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Message-ID: <20250117130337.4716-1-mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2025 13:03:34 +0000
From: Mel Gorman <mgorman@...hsingularity.net>
To: Kees Cook <kees@...nel.org>
Cc: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>,
linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Mel Gorman <mgorman@...hsingularity.net>
Subject: [PATCH 0/3] Allow default HARDENED_USERCOPY to be set at compile time
Some hardening options like HARDENED_USERCOPY can be set at boot time
and have negligible cost when disabled. The default for options like
init_on_alloc= can be set at compile time but hardened usercopy is
enabled by default if built in. This incurs overhead when a kernel
wishes to provide optional hardening but the user does not necessarily
care.
Hardening is desirable in some environments but ideally they would be opt-in
by kernel command line as hardening is typically a deliberate decision
whereas the performance overhead is not always obvious to all users.
Patches 1 and 2 move HARDENED_USERCOPY to the Kconfig.hardening and
default it to disabled. Patch 3 moves FORTIFY_SOURCE to hardening only
because the option is related to hardening and happened to be declared
near HARDENED_USERCOPY.
Building HARDENED_USERCOPY but disabled at runtime has neligible effect
within the noise. Enabling the option by default generally incurs 2-10%
of overhead depending on the workload with some extreme outliers depending
on the exact CPU. While the benchmarks are somewhat synthetic, the overhead
IO-intensive and network-intensive is easily detectable but the root cause
may not be obvious (e.g. 2-14% overhead for netperf TCP_STREAM running
over localhost with different ranges depending on the CPU).
.../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 4 ++-
mm/usercopy.c | 3 +-
security/Kconfig | 21 ------------
security/Kconfig.hardening | 33 +++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
--
2.43.0
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