linux-kernel - [RFC PATCH 06/19] KVM: SVM: Initialize apic protected state for SAVIC guests

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Message-ID: <20250228085115.105648-7-Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com>
Date: Fri, 28 Feb 2025 14:21:02 +0530
From: Neeraj Upadhyay <Neeraj.Upadhyay@....com>
To: <seanjc@...gle.com>, <pbonzini@...hat.com>, <kvm@...r.kernel.org>
CC: <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, <bp@...en8.de>, <tglx@...utronix.de>,
	<mingo@...hat.com>, <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, <Thomas.Lendacky@....com>,
	<nikunj@....com>, <Santosh.Shukla@....com>, <Vasant.Hegde@....com>,
	<Suravee.Suthikulpanit@....com>, <David.Kaplan@....com>, <x86@...nel.org>,
	<hpa@...or.com>, <peterz@...radead.org>, <huibo.wang@....com>,
	<naveen.rao@....com>, <binbin.wu@...ux.intel.com>, <isaku.yamahata@...el.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH 06/19] KVM: SVM: Initialize apic protected state for SAVIC guests

Initialize lapic's guest_apic_protected for Secure AVIC guests.
This is only an initialization commit and actual support for
creating Secure AVIC enabled guests and injecting interrupts
would be added in later commits.

Signed-off-by: Neeraj Upadhyay <Neeraj.Upadhyay@....com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 3 +++
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 5 +++++
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 456d841298f7..d4191c0a0133 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -1442,6 +1442,9 @@ static int svm_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	if (!vmcb01_page)
 		goto out;
 
+	if (sev_savic_active(vcpu->kvm))
+		vcpu->arch.apic->guest_apic_protected = APIC_STATE_PROTECTED_INJECTED_INTR;
+
 	if (sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
 		/*
 		 * SEV-ES guests require a separate VMSA page used to contain
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
index 9d7cdb8fbf87..7cde221e477e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
@@ -756,6 +756,10 @@ void sev_snp_init_protected_guest_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 int sev_gmem_prepare(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, gfn_t gfn, int max_order);
 void sev_gmem_invalidate(kvm_pfn_t start, kvm_pfn_t end);
 int sev_private_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn);
+static inline bool sev_savic_active(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	return to_kvm_sev_info(kvm)->vmsa_features & SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_AVIC;
+}
 #else
 static inline struct page *snp_safe_alloc_page_node(int node, gfp_t gfp)
 {
@@ -786,6 +790,7 @@ static inline int sev_private_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
+static inline bool sev_savic_active(struct kvm *kvm) { return false; }
 
 #endif
 
-- 
2.34.1