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Message-ID: <CA+fCnZf20PmUL5Ms7aoGq0CAdaXzcx0yrgSrmvgy89og_PwYMg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 6 Feb 2025 00:45:01 +0100
From: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...il.com>
To: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman@...el.com>
Cc: luto@...nel.org, xin@...or.com, kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH 02/15] kasan: Tag checking with dense tag-based mode
On Tue, Feb 4, 2025 at 6:35 PM Maciej Wieczor-Retman
<maciej.wieczor-retman@...el.com> wrote:
>
> In KASAN's tag-based mode (arm64) when a memory access occurs, the tag
> stored in the top 8 bits of the pointer is compared with tags saved in
> the region of the shadow memory that maps to memory the pointer points
> to. If any of the tags in the shadow memory region do not match the one
> stored in the pointer an error report is generated.
>
> With the introduction of the dense mode, tags won't necessarily occupy
> whole bytes of shadow memory if the previously allocated memory wasn't
> aligned to 32 bytes - which is the coverage of one shadow byte.
>
> Add an alternative implementation of kasan_check_range() that performs
> special checks on first and last bytes of shadow memory ranges if the
> originally allocated memory wasn't aligned to 32 bytes.
>
> Signed-off-by: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman@...el.com>
> ---
> include/linux/kasan.h | 47 +++++++++++++++-------
> mm/kasan/Makefile | 3 ++
> mm/kasan/dense.c | 83 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> mm/kasan/kasan.h | 2 +-
> mm/kasan/report.c | 2 +-
> mm/kasan/report_sw_tags.c | 12 ++----
> mm/kasan/sw_tags.c | 8 ++++
> 7 files changed, 133 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 mm/kasan/dense.c
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/kasan.h b/include/linux/kasan.h
> index ea0f5acd875b..5a3e9bec21c2 100644
> --- a/include/linux/kasan.h
> +++ b/include/linux/kasan.h
> @@ -33,6 +33,20 @@ typedef unsigned int __bitwise kasan_vmalloc_flags_t;
>
> #include <linux/pgtable.h>
>
> +#ifndef kasan_mem_to_shadow
> +static inline void *kasan_mem_to_shadow(const void *addr)
> +{
> + void *scaled;
> +
> + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC))
> + scaled = (void *)((unsigned long)addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT);
> + else
> + scaled = (void *)((long)addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT);
> +
> + return KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET + scaled;
> +}
> +#endif
Any reason this is moved up here?
> +
> /* Software KASAN implementations use shadow memory. */
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS_DENSE
> @@ -53,6 +67,25 @@ static inline u8 kasan_dense_tag(u8 tag)
>
> #define KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE (1UL << KASAN_GRANULE_SHIFT)
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS_DENSE
> +static inline u8 kasan_get_shadow_tag(const void *ptr)
> +{
> + u8 shadow_byte = *(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(ptr);
> + unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)ptr;
> + int shift;
> +
> + shift = !!(addr & KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE) * KASAN_TAG_WIDTH;
> + shadow_byte >>= shift;
> +
> + return shadow_byte & KASAN_TAG_KERNEL;
> +}
> +#else
> +static inline u8 kasan_get_shadow_tag(const void *addr)
> +{
> + return (*(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr));
> +}
> +#endif
> +
> #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS
> /* This matches KASAN_TAG_INVALID. */
> #define KASAN_SHADOW_INIT 0xFE
> @@ -73,20 +106,6 @@ extern p4d_t kasan_early_shadow_p4d[MAX_PTRS_PER_P4D];
> int kasan_populate_early_shadow(const void *shadow_start,
> const void *shadow_end);
>
> -#ifndef kasan_mem_to_shadow
> -static inline void *kasan_mem_to_shadow(const void *addr)
> -{
> - void *scaled;
> -
> - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC))
> - scaled = (void *)((unsigned long)addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT);
> - else
> - scaled = (void *)((long)addr >> KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT);
> -
> - return KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET + scaled;
> -}
> -#endif
> -
> int kasan_add_zero_shadow(void *start, unsigned long size);
> void kasan_remove_zero_shadow(void *start, unsigned long size);
>
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/Makefile b/mm/kasan/Makefile
> index b88543e5c0cc..3a460abd4c18 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/Makefile
> +++ b/mm/kasan/Makefile
> @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ KCOV_INSTRUMENT := n
>
> # Disable ftrace to avoid recursion.
