linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH] apparmor: fix typos and spelling errors

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Message-ID: <CAKCV-6swo49thNAsmBWPwM-foK=L2CFphLJxePC+WE5Ou1oBbg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 23 Jan 2025 11:43:09 -0800
From: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee@...onical.com>
To: Tanya Agarwal <tanyaagarwal25699@...il.com>
Cc: john.johansen@...onical.com, paul@...l-moore.com, jmorris@...ei.org, 
	serge@...lyn.com, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, 
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, skhan@...uxfoundation.org, 
	anupnewsmail@...il.com, Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>, 
	apparmor <apparmor@...ts.ubuntu.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] apparmor: fix typos and spelling errors

Reviewed-by: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee@...onical.com>

On Thu, Jan 23, 2025 at 11:30 AM Tanya Agarwal
<tanyaagarwal25699@...il.com> wrote:
>
> From: Tanya Agarwal <tanyaagarwal25699@...il.com>
>
> Fix typos and spelling errors in apparmor module comments that were
> identified using the codespell tool.
> No functional changes - documentation only.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tanya Agarwal <tanyaagarwal25699@...il.com>
> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>
> ---
> This patch set is split into individual patches for each LSM
> to facilitate easier review by respective maintainers.
>
> Original discussion:
> https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250112072925.1774-1-tanyaagarwal25699@gmail.com
>
>  security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c | 6 +++---
>  security/apparmor/domain.c     | 4 ++--
>  security/apparmor/label.c      | 2 +-
>  security/apparmor/lsm.c        | 2 +-
>  security/apparmor/policy.c     | 4 ++--
>  5 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
> index 2c0185ebc900..0c2f248d31bf 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
> @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
>   * The interface is split into two main components based on their function
>   * a securityfs component:
>   *   used for static files that are always available, and which allows
> - *   userspace to specificy the location of the security filesystem.
> + *   userspace to specify the location of the security filesystem.
>   *
>   *   fns and data are prefixed with
>   *      aa_sfs_
> @@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ static struct file_system_type aafs_ops = {
>  /**
>   * __aafs_setup_d_inode - basic inode setup for apparmorfs
>   * @dir: parent directory for the dentry
> - * @dentry: dentry we are seting the inode up for
> + * @dentry: dentry we are setting the inode up for
>   * @mode: permissions the file should have
>   * @data: data to store on inode.i_private, available in open()
>   * @link: if symlink, symlink target string
> @@ -2244,7 +2244,7 @@ static void *p_next(struct seq_file *f, void *p, loff_t *pos)
>  /**
>   * p_stop - stop depth first traversal
>   * @f: seq_file we are filling
> - * @p: the last profile writen
> + * @p: the last profile written
>   *
>   * Release all locking done by p_start/p_next on namespace tree
>   */
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
> index 5939bd9a9b9b..d959931eac28 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
> @@ -755,7 +755,7 @@ static int profile_onexec(const struct cred *subj_cred,
>                 /* change_profile on exec already granted */
>                 /*
>                  * NOTE: Domain transitions from unconfined are allowed
> -                * even when no_new_privs is set because this aways results
> +                * even when no_new_privs is set because this always results
>                  * in a further reduction of permissions.
>                  */
>                 return 0;
> @@ -926,7 +926,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>          *
>          * NOTE: Domain transitions from unconfined and to stacked
>          * subsets are allowed even when no_new_privs is set because this
> -        * aways results in a further reduction of permissions.
> +        * always results in a further reduction of permissions.
>          */
>         if ((bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS) &&
>             !unconfined(label) &&
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/label.c b/security/apparmor/label.c
> index 91483ecacc16..8bcff51becb8 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/label.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/label.c
> @@ -1456,7 +1456,7 @@ bool aa_update_label_name(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label, gfp_t gfp)
>
>  /*
>   * cached label name is present and visible
> - * @label->hname only exists if label is namespace hierachical
> + * @label->hname only exists if label is namespace hierarchical
>   */
>  static inline bool use_label_hname(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label,
>                                    int flags)
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> index 1edc12862a7d..04bf5d2f6e00 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> @@ -2006,7 +2006,7 @@ static int __init alloc_buffers(void)
>          * two should be enough, with more CPUs it is possible that more
>          * buffers will be used simultaneously. The preallocated pool may grow.
>          * This preallocation has also the side-effect that AppArmor will be
> -        * disabled early at boot if aa_g_path_max is extremly high.
> +        * disabled early at boot if aa_g_path_max is extremely high.
>          */
>         if (num_online_cpus() > 1)
>                 num = 4 + RESERVE_COUNT;
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
> index d0244fab0653..5cec3efc4794 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
> @@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ static struct aa_policy *__lookup_parent(struct aa_ns *ns,
>  }
>
>  /**
> - * __create_missing_ancestors - create place holders for missing ancestores
> + * __create_missing_ancestors - create place holders for missing ancestors
>   * @ns: namespace to lookup profile in (NOT NULL)
>   * @hname: hierarchical profile name to find parent of (NOT NULL)
>   * @gfp: type of allocation.
> @@ -1068,7 +1068,7 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_ns *policy_ns, struct aa_label *label,
>                 goto out;
>
>         /* ensure that profiles are all for the same ns
> -        * TODO: update locking to remove this constaint. All profiles in
> +        * TODO: update locking to remove this constraint. All profiles in
>          *       the load set must succeed as a set or the load will
>          *       fail. Sort ent list and take ns locks in hierarchy order
>          */
> --
> 2.39.5
>
>