linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH V2 02/12] KVM: x86: Allow the use of kvm_load_host_xsave_state() with guest_state

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Message-ID: <01e85b96-db63-4de2-9f49-322919e054ec@intel.com>
Date: Thu, 20 Feb 2025 18:50:17 +0800
From: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@...el.com>
To: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@...el.com>, pbonzini@...hat.com,
 seanjc@...gle.com
Cc: kvm@...r.kernel.org, rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com, kai.huang@...el.com,
 reinette.chatre@...el.com, tony.lindgren@...ux.intel.com,
 binbin.wu@...ux.intel.com, dmatlack@...gle.com, isaku.yamahata@...el.com,
 nik.borisov@...e.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, yan.y.zhao@...el.com,
 chao.gao@...el.com, weijiang.yang@...el.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH V2 02/12] KVM: x86: Allow the use of
 kvm_load_host_xsave_state() with guest_state_protected

On 1/29/2025 5:58 PM, Adrian Hunter wrote:
> From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
> 
> Allow the use of kvm_load_host_xsave_state() with
> vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected == true. This will allow TDX to reuse
> kvm_load_host_xsave_state() instead of creating its own version.
> 
> For consistency, amend kvm_load_guest_xsave_state() also.
> 
> Ensure that guest state that kvm_load_host_xsave_state() depends upon,
> such as MSR_IA32_XSS, cannot be changed by user space, if
> guest_state_protected.
> 
> [Adrian: wrote commit message]
> 
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/Z2GiQS_RmYeHU09L@google.com
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
> Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@...el.com>
> ---
> TD vcpu enter/exit v2:
>   - New patch
> ---
>   arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c |  7 +++++--
>   arch/x86/kvm/x86.c     | 18 +++++++++++-------
>   2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> index 7640a84e554a..b4bcfe15ad5e 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> @@ -4253,7 +4253,9 @@ static __no_kcsan fastpath_t svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>   		svm_set_dr6(svm, DR6_ACTIVE_LOW);
>   
>   	clgi();
> -	kvm_load_guest_xsave_state(vcpu);
> +
> +	if (!vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
> +		kvm_load_guest_xsave_state(vcpu);
>   
>   	kvm_wait_lapic_expire(vcpu);
>   
> @@ -4282,7 +4284,8 @@ static __no_kcsan fastpath_t svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>   	if (unlikely(svm->vmcb->control.exit_code == SVM_EXIT_NMI))
>   		kvm_before_interrupt(vcpu, KVM_HANDLING_NMI);
>   
> -	kvm_load_host_xsave_state(vcpu);
> +	if (!vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
> +		kvm_load_host_xsave_state(vcpu);
>   	stgi();
>   
>   	/* Any pending NMI will happen here */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> index bbb6b7f40b3a..5cf9f023fd4b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> @@ -1169,11 +1169,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_lmsw);
>   
>   void kvm_load_guest_xsave_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>   {
> -	if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
> -		return;
> +	WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected);
>   
>   	if (kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_OSXSAVE)) {
> -
>   		if (vcpu->arch.xcr0 != kvm_host.xcr0)
>   			xsetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK, vcpu->arch.xcr0);
>   
> @@ -1192,13 +1190,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_load_guest_xsave_state);
>   
>   void kvm_load_host_xsave_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>   {
> -	if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
> -		return;
> -
>   	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_PKU) &&
>   	    ((vcpu->arch.xcr0 & XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU) ||
>   	     kvm_is_cr4_bit_set(vcpu, X86_CR4_PKE))) {
> -		vcpu->arch.pkru = rdpkru();
> +		if (!vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
> +			vcpu->arch.pkru = rdpkru();

this needs justification.

>   		if (vcpu->arch.pkru != vcpu->arch.host_pkru)
>   			wrpkru(vcpu->arch.host_pkru);
>   	}


> @@ -3916,6 +3912,10 @@ int kvm_set_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
>   		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
>   		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES))
>   			return 1;
> +
> +		if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
> +			return 1;
> +

this and below change need to be a separate patch. So that we can 
discuss independently.

I see no reason to make MSR_IA32_XSS special than other MSRs. When 
guest_state_protected, most of the MSRs that aren't emulated by KVM are 
inaccessible by KVM.

>   		/*
>   		 * KVM supports exposing PT to the guest, but does not support
>   		 * IA32_XSS[bit 8]. Guests have to use RDMSR/WRMSR rather than
> @@ -4375,6 +4375,10 @@ int kvm_get_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
>   		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
>   		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES))
>   			return 1;
> +
> +		if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
> +			return 1;
> +
>   		msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.ia32_xss;
>   		break;
>   	case MSR_K7_CLK_CTL: