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Message-ID: <20250224203619.594724-4-luis.gerhorst@fau.de>
Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2025 21:36:13 +0100
From: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@....de>
To: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
	Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@...nel.org>,
	Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@...ux.dev>,
	Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@...il.com>,
	Song Liu <song@...nel.org>,
	Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@...ux.dev>,
	John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>,
	KP Singh <kpsingh@...nel.org>,
	Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@...ichev.me>,
	Hao Luo <haoluo@...gle.com>,
	Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...nel.org>,
	Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@...nel.org>,
	Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@...weicloud.com>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
	Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
	Mykola Lysenko <mykolal@...com>,
	Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>,
	Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@....de>,
	Henriette Herzog <henriette.herzog@....de>,
	Cupertino Miranda <cupertino.miranda@...cle.com>,
	Matan Shachnai <m.shachnai@...il.com>,
	Dimitar Kanaliev <dimitar.kanaliev@...eground.com>,
	Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@...e.com>,
	Daniel Xu <dxu@...uu.xyz>,
	bpf@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Maximilian Ott <ott@...fau.de>,
	Milan Stephan <milan.stephan@....de>
Subject: [RFC PATCH 3/9] bpf: Return EFAULT on misconfigurations

Mark these cases as non-recoverable, even when they only occur during
speculative path verification.

Signed-off-by: Luis Gerhorst <luis.gerhorst@....de>
Acked-by: Henriette Herzog <henriette.herzog@....de>
Cc: Maximilian Ott <ott@...fau.de>
Cc: Milan Stephan <milan.stephan@....de>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++------------------
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 42ff90bc81e6..d8a95b84c566 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -8668,7 +8668,7 @@ static int resolve_map_arg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 	if (!meta->map_ptr) {
 		/* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */
 		verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->type\n");
-		return -EACCES;
+		return -EFAULT;
 	}
 
 	switch (meta->map_ptr->map_type) {
@@ -9356,7 +9356,7 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg,
 			 * that kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier
 			 */
 			verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->key\n");
-			return -EACCES;
+			return -EFAULT;
 		}
 		key_size = meta->map_ptr->key_size;
 		err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, key_size, BPF_READ, false, NULL);
@@ -9383,7 +9383,7 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg,
 		if (!meta->map_ptr) {
 			/* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */
 			verbose(env, "invalid map_ptr to access map->value\n");
-			return -EACCES;
+			return -EFAULT;
 		}
 		meta->raw_mode = arg_type & MEM_UNINIT;
 		err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno, meta->map_ptr->value_size,
@@ -10687,7 +10687,7 @@ record_func_map(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta,
 
 	if (map == NULL) {
 		verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n");
-		return -EINVAL;
+		return -EFAULT;
 	}
 
 	/* In case of read-only, some additional restrictions
@@ -10726,7 +10726,7 @@ record_func_key(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta,
 		return 0;
 	if (!map || map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY) {
 		verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n");
-		return -EINVAL;
+		return -EFAULT;
 	}
 
 	reg = &regs[BPF_REG_3];
@@ -10972,7 +10972,7 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn
 	if (changes_data && fn->arg1_type != ARG_PTR_TO_CTX) {
 		verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d: r1 != ctx\n",
 			func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
-		return -EINVAL;
+		return -EFAULT;
 	}
 
 	memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta));
@@ -10982,6 +10982,7 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn
 	if (err) {
 		verbose(env, "kernel subsystem misconfigured func %s#%d\n",
 			func_id_name(func_id), func_id);
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(error_recoverable_with_nospec(err));
 		return err;
 	}
 
@@ -11274,7 +11275,7 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn
 		if (meta.map_ptr == NULL) {
 			verbose(env,
 				"kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n");
-			return -EINVAL;
+			return -EFAULT;
 		}
 
 		if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem &&
@@ -16291,7 +16292,7 @@ static int check_ld_imm(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
 		dst_reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP;
 	} else {
 		verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
-		return -EINVAL;
+		return -EFAULT;
 	}
 
 	return 0;
@@ -16338,7 +16339,7 @@ static int check_ld_abs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
 
 	if (!env->ops->gen_ld_abs) {
 		verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
-		return -EINVAL;
+		return -EFAULT;
 	}
 
 	if (insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_0 || insn->off != 0 ||
@@ -20398,7 +20399,7 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 						 -(subprogs[0].stack_depth + 8));
 		if (epilogue_cnt >= INSN_BUF_SIZE) {
 			verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
-			return -EINVAL;
+			return -EFAULT;
 		} else if (epilogue_cnt) {
 			/* Save the ARG_PTR_TO_CTX for the epilogue to use */
 			cnt = 0;
@@ -20417,13 +20418,13 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 	if (ops->gen_prologue || env->seen_direct_write) {
 		if (!ops->gen_prologue) {
 			verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
-			return -EINVAL;
+			return -EFAULT;
 		}
 		cnt = ops->gen_prologue(insn_buf, env->seen_direct_write,
 					env->prog);
 		if (cnt >= INSN_BUF_SIZE) {
 			verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
-			return -EINVAL;
+			return -EFAULT;
 		} else if (cnt) {
 			new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, 0, insn_buf, cnt);
 			if (!new_prog)
@@ -20574,7 +20575,7 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 
 			if (type == BPF_WRITE) {
 				verbose(env, "bpf verifier narrow ctx access misconfigured\n");
-				return -EINVAL;
+				return -EFAULT;
 			}
 
 			size_code = BPF_H;
@@ -20593,7 +20594,7 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 		if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= INSN_BUF_SIZE ||
 		    (ctx_field_size && !target_size)) {
 			verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
-			return -EINVAL;
+			return -EFAULT;
 		}
 
 		if (is_narrower_load && size < target_size) {
@@ -20601,7 +20602,7 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 				off, size, size_default) * 8;
 			if (shift && cnt + 1 >= INSN_BUF_SIZE) {
 				verbose(env, "bpf verifier narrow ctx load misconfigured\n");
-				return -EINVAL;
+				return -EFAULT;
 			}
 			if (ctx_field_size <= 4) {
 				if (shift)
@@ -21355,7 +21356,7 @@ static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 			cnt = env->ops->gen_ld_abs(insn, insn_buf);
 			if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= INSN_BUF_SIZE) {
 				verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
-				return -EINVAL;
+				return -EFAULT;
 			}
 
 			new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
@@ -21648,7 +21649,7 @@ static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 					goto patch_map_ops_generic;
 				if (cnt <= 0 || cnt >= INSN_BUF_SIZE) {
 					verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
-					return -EINVAL;
+					return -EFAULT;
 				}
 
 				new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta,
@@ -21991,7 +21992,7 @@ static int do_misc_fixups(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 		    !map_ptr->ops->map_poke_untrack ||
 		    !map_ptr->ops->map_poke_run) {
 			verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
-			return -EINVAL;
+			return -EFAULT;
 		}
 
 		ret = map_ptr->ops->map_poke_track(map_ptr, prog->aux);
-- 
2.48.1


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