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Message-ID: <174041641314.2341854.17309269285047570958.b4-ty@google.com>
Date: Fri, 28 Feb 2025 09:06:36 -0800
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>, Paul Durrant <paul@....org>
Cc: kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@...cle.com>, David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 0/5] KVM: x86/xen: Restrict hypercall MSR index
On Fri, 14 Feb 2025 17:14:32 -0800, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> Harden KVM against goofy userspace by restricting the Xen hypercall MSR
> index to the de facto standard synthetic range, 0x40000000 - 0x4fffffff.
> This obviously has the potential to break userspace, but I'm fairly confident
> it'll be fine (knock wood), and doing nothing is not an option as letting
> userspace redirect any WRMSR is at best completely broken.
>
> Patches 2-5 are tangentially related cleanups.
>
> [...]
Applied to kvm-x86 xen, with the docs change. Thanks for the reviews!
[1/5] KVM: x86/xen: Restrict hypercall MSR to unofficial synthetic range
https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux/commit/5c17848134ab
[2/5] KVM: x86/xen: Add an #ifdef'd helper to detect writes to Xen MSR
https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux/commit/bb0978d95a55
[3/5] KVM: x86/xen: Consult kvm_xen_enabled when checking for Xen MSR writes
https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux/commit/a5d7700af6b0
[4/5] KVM: x86/xen: Bury xen_hvm_config behind CONFIG_KVM_XEN=y
https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux/commit/69e5a7dde965
[5/5] KVM: x86/xen: Move kvm_xen_hvm_config field into kvm_xen
https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux/commit/26e228ec1695
--
https://github.com/kvm-x86/linux/tree/next
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