> CFLAGS_REMOVE_common.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
> +CFLAGS_REMOVE_dense.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
> CFLAGS_REMOVE_generic.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
> CFLAGS_REMOVE_init.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
> CFLAGS_REMOVE_quarantine.o = $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE)
> @@ -24,6 +25,7 @@ CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME += -fno-stack-protector
> CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME += -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING
>
> CFLAGS_common.o := $(CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME)
> +CFLAGS_dense.o := $(CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME)
> CFLAGS_generic.o := $(CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME)
> CFLAGS_init.o := $(CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME)
> CFLAGS_quarantine.o := $(CC_FLAGS_KASAN_RUNTIME)
> @@ -49,6 +51,7 @@ RUSTFLAGS_kasan_test_rust.o := $(RUSTFLAGS_KASAN)
> CFLAGS_kasan_test_module.o := $(CFLAGS_KASAN_TEST)
>
> obj-y := common.o report.o
> +obj-$(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS_DENSE) += dense.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) += init.o generic.o report_generic.o shadow.o quarantine.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS) += hw_tags.o report_hw_tags.o tags.o report_tags.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) += init.o report_sw_tags.o shadow.o sw_tags.o tags.o report_tags.o
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/dense.c b/mm/kasan/dense.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..306bbbfdce29
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/mm/kasan/dense.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +
> +#include "kasan.h"
> +
> +static __always_inline bool kasan_check_range_inline(const void *addr,
> + size_t size, bool write,
> + unsigned long ret_ip)
> +{
> + u8 *shadow_first, *shadow_last, *shadow, *shadow_first_aligned, *shadow_last_aligned;
> + u64 addr_start_aligned, addr_end_aligned;
> + u8 tag, kasan_granule_offset;
> + size_t aligned_size;
> + void *untagged_addr;
> +
> + if (unlikely(size == 0))
> + return true;
> +
> + if (unlikely(addr + size < addr))
> + return !kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip);
> +
> + tag = get_tag((const void *)addr);
> +
> + /*
> + * Ignore accesses for pointers tagged with native kernel
> + * pointer tag to suppress false positives caused by kmap.
> + *
> + * Some kernel code was written to account for archs that don't keep
> + * high memory mapped all the time, but rather map and unmap particular
> + * pages when needed. Instead of storing a pointer to the kernel memory,
> + * this code saves the address of the page structure and offset within
> + * that page for later use. Those pages are then mapped and unmapped
> + * with kmap/kunmap when necessary and virt_to_page is used to get the
> + * virtual address of the page. For arm64 (that keeps the high memory
> + * mapped all the time), kmap is turned into a page_address call.
> +
> + * The issue is that with use of the page_address + virt_to_page
> + * sequence the top byte value of the original pointer gets lost (gets
> + * set to KASAN_TAG_KERNEL).
> + */
> + if (tag == KASAN_TAG_KERNEL)
> + return true;
> +
> + untagged_addr = kasan_reset_tag((void *)round_down((u64)addr, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE));
> + if (unlikely(!addr_has_metadata(untagged_addr)))
> + return !kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip);
> +
> + kasan_granule_offset = ((u64)addr & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK);
> + aligned_size = round_up(size + kasan_granule_offset, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
> + shadow_first = kasan_mem_to_shadow(untagged_addr);
> + shadow_last = kasan_mem_to_shadow(untagged_addr + aligned_size);
> + addr_start_aligned = round_up((u64)untagged_addr, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> + addr_end_aligned = round_down((u64)untagged_addr + aligned_size, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE);
> + shadow_first_aligned = kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)addr_start_aligned);
> + shadow_last_aligned = kasan_mem_to_shadow((void *)addr_end_aligned);
> +
> + /* Check the first unaligned tag in shadow memory. */
> + if ((u64)untagged_addr % KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE) {
> + if (unlikely((*shadow_first >> KASAN_TAG_WIDTH) != tag))
> + return !kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip);
> + }
> +
> + /* Check the middle aligned part in shadow memory. */
> + for (shadow = shadow_first_aligned; shadow < shadow_last_aligned; shadow++) {
> + if (unlikely(*shadow != ((tag << KASAN_TAG_WIDTH) | tag)))
> + return !kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip);
> + }
> +
> + /* Check the last unaligned tag in shadow memory. */
> + if (((u64)untagged_addr + aligned_size) % KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE) {
> + if (unlikely((*shadow_last & KASAN_TAG_MASK) != tag))
> + return !kasan_report(addr, size, write, ret_ip);
> + }
> +
> + return true;
> +}
> +
> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS_DENSE)
> +bool kasan_check_range(const void *addr, size_t size, bool write,
> + unsigned long ret_ip)
> +{
> + return kasan_check_range_inline(addr, size, write, ret_ip);
> +}
> +#endif
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.h b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
> index 0e04c5e2c405..d29bd0e65020 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/kasan.h
> +++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
> @@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ static inline bool kasan_requires_meta(void)
> #define META_BYTES_PER_BLOCK 1
> #define META_BLOCKS_PER_ROW 16
> #define META_BYTES_PER_ROW (META_BLOCKS_PER_ROW * META_BYTES_PER_BLOCK)
> -#define META_MEM_BYTES_PER_ROW (META_BYTES_PER_ROW * KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE)
> +#define META_MEM_BYTES_PER_ROW (META_BYTES_PER_ROW * KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE)
> #define META_ROWS_AROUND_ADDR 2
>
> #define KASAN_STACK_DEPTH 64
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/report.c b/mm/kasan/report.c
> index c08097715686..ee9e406b0cdb 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/report.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/report.c
> @@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ static int meta_pointer_offset(const void *row, const void *addr)
> * plus 1 byte for space.
