linux-kernel - [tip: x86/bugs] x86/bugs: Relocate mds/taa/mmio/rfds defines

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Message-ID: <174074362368.10177.4839927541564124478.tip-bot2@tip-bot2>
Date: Fri, 28 Feb 2025 11:53:43 -0000
From: "tip-bot2 for David Kaplan" <tip-bot2@...utronix.de>
To: linux-tip-commits@...r.kernel.org
Cc: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@....com>,
 "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp@...en8.de>, x86@...nel.org,
 linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [tip: x86/bugs] x86/bugs: Relocate mds/taa/mmio/rfds defines

The following commit has been merged into the x86/bugs branch of tip:

Commit-ID:     2c93762ec4b3ab66980ee7aaffde1e050bfbf291
Gitweb:        https://git.kernel.org/tip/2c93762ec4b3ab66980ee7aaffde1e050bfbf291
Author:        David Kaplan <david.kaplan@....com>
AuthorDate:    Wed, 08 Jan 2025 14:24:42 -06:00
Committer:     Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@...en8.de>
CommitterDate: Fri, 28 Feb 2025 12:39:17 +01:00

x86/bugs: Relocate mds/taa/mmio/rfds defines

Move the mds, taa, mmio, and rfds mitigation enums earlier in the file to
prepare for restructuring of these mitigations as they are all inter-related.

No functional change.

Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@....com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@...en8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250108202515.385902-3-david.kaplan@amd.com
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++------------------
 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 5397d0a..4269ed1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -247,6 +247,37 @@ static const char * const mds_strings[] = {
 	[MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV]	= "Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode",
 };
 
+enum taa_mitigations {
+	TAA_MITIGATION_OFF,
+	TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
+	TAA_MITIGATION_VERW,
+	TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED,
+};
+
+/* Default mitigation for TAA-affected CPUs */
+static enum taa_mitigations taa_mitigation __ro_after_init =
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_TAA) ? TAA_MITIGATION_VERW : TAA_MITIGATION_OFF;
+
+enum mmio_mitigations {
+	MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF,
+	MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
+	MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW,
+};
+
+/* Default mitigation for Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */
+static enum mmio_mitigations mmio_mitigation __ro_after_init =
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_MMIO_STALE_DATA) ? MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW : MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF;
+
+enum rfds_mitigations {
+	RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF,
+	RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW,
+	RFDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
+};
+
+/* Default mitigation for Register File Data Sampling */
+static enum rfds_mitigations rfds_mitigation __ro_after_init =
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RFDS) ? RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW : RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+
 static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void)
 {
 	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
@@ -290,16 +321,6 @@ early_param("mds", mds_cmdline);
 #undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)	"TAA: " fmt
 
-enum taa_mitigations {
-	TAA_MITIGATION_OFF,
-	TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
-	TAA_MITIGATION_VERW,
-	TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED,
-};
-
-/* Default mitigation for TAA-affected CPUs */
-static enum taa_mitigations taa_mitigation __ro_after_init =
-	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_TAA) ? TAA_MITIGATION_VERW : TAA_MITIGATION_OFF;
 static bool taa_nosmt __ro_after_init;
 
 static const char * const taa_strings[] = {
@@ -390,15 +411,6 @@ early_param("tsx_async_abort", tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline);
 #undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)	"MMIO Stale Data: " fmt
 
-enum mmio_mitigations {
-	MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF,
-	MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
-	MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW,
-};
-
-/* Default mitigation for Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */
-static enum mmio_mitigations mmio_mitigation __ro_after_init =
-	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_MMIO_STALE_DATA) ? MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW : MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF;
 static bool mmio_nosmt __ro_after_init = false;
 
 static const char * const mmio_strings[] = {
@@ -487,16 +499,6 @@ early_param("mmio_stale_data", mmio_stale_data_parse_cmdline);
 #undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)	"Register File Data Sampling: " fmt
 
-enum rfds_mitigations {
-	RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF,
-	RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW,
-	RFDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
-};
-
-/* Default mitigation for Register File Data Sampling */
-static enum rfds_mitigations rfds_mitigation __ro_after_init =
-	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RFDS) ? RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW : RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
-
 static const char * const rfds_strings[] = {
 	[RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF]			= "Vulnerable",
 	[RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW]			= "Mitigation: Clear Register File",