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Message-ID: <CAEf4BzYPmtUirnO3Bp+3F3d4++4ttL_MZAG+yGcTTKTRK2X2vw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 11 Feb 2025 08:47:18 -0800
From: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii.nakryiko@...il.com>
To: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...nel.org>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>, Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@...nel.org>, Kees Cook <kees@...nel.org>, Eyal Birger <eyal.birger@...il.com>,
stable@...r.kernel.org, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-trace-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-api@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
bpf@...r.kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Deepak Gupta <debug@...osinc.com>,
Stephen Rothwell <sfr@...b.auug.org.au>
Subject: Re: [PATCHv2 perf/core] uprobes: Harden uretprobe syscall trampoline check
On Tue, Feb 11, 2025 at 3:16 AM Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...nel.org> wrote:
>
> Jann reported [1] possible issue when trampoline_check_ip returns
> address near the bottom of the address space that is allowed to
> call into the syscall if uretprobes are not set up.
>
> Though the mmap minimum address restrictions will typically prevent
> creating mappings there, let's make sure uretprobe syscall checks
> for that.
>
> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/202502081235.5A6F352985@keescook/T/#m9d416df341b8fbc11737dacbcd29f0054413cbbf
> Cc: Kees Cook <kees@...nel.org>
> Cc: Eyal Birger <eyal.birger@...il.com>
> Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org
> Fixes: ff474a78cef5 ("uprobe: Add uretprobe syscall to speed up return probe")
> Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <kees@...nel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...nel.org>
> ---
> v2 changes:
> - adding UPROBE_NO_TRAMPOLINE_VADDR macro (Andrii)
> - rebased on top of perf/core
>
> arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c | 16 +++++++++++-----
> 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c b/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c
> index 5a952c5ea66b..e8d3c59aa9f7 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c
> @@ -357,19 +357,25 @@ void *arch_uprobe_trampoline(unsigned long *psize)
> return &insn;
> }
>
> -static unsigned long trampoline_check_ip(void)
> +static unsigned long trampoline_check_ip(unsigned long tramp)
> {
> - unsigned long tramp = uprobe_get_trampoline_vaddr();
> -
> return tramp + (uretprobe_syscall_check - uretprobe_trampoline_entry);
> }
>
> +#define UPROBE_NO_TRAMPOLINE_VADDR ((unsigned long)-1)
> +
> SYSCALL_DEFINE0(uretprobe)
> {
> struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(current);
> - unsigned long err, ip, sp, r11_cx_ax[3];
> + unsigned long err, ip, sp, r11_cx_ax[3], tramp;
> +
> + /* If there's no trampoline, we are called from wrong place. */
> + tramp = uprobe_get_trampoline_vaddr();
> + if (tramp == UPROBE_NO_TRAMPOLINE_VADDR)
> + goto sigill;
>
> - if (regs->ip != trampoline_check_ip())
> + /* Make sure the ip matches the only allowed sys_uretprobe caller. */
> + if (regs->ip != trampoline_check_ip(tramp))
> goto sigill;
>
LGTM. I don't know if that would make any difference, but I'd sprinkle
unlikely() around these two conditions to make sure they don't
interfere with instruction flow much
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@...nel.org>
> err = copy_from_user(r11_cx_ax, (void __user *)regs->sp, sizeof(r11_cx_ax));
> --
> 2.48.1
>
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