[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20250219164029.2309119-2-kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
Date: Wed, 19 Feb 2025 16:40:27 +0000
From: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@....com>
To: linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@....com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@....com>,
Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 1/3] arm64/sysreg: Improve PIR/POR helpers
We currently have one helper to set a PIRx_ELx's permission field to
a given value, PIRx_ELx_PERM(), and another helper to extract a
permission field from POR_ELx, POR_ELx_IDX(). The naming is pretty
confusing - it isn't clear at all that "_PERM" corresponds to a
setter and "_IDX" to a getter.
This patch aims at improving the situation by using the same
suffixes as FIELD_PREP()/FIELD_GET(), which we have already adopted
for SYS_FIELD_{PREP,GET}():
* PIRx_ELx_PERM_PREP(), POR_ELx_PERM_PREP() create a register value
where the permission field for a given index is set to a given value.
* POR_ELx_PERM_GET() extracts the permission field from a given
register value for a given index.
These helpers are not implemented using FIELD_PREP()/FIELD_GET()
because the mask may not be constant, and they need to be usable in
assembly. They are all defined in asm/sysreg.h, as one would expect
for basic sysreg-related helpers.
Finally the new POR_ELx_PERM_* macros are used for existing
calculations in signal.c and mmu.c.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@....com>
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h | 36 +++++++++++++--------------
arch/arm64/include/asm/por.h | 9 +++----
arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h | 10 +++++++-
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c | 2 +-
arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c | 6 ++---
5 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h
index a95f1f77bb39..7830d031742e 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h
@@ -169,25 +169,25 @@ static inline bool __pure lpa2_is_enabled(void)
#define PAGE_GCS_RO __pgprot(_PAGE_GCS_RO)
#define PIE_E0 ( \
- PIRx_ELx_PERM(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_GCS), PIE_GCS) | \
- PIRx_ELx_PERM(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_GCS_RO), PIE_R) | \
- PIRx_ELx_PERM(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_EXECONLY), PIE_X_O) | \
- PIRx_ELx_PERM(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_READONLY_EXEC), PIE_RX_O) | \
- PIRx_ELx_PERM(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_SHARED_EXEC), PIE_RWX_O) | \
- PIRx_ELx_PERM(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_READONLY), PIE_R_O) | \
- PIRx_ELx_PERM(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_SHARED), PIE_RW_O))
+ PIRx_ELx_PERM_PREP(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_GCS), PIE_GCS) | \
+ PIRx_ELx_PERM_PREP(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_GCS_RO), PIE_R) | \
+ PIRx_ELx_PERM_PREP(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_EXECONLY), PIE_X_O) | \
+ PIRx_ELx_PERM_PREP(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_READONLY_EXEC), PIE_RX_O) | \
+ PIRx_ELx_PERM_PREP(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_SHARED_EXEC), PIE_RWX_O) | \
+ PIRx_ELx_PERM_PREP(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_READONLY), PIE_R_O) | \
+ PIRx_ELx_PERM_PREP(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_SHARED), PIE_RW_O))
#define PIE_E1 ( \
- PIRx_ELx_PERM(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_GCS), PIE_NONE_O) | \
- PIRx_ELx_PERM(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_GCS_RO), PIE_NONE_O) | \
- PIRx_ELx_PERM(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_EXECONLY), PIE_NONE_O) | \
- PIRx_ELx_PERM(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_READONLY_EXEC), PIE_R) | \
- PIRx_ELx_PERM(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_SHARED_EXEC), PIE_RW) | \
- PIRx_ELx_PERM(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_READONLY), PIE_R) | \
- PIRx_ELx_PERM(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_SHARED), PIE_RW) | \
- PIRx_ELx_PERM(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_KERNEL_ROX), PIE_RX) | \
- PIRx_ELx_PERM(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC), PIE_RWX) | \
- PIRx_ELx_PERM(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_KERNEL_RO), PIE_R) | \
- PIRx_ELx_PERM(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_KERNEL), PIE_RW))
