Message-ID: <CA+i-1C2xK8hzMQ8Y-=-7iYy+27nnouQZu1NdWG0qa35t+OQLqw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 19 Feb 2025 14:53:03 +0100
From: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@...gle.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
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	Ofir Weisse <oweisse@...gle.com>, Junaid Shahid <junaids@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v2 03/29] mm: asi: Introduce ASI core API

Argh, sorry, GMail switched back to HTML mode somehow. Maybe I have to
get a proper mail client after all.

Here's the clean version.

On Wed, 19 Feb 2025 at 11:57, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de> wrote:
>
> > + * Runtime usage:
> > + *
> > + * 1. Call asi_enter() to switch to the restricted address space. This can't be
> > + *    from an interrupt or exception handler and preemption must be disabled.
> > + *
> > + * 2. Execute untrusted code.
> > + *
> > + * 3. Call asi_relax() to inform the ASI subsystem that untrusted code execution
> > + *    is finished. This doesn't cause any address space change. This can't be
> > + *    from an interrupt or exception handler and preemption must be disabled.
> > + *
> > + * 4. Either:
> > + *
> > + *    a. Go back to 1.
> > + *
> > + *    b. Call asi_exit() before returning to userspace. This immediately
> > + *       switches to the unrestricted address space.
>
> So only from reading this, it does sound weird. Maybe the code does it
> differently - I'll see soon - but this basically says:
>
> I asi_enter(), do something, asi_relax() and then I decide to do something
> more and to asi_enter() again!? And then I can end it all with a *single*
> asi_exit() call?
>
> Hm, definitely weird API. Why?


OK, sounds like I need to rewrite this explanation! It's only been
read before by people who already knew how this thing worked so this
might take a few attempts to make it clear.

Maybe the best way to make it clear is to explain this with reference
to KVM. At a super high level, That looks like:

ioctl(KVM_RUN) {
    enter_from_user_mode()
    while !need_userspace_handling() {
        asi_enter();  // part 1
        vmenter();  // part 2
        asi_relax(); // part 3
    }
    asi _exit(); // part 4b
    exit_to_user_mode()
}

So part 4a is just referring to continuation of the loop.

This explanation was written when that was the only user of this API
so it was probably clearer, now we have userspace it seems a bit odd.

With my pseudocode above, does it make more sense? If so I'll try to
think of a better way to explain it.

> /*
>  * Leave the "tense" state if we are in it, i.e. end the critical section. We
>  * will stay relaxed until the next asi_enter.
>  */
> void asi_relax(void);
>
> Yeah, so there's no API functions balance between enter() and relax()...


asi_enter() is actually balanced with asi_relax(). The comment says
"if we are in it" because technically if you call this asi_relax()
outside of the critical section, it's a nop. But, there's no reason to
do that, so we could definitely change the comment and WARN if that
happens.

>
> > +#define ASI_TAINT_OTHER_MM_CONTROL   ((asi_taints_t)BIT(6))
> > +#define ASI_NUM_TAINTS                       6
> > +static_assert(BITS_PER_BYTE * sizeof(asi_taints_t) >= ASI_NUM_TAINTS);
>
> Why is this a typedef at all to make the code more unreadable than it needs to
> be? Why not a simple unsigned int or char or whatever you need?


My thinking was just that it's nicer to see asi_taints_t and know that
it means "it holds taint flags and it's big enough" instead of having
to remember the space needed for these flags. But yeah I'm fine with
making it a raw integer type.

> > +#define ASI_TAINTS_CONTROL_MASK \
> > +     (ASI_TAINT_USER_CONTROL | ASI_TAINT_GUEST_CONTROL | ASI_TAINT_OTHER_MM_CONTROL)
> > +
> > +#define ASI_TAINTS_DATA_MASK \
> > +     (ASI_TAINT_KERNEL_DATA | ASI_TAINT_USER_DATA | ASI_TAINT_OTHER_MM_DATA)
> > +
> > +#define ASI_TAINTS_GUEST_MASK (ASI_TAINT_GUEST_DATA | ASI_TAINT_GUEST_CONTROL)
> > +#define ASI_TAINTS_USER_MASK (ASI_TAINT_USER_DATA | ASI_TAINT_USER_CONTROL)
> > +
> > +/* The taint policy tells ASI how a class interacts with the CPU taints */
> > +struct asi_taint_policy {
> > +     /*
> > +      * What taints would necessitate a flush when entering the domain, to
> > +      * protect it from attack by prior domains?
> > +      */
> > +     asi_taints_t prevent_control;
>
> So if those necessitate a flush, why isn't this var called "taints_to_flush"
> or whatever which exactly explains what it is?


Well it needs to be disambiguated from the field below (currently
protect_data) but it could be control_to_flush (and data_to_flush).

The downside of that is that having one say "prevent" and one say
"protect" is quite meaningful. prevent_control is describing things we
need to do to protect the system from this domain, protect_data is
about protecting the domain from the system. However, while that
difference is meaningful it might not actually be helpful for the
reader of the code so I'm not wed to it.

Also worth noting that we could just combine these fields. At present
they should have disjoint bits set. But, they're used in separate
contexts and have separate (although conceptually very similar)
meanings, so I think that would reduce clarity.

>
> Spellchecker please. Go over your whole set.


Ack, I've set up a local thingy to spellcheck all my commits so
hopefully you should encounter less of that noise in future.

For the pronouns stuff I will do my best but you might still spot
violations in older text, sorry about that.

> > +     /* What taints should be set when entering the domain? */
> > +     asi_taints_t set;
>
>
> So "required_taints" or so... hm?


What this field is describing is: when we run the untrusted code, what
happens? I don't mean "what does the kernel do" but what physically
happens on the CPU from an exploit point of view.

For example setting ASI_TAINT_USER_DATA in this field means "when we
run the untrusted code (i.e. userspace), userspace data gets left
behind in sidechannels".

"Should be set" in the comment means "this field should be set to
record that a thing has happened" not "this field being set is a
requirement for some API" or something. So I don't think "required" is
right but this is hard to name.

That commentary should also be expanded I think, since "should be set"
is pretty ambiguous. And maybe if we called it "to_set" it would be
more obvious that "set" is a verb? I'm very open to suggestions.

>
> > +
> > +void asi_init_mm_state(struct mm_struct *mm);
> > +
> > +int asi_init_class(enum asi_class_id class_id, struct asi_taint_policy *taint_policy);
> > +void asi_uninit_class(enum asi_class_id class_id);
>
> "uninit", meh. "exit" perhaps? or "destroy"


>
> And you have "asi_destroy" already so I guess you can do:
>
> asi_class_init()
> asi_class_destroy()
>
> to have the namespace correct.


Yeah, not sure what I was thinking here!

>
> > +static __always_inline bool asi_is_tense(void)
> > +{
> > +     return !asi_is_relaxed();
> > +}
>
> So can we tone down the silly helpers above? You don't really need
> asi_is_tense() for example. It is still very intuitive if I read
>
>         if (!asi_is_relaxed())
>
Yep that sounds good.

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