linux-kernel - [PATCH 0/1] security: Propagate universal pointer data in bpf hooks

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Message-ID: <20250226003055.1654837-1-bboscaccy@linux.microsoft.com>
Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2025 16:30:29 -0800
From: Blaise Boscaccy <bboscaccy@...ux.microsoft.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
	John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>,
	Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@...nel.org>,
	Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@...ux.dev>,
	Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@...il.com>,
	Song Liu <song@...nel.org>,
	Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@...ux.dev>,
	KP Singh <kpsingh@...nel.org>,
	Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@...ichev.me>,
	Hao Luo <haoluo@...gle.com>,
	Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...nel.org>,
	Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@...il.com>,
	Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@...hat.com>,
	linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	bpf@...r.kernel.org,
	selinux@...r.kernel.org,
	bboscaccy@...ux.microsoft.com
Subject: [PATCH 0/1] security: Propagate universal pointer data in bpf hooks

Hello,

While trying to implement an eBPF gatekeeper program, we ran into an
issue whereas the LSM hooks are missing some relevant data.

Certain subcommands passed to the bpf() syscall can be invoked from
either the kernel or userspace. Additionally, some fields in the
bpf_attr sruct contain pointers, and depending on where the subcommand
was invoked, could point to either user or kernel memory. One example
of this, is the bpf_prog_load subcommand and it's fd_array.  This data
is made available and used by the verifier, but not made available to
the LSM subsystem. This patchset simply exposes that information to
applicable LSM hooks.

Blaise Boscaccy (1):
  security: Propagate universal pointer data in bpf hooks

 include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h |  6 +++---
 include/linux/security.h      | 13 +++++++------
 kernel/bpf/syscall.c          | 10 +++++-----
 security/security.c           | 17 ++++++++++-------
 security/selinux/hooks.c      |  6 +++---
 5 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)

-- 
2.48.1