> */
> return 3 + (BITS_PER_LONG / 8) * 2 +
> - (addr - row) / KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE * 3 + 1;
> + (addr - row) / KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE * 3 + 1;
> }
>
> static void print_memory_metadata(const void *addr)
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/report_sw_tags.c b/mm/kasan/report_sw_tags.c
> index 689e94f9fe3c..1ac5c7a9011d 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/report_sw_tags.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/report_sw_tags.c
> @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ const void *kasan_find_first_bad_addr(const void *addr, size_t size)
> if (!addr_has_metadata(p))
> return p;
>
> - while (p < end && tag == *(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(p))
> + while (p < end && tag == kasan_get_shadow_tag(p))
> p += KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
>
> return p;
> @@ -48,7 +48,6 @@ const void *kasan_find_first_bad_addr(const void *addr, size_t size)
> size_t kasan_get_alloc_size(void *object, struct kmem_cache *cache)
> {
> size_t size = 0;
> - u8 *shadow;
>
> /*
> * Skip the addr_has_metadata check, as this function only operates on
> @@ -59,13 +58,11 @@ size_t kasan_get_alloc_size(void *object, struct kmem_cache *cache)
> * The loop below returns 0 for freed objects, for which KASAN cannot
> * calculate the allocation size based on the metadata.
> */
> - shadow = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(object);
> while (size < cache->object_size) {
> - if (*shadow != KASAN_TAG_INVALID)
> + if (kasan_get_shadow_tag(object + size) != KASAN_TAG_INVALID)
> size += KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE;
> else
> return size;
> - shadow++;
> }
>
> return cache->object_size;
> @@ -78,9 +75,8 @@ void kasan_metadata_fetch_row(char *buffer, void *row)
>
> void kasan_print_tags(u8 addr_tag, const void *addr)
> {
> - u8 *shadow = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr);
> -
> - pr_err("Pointer tag: [%02x], memory tag: [%02x]\n", addr_tag, *shadow);
> + pr_err("Pointer tag: [%02x], memory tag: [%02x]\n", addr_tag,
> + kasan_get_shadow_tag(addr));
> }
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/sw_tags.c b/mm/kasan/sw_tags.c
> index 32435d33583a..7a6b8ea9bf78 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/sw_tags.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/sw_tags.c
> @@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ u8 __hwasan_generate_tag(void)
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(__hwasan_generate_tag);
>
> +#if !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS_DENSE)
> bool kasan_check_range(const void *addr, size_t size, bool write,
> unsigned long ret_ip)
> {
> @@ -127,17 +128,24 @@ bool kasan_check_range(const void *addr, size_t size, bool write,
>
> return true;
> }
> +#endif
>
> bool kasan_byte_accessible(const void *addr)
> {
> u8 tag = get_tag(addr);
> void *untagged_addr = kasan_reset_tag(addr);
> u8 shadow_byte;
> + int shift;
>
> if (!addr_has_metadata(untagged_addr))
> return false;
>
> shadow_byte = READ_ONCE(*(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(untagged_addr));
> + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS_DENSE)) {
> + shift = !!((u64)addr & BIT(KASAN_TAG_WIDTH)) * KASAN_TAG_WIDTH;
> + shadow_byte = (shadow_byte >> shift) & KASAN_TAG_KERNEL;
> + }
> +
> return tag == KASAN_TAG_KERNEL || tag == shadow_byte;
> }
>
> --
> 2.47.1
>
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