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Message-ID: <90a00957-02b5-440a-9168-de93c760fea7@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 18 Feb 2025 17:17:20 +0100
From: David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>
To: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@...cle.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@...gle.com>,
"Liam R . Howlett" <Liam.Howlett@...cle.com>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>, Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@...e.cz>,
"Paul E . McKenney" <paulmck@...nel.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,
linux-mm@...ck.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>, linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org,
linux-api@...r.kernel.org, John Hubbard <jhubbard@...dia.com>,
Juan Yescas <jyescas@...gle.com>, Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/4] mm: allow guard regions in file-backed and read-only
mappings
On 18.02.25 17:12, Lorenzo Stoakes wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 18, 2025 at 05:01:16PM +0100, David Hildenbrand wrote:
>> On 13.02.25 19:17, Lorenzo Stoakes wrote:
>>> There is no reason to disallow guard regions in file-backed mappings -
>>> readahead and fault-around both function correctly in the presence of PTE
>>> markers, equally other operations relating to memory-mapped files function
>>> correctly.
>>>
>>> Additionally, read-only mappings if introducing guard-regions, only
>>> restrict the mapping further, which means there is no violation of any
>>> access rights by permitting this to be so.
>>>
>>> Removing this restriction allows for read-only mapped files (such as
>>> executable files) correctly which would otherwise not be permitted.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@...cle.com>
>>> ---
>>> mm/madvise.c | 8 +-------
>>> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 7 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/mm/madvise.c b/mm/madvise.c
>>> index 6ecead476a80..e01e93e179a8 100644
>>> --- a/mm/madvise.c
>>> +++ b/mm/madvise.c
>>> @@ -1051,13 +1051,7 @@ static bool is_valid_guard_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma, bool allow_locked)
>>> if (!allow_locked)
>>> disallowed |= VM_LOCKED;
>>> - if (!vma_is_anonymous(vma))
>>> - return false;
>>> -
>>> - if ((vma->vm_flags & (VM_MAYWRITE | disallowed)) != VM_MAYWRITE)
>>> - return false;
>>> -
>>> - return true;
>>> + return !(vma->vm_flags & disallowed);
>>> }
>>> static bool is_guard_pte_marker(pte_t ptent)
>>
>> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@...hat.com>
>
> Thanks!
>
>>
>> I assume these markers cannot completely prevent us from allocating
>> pages/folios for these underlying file/pageache ranges of these markers in
>> case of shmem during page faults, right?
>
> If the markers are in place, then page faulting will result in a
> segfault. If we faulted in a shmem page then installed markers (which would
> zap the range), then the page cache will be populated, but obviously
> subject to standard reclaim.
Well, yes, (a) if there is swap and (b), if the noswap option was not
specified for tmpfs.
Okay, so installing a guard entry might require punshing a hole to get
rid of any already-existing memory. But readahead (below) might mess it up.
>
> If we perform synchronous readahead prior to a guard region that includes
> (partially or fully) a guard region we might major fault entries into the
> page cache that are then not accessable _from that mapping_, this is rather
> unavoidable as this doesn't account for page table mappings and should be
> largely trivial overhead (also these folios are reclaimable).
Right, that's what I had in mind: assume I have a single marker in a
PMD, shmem might allocate a PMD THP to back that region, ignoring the
marker hint. (so I think)
Thanks!
--
Cheers,
David / dhildenb
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