linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v4 4/4] locking/lockdep: Add kasan_check_byte() check in lock

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Message-ID: <dfe06175-1c19-407d-9583-43576ab9b588@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2025 12:18:51 -0500
From: Waiman Long <llong@...hat.com>
To: Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>, Waiman Long <llong@...hat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
 Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>, Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@...il.com>,
 Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@...il.com>,
 Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>,
 Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...il.com>, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
 Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@....com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
 kasan-dev@...glegroups.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 4/4] locking/lockdep: Add kasan_check_byte() check in
 lock_acquire()

On 2/14/25 11:43 AM, Marco Elver wrote:
> On Fri, 14 Feb 2025 at 17:18, Waiman Long <llong@...hat.com> wrote:
>> On 2/14/25 9:44 AM, Marco Elver wrote:
>>> On Fri, 14 Feb 2025 at 15:09, Waiman Long <llong@...hat.com> wrote:
>>>> On 2/14/25 5:44 AM, Marco Elver wrote:
>>>>> On Thu, 13 Feb 2025 at 21:02, Waiman Long <longman@...hat.com> wrote:
>>>>>> KASAN instrumentation of lockdep has been disabled as we don't need
>>>>>> KASAN to check the validity of lockdep internal data structures and
>>>>>> incur unnecessary performance overhead. However, the lockdep_map pointer
>>>>>> passed in externally may not be valid (e.g. use-after-free) and we run
>>>>>> the risk of using garbage data resulting in false lockdep reports. Add
>>>>>> kasan_check_byte() call in lock_acquire() for non kernel core data
>>>>>> object to catch invalid lockdep_map and abort lockdep processing if
>>>>>> input data isn't valid.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Suggested-by: Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>
>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@...hat.com>
>>>>> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>
>>>>>
>>>>> but double-check if the below can be simplified.
>>>>>
>>>>>> ---
>>>>>>     kernel/locking/lock_events_list.h |  1 +
>>>>>>     kernel/locking/lockdep.c          | 14 ++++++++++++++
>>>>>>     2 files changed, 15 insertions(+)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> diff --git a/kernel/locking/lock_events_list.h b/kernel/locking/lock_events_list.h
>>>>>> index 9ef9850aeebe..bed59b2195c7 100644
>>>>>> --- a/kernel/locking/lock_events_list.h
>>>>>> +++ b/kernel/locking/lock_events_list.h
>>>>>> @@ -95,3 +95,4 @@ LOCK_EVENT(rtmutex_deadlock)  /* # of rt_mutex_handle_deadlock()'s    */
>>>>>>     LOCK_EVENT(lockdep_acquire)
>>>>>>     LOCK_EVENT(lockdep_lock)
>>>>>>     LOCK_EVENT(lockdep_nocheck)
>>>>>> +LOCK_EVENT(lockdep_kasan_fail)
>>>>>> diff --git a/kernel/locking/lockdep.c b/kernel/locking/lockdep.c
>>>>>> index 8436f017c74d..98dd0455d4be 100644
>>>>>> --- a/kernel/locking/lockdep.c
>>>>>> +++ b/kernel/locking/lockdep.c
>>>>>> @@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
>>>>>>     #include <linux/lockdep.h>
>>>>>>     #include <linux/context_tracking.h>
>>>>>>     #include <linux/console.h>
>>>>>> +#include <linux/kasan.h>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>     #include <asm/sections.h>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> @@ -5830,6 +5831,19 @@ void lock_acquire(struct lockdep_map *lock, unsigned int subclass,
>>>>>>            if (!debug_locks)
>>>>>>                    return;
>>>>>>
>>>>>> +       /*
>>>>>> +        * As KASAN instrumentation is disabled and lock_acquire() is usually
>>>>>> +        * the first lockdep call when a task tries to acquire a lock, add
>>>>>> +        * kasan_check_byte() here to check for use-after-free of non kernel
>>>>>> +        * core lockdep_map data to avoid referencing garbage data.
>>>>>> +        */
>>>>>> +       if (unlikely(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN) &&
>>>>> This is not needed - kasan_check_byte() will always return true if
>>>>> KASAN is disabled or not compiled in.
>>>> I added this check because of the is_kernel_core_data() call.
>>>>>> +                    !is_kernel_core_data((unsigned long)lock) &&
>>>>> Why use !is_kernel_core_data()? Is it to improve performance?
>>>> Not exactly. In my testing, just using kasan_check_byte() doesn't quite
>>>> work out. It seems to return false positive in some cases causing
>>>> lockdep splat. I didn't look into exactly why this happens and I added
>>>> the is_kernel_core_data() call to work around that.
>>> Globals should have their shadow memory unpoisoned by default, so
>>> that's definitely odd.
>>>
>>> Out of curiosity, do you have such a false positive splat? Wondering
>>> which data it's accessing. Maybe that'll tell us more about what's
>>> wrong.
>> The kasan_check_byte() failure happens very early in the boot cycle.
>> There is no KASAN report, but the API returns false. I inserted a
>> WARN_ON(1) to dump out the stack.
> I see - I suspect this is before ctors had a chance to run, which is
> the way globals are registered with KASAN.
>
> I think it'd be fair to just remove the lockdep_kasan_fail event,
> given KASAN would produce its own report on a real error anyway.
>
> I.e. just do the kasan_check_byte(), and don't bail even if it returns
> false. The KASAN report would appear before everything else (incl. a
> bad lockdep report due to possible corrupted memory) and I think
> that's all we need to be able to debug a real bug.

Fair, will update the patch.

Cheers,
Longman

>