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Message-ID: <bd6c2bee-b9bb-4eba-9216-135df204a10e@schaufler-ca.com>
Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2025 09:18:31 -0800
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
To: Hamza Mahfooz <hamzamahfooz@...ux.microsoft.com>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>, Jens Axboe <axboe@...nel.dk>,
Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@...il.com>,
Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@...il.com>,
Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@...hat.com>, Bram Bonné
<brambonne@...gle.com>, Thiébaud Weksteen
<tweek@...gle.com>, Christian Göttsche
<cgzones@...glemail.com>, Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@...nel.org>,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, io-uring@...r.kernel.org,
selinux@...r.kernel.org, Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks for io_uring_setup()
On 1/27/2025 7:57 AM, Hamza Mahfooz wrote:
> It is desirable to allow LSM to configure accessibility to io_uring
> because it is a coarse yet very simple way to restrict access to it. So,
> add an LSM for io_uring_allowed() to guard access to io_uring.
I don't like this at all at all. It looks like you're putting in a hook
so that io_uring can easily deflect any responsibility for safely
interacting with LSMs.
>
> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
> Signed-off-by: Hamza Mahfooz <hamzamahfooz@...ux.microsoft.com>
> ---
> include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 +
> include/linux/security.h | 5 +++++
> io_uring/io_uring.c | 2 +-
> security/security.c | 12 ++++++++++++
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
> security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 +-
> 6 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> index e2f1ce37c41e..9eb313bd0c93 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> @@ -455,6 +455,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, perf_event_write, struct perf_event *event)
> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_override_creds, const struct cred *new)
> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_sqpoll, void)
> LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_cmd, struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
> +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, uring_allowed, void)
> #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
>
> LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, initramfs_populated, void)
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 980b6c207cad..3e68f8468a22 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -2362,6 +2362,7 @@ static inline int security_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
> extern int security_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new);
> extern int security_uring_sqpoll(void);
> extern int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd);
> +extern int security_uring_allowed(void);
> #else
> static inline int security_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new)
> {
> @@ -2375,6 +2376,10 @@ static inline int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
> {
> return 0;
> }
> +extern int security_uring_allowed(void)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
> #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
>
> diff --git a/io_uring/io_uring.c b/io_uring/io_uring.c
> index c2d8bd4c2cfc..9df7b3b556ef 100644
> --- a/io_uring/io_uring.c
> +++ b/io_uring/io_uring.c
> @@ -3808,7 +3808,7 @@ static inline int io_uring_allowed(void)
> return -EPERM;
>
> allowed_lsm:
> - return 0;
> + return security_uring_allowed();
> }
>
> SYSCALL_DEFINE2(io_uring_setup, u32, entries,
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 143561ebc3e8..c9fae447327e 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -5999,6 +5999,18 @@ int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
> {
> return call_int_hook(uring_cmd, ioucmd);
> }
> +
> +/**
> + * security_uring_allowed() - Check if io_uring_setup() is allowed
> + *
> + * Check whether the current task is allowed to call io_uring_setup().
> + *
> + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
> + */
> +int security_uring_allowed(void)
> +{
> + return call_int_hook(uring_allowed);
> +}
> #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
>
> /**
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 7b867dfec88b..fb37e87df226 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -7137,6 +7137,19 @@ static int selinux_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
> return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), isec->sid,
> SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__CMD, &ad);
> }
> +
> +/**
> + * selinux_uring_allowed - check if io_uring_setup() can be called
> + *
> + * Check to see if the current task is allowed to call io_uring_setup().
> + */
> +static int selinux_uring_allowed(void)
> +{
> + u32 sid = current_sid();
> +
> + return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__ALLOWED,
> + NULL);
> +}
> #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
>
> static const struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid = {
> @@ -7390,6 +7403,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_override_creds, selinux_uring_override_creds),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_sqpoll, selinux_uring_sqpoll),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_cmd, selinux_uring_cmd),
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_allowed, selinux_uring_allowed),
> #endif
>
> /*
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> index 03e82477dce9..8a8f3908aac8 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> @@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ const struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
> { "perf_event",
> { "open", "cpu", "kernel", "tracepoint", "read", "write", NULL } },
> { "anon_inode", { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } },
> - { "io_uring", { "override_creds", "sqpoll", "cmd", NULL } },
> + { "io_uring", { "override_creds", "sqpoll", "cmd", "allowed", NULL } },
> { "user_namespace", { "create", NULL } },
> /* last one */ { NULL, {} }
> };
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