Message-ID: <xhsmhv7tgihs3.mognet@vschneid-thinkpadt14sgen2i.remote.csb>
Date: Tue, 11 Feb 2025 17:10:36 +0100
From: Valentin Schneider <vschneid@...hat.com>
To: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...el.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 29/30] x86/mm, mm/vmalloc: Defer
 flush_tlb_kernel_range() targeting NOHZ_FULL CPUs

On 11/02/25 06:22, Dave Hansen wrote:
> On 2/11/25 05:33, Valentin Schneider wrote:
>>> 2. It's wrong to assume that TLB entries are only populated for
>>> addresses you access - thanks to speculative execution, you have to
>>> assume that the CPU might be populating random TLB entries all over
>>> the place.
>> Gotta love speculation. Now it is supposed to be limited to genuinely
>> accessible data & code, right? Say theoretically we have a full TLBi as
>> literally the last thing before doing the return-to-userspace, speculation
>> should be limited to executing maybe bits of the return-from-userspace
>> code?
>
> In practice, it's mostly limited like that.
>
> Architecturally, there are no promises from the CPU. It is within its
> rights to cache anything from the page tables at any time. If it's in
> the CR3 tree, it's fair game.
>
>> Furthermore, I would hope that once a CPU is executing in userspace, it's
>> not going to populate the TLB with kernel address translations - AIUI the
>> whole vulnerability mitigation debacle was about preventing this sort of
>> thing.
>
> Nope, unfortunately. There's two big exception to this. First, "implicit
> supervisor-mode accesses". There are structures for which the CPU gets a
> virtual address and accesses it even while userspace is running. The LDT
> and GDT are the most obvious examples, but there are some less
> ubiquitous ones like the buffers for PEBS events.
>
> Second, remember that user versus supervisor is determined *BY* the page
> tables. Before Linear Address Space Separation (LASS), all virtual
> memory accesses walk the page tables, even userspace accesses to kernel
> addresses.  The User/Supervisor bit is *in* the page tables, of course.
>
> A userspace access to a kernel address results in a page walk and the
> CPU is completely free to cache all or part of that page walk. A
> Meltdown-style _speculative_ userspace access to kernel memory won't
> generate a fault either. It won't leak data like it used to, of course,
> but it can still walk the page tables. That's one reason LASS is needed.

Bummer, now I have at least two architectures proving me wrong :-) Thank
you as well for the education, I really appreciate it.

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