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Message-ID: <20250227112856.aylsurbt3uqm4ivw@pengutronix.de>
Date: Thu, 27 Feb 2025 12:28:56 +0100
From: Marco Felsch <m.felsch@...gutronix.de>
To: Laurentiu Mihalcea <laurentiumihalcea111@...il.com>
Cc: Rob Herring <robh@...nel.org>, Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk+dt@...nel.org>,
Conor Dooley <conor+dt@...nel.org>, Shawn Guo <shawnguo@...nel.org>,
Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@...gutronix.de>,
Fabio Estevam <festevam@...il.com>,
Daniel Baluta <daniel.baluta@....com>,
Shengjiu Wang <shengjiu.wang@....com>, Frank Li <Frank.li@....com>,
imx@...ts.linux.dev, linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
Pengutronix Kernel Team <kernel@...gutronix.de>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/5] imx8mp: add support for the IMX AIPSTZ bridge
Hi Laurentiu,
On 25-02-26, Marco Felsch wrote:
> Hi,
>
> On 25-02-26, Laurentiu Mihalcea wrote:
> > From: Laurentiu Mihalcea <laurentiu.mihalcea@....com>
> >
> > The AIPSTZ bridge offers some security-related configurations which can
> > be used to restrict master access to certain peripherals on the bridge.
> >
> > Normally, this could be done from a secure environment such as ATF before
> > Linux boots but the configuration of AIPSTZ5 is lost each time the power
> > domain is powered off and then powered on. Because of this, it has to be
> > configured each time the power domain is turned on and before any master
> > tries to access the peripherals (e.g: AP, CM7, DSP, on i.MX8MP).
>
> My question still stands:
>
> Setting these bits requires very often that the core is running at EL3
> (e.g. secure-monitor) which is not the case for Linux. Can you please
> provide more information how Linux can set these bits?
Sorry I didn't noticed your response:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/a62ab860-5e0e-4ebc-af1f-6fb7ac621e2b@gmail.com/
If EL1 is allowed to set the security access configuration of the IP
cores doesn't this mean that a backdoor can be opened? E.g. your
secure-boot system configures one I2C IP core to be accessible only from
secure-world S-EL1 (OP-TEE) and after the power-domain was power-cycled
it's accessible from EL1 again. This doesn't seem right. Why should a
user be able to limit the access permissions to an IP core to only be
accessible from secure-world if the IP core is accessible from
normal-world after the power-domain was power-cycled.
Regards,
Marco
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