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Message-ID: <67acd205.050a0220.3d72c.01bf.GAE@google.com> Date: Wed, 12 Feb 2025 08:53:25 -0800 From: syzbot <syzbot+167028f6dd31d18e95c3@...kaller.appspotmail.com> To: kent.overstreet@...ux.dev, linux-bcachefs@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, syzkaller-bugs@...glegroups.com Subject: [syzbot] [bcachefs?] general protection fault in bch2_journal_do_writes (2) Hello, syzbot found the following issue on: HEAD commit: ed58d103e6da Add linux-next specific files for 20250207 git tree: linux-next console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=158addf8580000 kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=244a34ec1429746 dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=167028f6dd31d18e95c3 compiler: Debian clang version 15.0.6, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.40 Unfortunately, I don't have any reproducer for this issue yet. Downloadable assets: disk image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/ce459b7174dd/disk-ed58d103.raw.xz vmlinux: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/60699733c0c8/vmlinux-ed58d103.xz kernel image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/f589bce7c898/bzImage-ed58d103.xz IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit: Reported-by: syzbot+167028f6dd31d18e95c3@...kaller.appspotmail.com bcachefs (loop0): done initializing freespace bcachefs (loop0): reading snapshots table bcachefs (loop0): reading snapshots done Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xf110004ee8002002: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0x8880227740010010-0x8880227740010017] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 9260 Comm: syz.0.650 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc1-next-20250207-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 12/27/2024 RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x6a/0x2100 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5091 Code: b6 04 30 84 c0 0f 85 f8 16 00 00 45 31 f6 83 3d 3b fe 80 0e 00 0f 84 c8 13 00 00 89 54 24 60 89 5c 24 38 4c 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <80> 3c 30 00 74 12 4c 89 ff e8 e8 79 8b 00 48 be 00 00 00 00 00 fc RSP: 0018:ffffc90004886c30 EFLAGS: 00010803 RAX: 1110044ee8002002 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: 8880227740010017 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff20376cf R12: ffff888025483c00 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 8880227740010017 FS: 00007f1ec11346c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b8600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fbd2b5fbdf0 CR3: 000000005e3ea000 CR4: 00000000003526f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5851 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154 __queue_work+0x759/0xf50 queue_work_on+0x1c2/0x380 kernel/workqueue.c:2390 queue_work include/linux/workqueue.h:662 [inline] closure_queue include/linux/closure.h:268 [inline] closure_call include/linux/closure.h:432 [inline] bch2_journal_do_writes+0x383/0x420 fs/bcachefs/journal.c:200 bch2_journal_buf_put_final+0x9e/0xf0 fs/bcachefs/journal.c:218 __bch2_journal_buf_put fs/bcachefs/journal.h:277 [inline] __journal_entry_close+0x812/0xdf0 fs/bcachefs/journal.c:309 journal_entry_want_write+0xf3/0x250 fs/bcachefs/journal.c:339 bch2_journal_flush_seq_async+0x769/0x880 fs/bcachefs/journal.c:805 bch2_journal_flush_seq+0xe5/0x2b0 fs/bcachefs/journal.c:822 bch2_fs_initialize+0x129a/0x1610 fs/bcachefs/recovery.c:1200 bch2_fs_start+0x36d/0x610 fs/bcachefs/super.c:1042 bch2_fs_get_tree+0xd8d/0x1740 fs/bcachefs/fs.c:2203 vfs_get_tree+0x90/0x2b0 fs/super.c:1759 do_new_mount+0x2be/0xb40 fs/namespace.c:3659 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3999 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4210 [inline] __se_sys_mount+0x2d6/0x3c0 fs/namespace.c:4187 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f1ec038e58a Code: d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb a6 e8 de 1a 00 00 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f1ec1133e68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f1ec1133ef0 RCX: 00007f1ec038e58a RDX: 00004000000000c0 RSI: 0000400000000180 RDI: 00007f1ec1133eb0 RBP: 00004000000000c0 R08: 00007f1ec1133ef0 R09: 0000000000000010 R10: 0000000000000010 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000400000000180 R13: 00007f1ec1133eb0 R14: 00000000000059d5 R15: 0000400000000480 </TASK> Modules linked in: ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x6a/0x2100 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5091 Code: b6 04 30 84 c0 0f 85 f8 16 00 00 45 31 f6 83 3d 3b fe 80 0e 00 0f 84 c8 13 00 00 89 54 24 60 89 5c 24 38 4c 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <80> 3c 30 00 74 12 4c 89 ff e8 e8 79 8b 00 48 be 00 00 00 00 00 fc RSP: 0018:ffffc90004886c30 EFLAGS: 00010803 RAX: 1110044ee8002002 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: 8880227740010017 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff20376cf R12: ffff888025483c00 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 8880227740010017 FS: 00007f1ec11346c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b8600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fbd2b5fbdf0 CR3: 000000005e3ea000 CR4: 00000000003526f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 ---------------- Code disassembly (best guess): 0: b6 04 mov $0x4,%dh 2: 30 84 c0 0f 85 f8 16 xor %al,0x16f8850f(%rax,%rax,8) 9: 00 00 add %al,(%rax) b: 45 31 f6 xor %r14d,%r14d e: 83 3d 3b fe 80 0e 00 cmpl $0x0,0xe80fe3b(%rip) # 0xe80fe50 15: 0f 84 c8 13 00 00 je 0x13e3 1b: 89 54 24 60 mov %edx,0x60(%rsp) 1f: 89 5c 24 38 mov %ebx,0x38(%rsp) 23: 4c 89 f8 mov %r15,%rax 26: 48 c1 e8 03 shr $0x3,%rax * 2a: 80 3c 30 00 cmpb $0x0,(%rax,%rsi,1) <-- trapping instruction 2e: 74 12 je 0x42 30: 4c 89 ff mov %r15,%rdi 33: e8 e8 79 8b 00 call 0x8b7a20 38: 48 rex.W 39: be 00 00 00 00 mov $0x0,%esi 3e: 00 fc add %bh,%ah --- This report is generated by a bot. It may contain errors. See https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ for more information about syzbot. syzbot engineers can be reached at syzkaller@...glegroups.com. syzbot will keep track of this issue. See: https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#status for how to communicate with syzbot. If the report is already addressed, let syzbot know by replying with: #syz fix: exact-commit-title If you want to overwrite report's subsystems, reply with: #syz set subsystems: new-subsystem (See the list of subsystem names on the web dashboard) If the report is a duplicate of another one, reply with: #syz dup: exact-subject-of-another-report If you want to undo deduplication, reply with: #syz undup
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