+ PIRx_ELx_PERM_PREP(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_GCS), PIE_NONE_O) | \
+ PIRx_ELx_PERM_PREP(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_GCS_RO), PIE_NONE_O) | \
+ PIRx_ELx_PERM_PREP(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_EXECONLY), PIE_NONE_O) | \
+ PIRx_ELx_PERM_PREP(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_READONLY_EXEC), PIE_R) | \
+ PIRx_ELx_PERM_PREP(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_SHARED_EXEC), PIE_RW) | \
+ PIRx_ELx_PERM_PREP(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_READONLY), PIE_R) | \
+ PIRx_ELx_PERM_PREP(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_SHARED), PIE_RW) | \
+ PIRx_ELx_PERM_PREP(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_KERNEL_ROX), PIE_RX) | \
+ PIRx_ELx_PERM_PREP(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC), PIE_RWX) | \
+ PIRx_ELx_PERM_PREP(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_KERNEL_RO), PIE_R) | \
+ PIRx_ELx_PERM_PREP(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_KERNEL), PIE_RW))
#endif /* __ASM_PGTABLE_PROT_H */
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/por.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/por.h
index e06e9f473675..e6bf00bd0500 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/por.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/por.h
@@ -6,26 +6,25 @@
#ifndef _ASM_ARM64_POR_H
#define _ASM_ARM64_POR_H
-#define POR_BITS_PER_PKEY 4
-#define POR_ELx_IDX(por_elx, idx) (((por_elx) >> ((idx) * POR_BITS_PER_PKEY)) & 0xf)
+#include <asm/sysreg.h>
static inline bool por_elx_allows_read(u64 por, u8 pkey)
{
- u8 perm = POR_ELx_IDX(por, pkey);
+ u8 perm = POR_ELx_PERM_GET(pkey, por);
return perm & POE_R;
}
static inline bool por_elx_allows_write(u64 por, u8 pkey)
{
- u8 perm = POR_ELx_IDX(por, pkey);
+ u8 perm = POR_ELx_PERM_GET(pkey, por);
return perm & POE_W;
}
static inline bool por_elx_allows_exec(u64 por, u8 pkey)
{
- u8 perm = POR_ELx_IDX(por, pkey);
+ u8 perm = POR_ELx_PERM_GET(pkey, por);
return perm & POE_X;
}
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h
index 05ea5223d2d5..c9ce4ce5131c 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h
@@ -1062,8 +1062,11 @@
#define PIE_RX UL(0xa)
#define PIE_RW UL(0xc)
#define PIE_RWX UL(0xe)
+#define PIE_MASK UL(0xf)
-#define PIRx_ELx_PERM(idx, perm) ((perm) << ((idx) * 4))
+#define PIRx_ELx_BITS_PER_IDX 4
+#define PIRx_ELx_PERM_SHIFT(idx) ((idx) * PIRx_ELx_BITS_PER_IDX)
+#define PIRx_ELx_PERM_PREP(idx, perm) (((perm) & PIE_MASK) << PIRx_ELx_PERM_SHIFT(idx))
/*
* Permission Overlay Extension (POE) permission encodings.
@@ -1078,6 +1081,11 @@
#define POE_RXW UL(0x7)
#define POE_MASK UL(0xf)
+#define POR_ELx_BITS_PER_IDX 4
+#define POR_ELx_PERM_SHIFT(idx) ((idx) * POR_ELx_BITS_PER_IDX)
+#define POR_ELx_PERM_GET(idx, reg) (((reg) >> POR_ELx_PERM_SHIFT(idx)) & POE_MASK)
+#define POR_ELx_PERM_PREP(idx, perm) (((perm) & POE_MASK) << POR_ELx_PERM_SHIFT(idx))
+
/* Initial value for Permission Overlay Extension for EL0 */
#define POR_EL0_INIT POE_RXW
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c
index 99ea26d400ff..bf6226256549 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ static void save_reset_user_access_state(struct user_access_state *ua_state)
u64 por_enable_all = 0;
for (int pkey = 0; pkey < arch_max_pkey(); pkey++)
- por_enable_all |= POE_RXW << (pkey * POR_BITS_PER_PKEY);
+ por_enable_all |= POR_ELx_PERM_PREP(pkey, POE_RXW);
ua_state->por_el0 = read_sysreg_s(SYS_POR_EL0);
write_sysreg_s(por_enable_all, SYS_POR_EL0);
diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
index b4df5bc5b1b8..69a83a77ccce 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c
@@ -1557,7 +1557,6 @@ int arch_set_user_pkey_access(struct task_struct *tsk, int pkey, unsigned long i
{
u64 new_por = POE_RXW;
u64 old_por;
- u64 pkey_shift;
if (!system_supports_poe())
return -ENOSPC;
@@ -1582,12 +1581,11 @@ int arch_set_user_pkey_access(struct task_struct *tsk, int pkey, unsigned long i
new_por &= ~POE_X;
/* Shift the bits in to the correct place in POR for pkey: */
- pkey_shift = pkey * POR_BITS_PER_PKEY;
- new_por <<= pkey_shift;
+ new_por = POR_ELx_PERM_PREP(pkey, new_por);
/* Get old POR and mask off any old bits in place: */
old_por = read_sysreg_s(SYS_POR_EL0);
- old_por &= ~(POE_MASK << pkey_shift);
+ old_por &= ~(POE_MASK << POR_ELx_PERM_SHIFT(pkey));
/* Write old part along with new part: */
write_sysreg_s(old_por | new_por, SYS_POR_EL0);
--
2.47.0
Powered by blists - more mailing lists