.  With a "full"
> > IRQ chip, KVM is responsible for emulating the I/O APIC, which is more or less
> > nonsensical on TDX because it's fully virtual world, i.e. there's no reason to
> > emulate legacy devices that only know how to talk to the I/O APIC (or PIC, etc.).
> > Disallowing an in-kernel I/O APIC is ideal from KVM's perspective, because
> > level-triggered interrupts and thus the I/O APIC as a whole can't be faithfully
> > emulated (see below).
> 
> Disabling in-kernel IOAPIC/PIC for TDX guests is fine to me, but I think that,
> "conceptually", having IOAPIC/PIC in userspace doesn't mean disabling IOAPIC,
> because theoretically usrespace IOAPIC still needs to be told about the EOI for
> emulation.  I just haven't figured out how does userpsace IOAPIC work with KVM
> in case of "split IRQCHIP" w/o trapping EOI for level-triggered interrupt. :-)

Userspace I/O APIC _does_ intercept EOI.  KVM scans the GSI routes provided by
userspace and intercepts those that are configured to be delivered as level-
triggered interrupts.  Whereas with an in-kernel I/O APIC, KVM scans the GSI
routes *and* the I/O APIC Redirection Table (for interrupts that are routed
through the I/O APIC).

> If the point is to disable in-kernel IOAPIC/PIC for TDX guests, then I think
> both KVM_IRQCHIP_NONE and KVM_IRQCHIP_SPLIT should be allowed for TDX, but not
> just KVM_IRQCHIP_SPLIT?

No, because APICv is mandatory for TDX, which rules out KVM_IRQCHIP_NONE.

> 
> > 
> > > I think the problem is level-triggered interrupt,
> > 
> > Yes, because the TDX Module doesn't allow the hypervisor to modify the EOI-bitmap,
> > i.e. all EOIs are accelerated and never trigger exits.
> > 
> > > so I think another option is to reject level-triggered interrupt for TDX guest.
> > 
> > This is a "don't do that, it will hurt" situation.  With a sane VMM, the level-ness
> > of GSIs is controlled by the guest.  For GSIs that are routed through the I/O APIC,
> > the level-ness is determined by the corresponding Redirection Table entry.  For
> > "GSIs" that are actually MSIs (KVM piggybacks legacy GSI routing to let userspace
> > wire up MSIs), and for direct MSIs injection (KVM_SIGNAL_MSI), the level-ness is
> > dictated by the MSI itself, which again is guest controlled.
> > 
> > If the guest induces generation of a level-triggered interrupt, the VMM is left
> > with the choice of dropping the interrupt, sending it as-is, or converting it to
> > an edge-triggered interrupt.  Ditto for KVM.  All of those options will make the
> > guest unhappy.
> > 
> > So while it _might_ make debugging broken guests either, I don't think it's worth
> > the complexity to try and prevent the VMM/guest from sending level-triggered
> > GSI-routed interrupts.  
> > 
> 
> KVM can at least have some chance to print some error message?

No.  A guest can shoot itself any number of ways, and userspace has every
opportunity to log weirdness in this case.