linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v2 3/5] x86/mce: add EX_TYPE_EFAULT_REG as in-kernel recovery context to fix copy-from-user operations regression

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Message-ID: <5ff00e53-957b-4a4e-a893-f83c4995c1ed@linux.alibaba.com>
Date: Fri, 21 Feb 2025 14:52:24 +0800
From: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@...ux.alibaba.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
 "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@...el.com>
Cc: nao.horiguchi@...il.com, tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com,
 dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com, x86@...nel.org, hpa@...or.com,
 linmiaohe@...wei.com, akpm@...ux-foundation.org, jpoimboe@...nel.org,
 linux-edac@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
 linux-mm@...ck.org, baolin.wang@...ux.alibaba.com,
 tianruidong@...ux.alibaba.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 3/5] x86/mce: add EX_TYPE_EFAULT_REG as in-kernel
 recovery context to fix copy-from-user operations regression



在 2025/2/19 18:40, Peter Zijlstra 写道:
> On Tue, Feb 18, 2025 at 05:48:00PM +0100, Borislav Petkov wrote:
>> On Tue, Feb 18, 2025 at 03:15:35PM +0100, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c
>>> index dac4d64dfb2a..cfdae25eacd7 100644
>>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c
>>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c
>>> @@ -301,18 +301,19 @@ static noinstr int error_context(struct mce *m, struct pt_regs *regs)
>>>   	instrumentation_end();
>>>   
>>>   	switch (fixup_type) {
>>> -	case EX_TYPE_UACCESS:
>>> -		if (!copy_user)
>>> -			return IN_KERNEL;
>>> -		m->kflags |= MCE_IN_KERNEL_COPYIN;
>>> -		fallthrough;
>>> -
>>>   	case EX_TYPE_FAULT_MCE_SAFE:
>>>   	case EX_TYPE_DEFAULT_MCE_SAFE:
>>>   		m->kflags |= MCE_IN_KERNEL_RECOV;
>>>   		return IN_KERNEL_RECOV;
>>>   
>>>   	default:
>>> +		if (copy_user) {
>>
>> As said on chat, if we can make is_copy_from_user() *always* correctly detect
>> user access, then sure but I'm afraid EX_TYPE_UACCESS being generated at the
>> handful places where we do user memory access is there for a reason as it
>> makes it pretty explicit.
> 
> Thing is, we have copy routines that do not know if its user or not.
> is_copy_from_user() must be reliable.
> 
> Anyway, if you all really want to go all funny, try the below.
> 
> Someone has to go and stick some EX_FLAG_USER on things, but I just
> really don't believe that's doing to be useful. Because while you're
> doing that, you should also audit if is_copy_from_user() will catch it
> and if it does, you don't need the tag.
> 
> See how much tags you end up with..

Agreed, I think the key point whether the error context is in a read from user
memory. We do not care about the ex-type if we know its a MOV
reading from userspace.

is_copy_from_user() return true when both of the following two checks are
true:

- the current instruction is copy
- source address is user memory

If copy_user is true, we set

m->kflags |= MCE_IN_KERNEL_COPYIN | MCE_IN_KERNEL_RECOV;

Then do_machine_check will try fixup_exception first.

	/*
	 * Handle an MCE which has happened in kernel space but from
	 * which the kernel can recover: ex_has_fault_handler() has
	 * already verified that the rIP at which the error happened is
	 * a rIP from which the kernel can recover (by jumping to
	 * recovery code specified in _ASM_EXTABLE_FAULT()) and the
	 * corresponding exception handler which would do that is the
	 * proper one.
	 */
	if (m->kflags & MCE_IN_KERNEL_RECOV) {
		if (!fixup_exception(regs, X86_TRAP_MC, 0, 0))
			mce_panic("Failed kernel mode recovery", &err, msg);
	}

	if (m->kflags & MCE_IN_KERNEL_COPYIN)
		queue_task_work(&err, msg, kill_me_never);

So Peter's code is fine to me.

---
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c
index dac4d64dfb2a..cb021058165f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c
@@ -300,13 +300,12 @@ static noinstr int error_context(struct mce *m, struct pt_regs *regs)
  	copy_user  = is_copy_from_user(regs);
  	instrumentation_end();
  
-	switch (fixup_type) {
-	case EX_TYPE_UACCESS:
-		if (!copy_user)
-			return IN_KERNEL;
-		m->kflags |= MCE_IN_KERNEL_COPYIN;
-		fallthrough;
+	if (copy_user) {
+		m->kflags |= MCE_IN_KERNEL_COPYIN | MCE_IN_KERNEL_COPYIN;
+		return IN_KERNEL_RECOV
+	}
  
+	switch (fixup_type) {
  	case EX_TYPE_FAULT_MCE_SAFE:
  	case EX_TYPE_DEFAULT_MCE_SAFE:
  		m->kflags |= MCE_IN_KERNEL_RECOV;


Is that ok? Please correct me if I missed anyting.

Thanks.
Shuai