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Message-Id: <173887689139.3506371.3849387827240027734.b4-ty@kernel.org>
Date: Thu, 6 Feb 2025 13:21:34 -0800
From: Kees Cook <kees@...nel.org>
To: luto@...capital.net,
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Eyal Birger <eyal.birger@...il.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees@...nel.org>,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 0/2] seccomp: pass uretprobe system call through seccomp
On Sun, 02 Feb 2025 08:29:19 -0800, Eyal Birger wrote:
> uretprobe(2) is an performance enhancement system call added to improve
> uretprobes on x86_64.
>
> Confinement environments such as Docker are not aware of this new system
> call and kill confined processes when uretprobes are attached to them.
>
> Since uretprobe is a "kernel implementation detail" system call which is
> not used by userspace application code directly, pass this system call
> through seccomp without forcing existing userspace confinement environments
> to be changed.
>
> [...]
With the changes I mentioned in each patch, I've applied this to
for-next/seccomp, with the intention of getting them into v6.14-rc2.
Thanks!
[1/2] seccomp: passthrough uretprobe systemcall without filtering
https://git.kernel.org/kees/c/cf6cb56ef244
[2/2] selftests/seccomp: validate uretprobe syscall passes through seccomp
https://git.kernel.org/kees/c/c2debdb8544f
Take care,
--
Kees Cook
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