linux-kernel - Re: [RFC] Circumventing FineIBT Via Entrypoints

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Message-ID: <20250214095751.GF21726@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net>
Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2025 10:57:51 +0100
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
To: Kees Cook <kees@...nel.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@...rix.com>, jannh@...gle.com,
	jmill@....edu, joao@...rdrivepizza.com,
	linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	luto@...nel.org, samitolvanen@...gle.com
Subject: Re: [RFC] Circumventing FineIBT Via Entrypoints

On Thu, Feb 13, 2025 at 12:53:28PM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:

> Right, the "if they can control a function pointer" is the part I'm
> focusing on. This attack depends on making an indirect call with a
> controlled pointer. Non-FineIBT CFI will protect against that step,
> so I think this is only an issue for IBT-only and FineIBT, but not CFI
> nor CFI+IBT.

Yes, the whole caller side validation should stop this.