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Message-ID: <CAAH4kHYqQOm8JrKDDDBgWqOY4QFX3zksfdDGr2nWQBFUEbh8OQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 28 Feb 2025 19:57:40 -0800
From: Dionna Amalie Glaze <dionnaglaze@...gle.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
Cc: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@...hat.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Claudio Carvalho <cclaudio@...ux.ibm.com>, Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@....de>, x86@...nel.org,
Dov Murik <dovmurik@...ux.ibm.com>, linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev,
James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Joerg Roedel <jroedel@...e.de>, Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...pe.ca>, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@....com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 5/6] tpm: add SNP SVSM vTPM driver
On Fri, Feb 28, 2025 at 5:51 PM Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Feb 28, 2025 at 06:07:19PM +0100, Stefano Garzarella wrote:
> > Add driver for the vTPM defined by the AMD SVSM spec [1].
> >
> > The specification defines a protocol that a SEV-SNP guest OS can use to
> > discover and talk to a vTPM emulated by the Secure VM Service Module (SVSM)
> > in the guest context, but at a more privileged level (VMPL0).
> >
> > The new tpm-svsm platform driver uses two functions exposed by x86/sev
> > to verify that the device is actually emulated by the platform and to
> > send commands and receive responses.
> >
> > The vTPM is emulated through the TCG reference implementation, so this
> > driver leverages tpm_tcgsim.h to fill commands and parse responses.
>
> Why? Please don't.
>
> >
> > The device cannot be hot-plugged/unplugged as it is emulated by the
> > platform, so we can use module_platform_driver_probe(). The probe
> > function will only check whether in the current runtime configuration,
> > SVSM is present and provides a vTPM.
> >
> > [1] "Secure VM Service Module for SEV-SNP Guests"
> > Publication # 58019 Revision: 1.00
> > https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/epyc-technical-docs/specifications/58019.pdf
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@...hat.com>
> > ---
> > drivers/char/tpm/tpm_svsm.c | 120 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig | 10 +++
> > drivers/char/tpm/Makefile | 1 +
> > 3 files changed, 131 insertions(+)
> > create mode 100644 drivers/char/tpm/tpm_svsm.c
> >
> > diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_svsm.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_svsm.c
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..1c34133990c5
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_svsm.c
> > @@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
> > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
> > +/*
> > + * Copyright (C) 2025 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
> > + *
> > + * Driver for the vTPM defined by the AMD SVSM spec [1].
> > + *
> > + * The specification defines a protocol that a SEV-SNP guest OS can use to
> > + * discover and talk to a vTPM emulated by the Secure VM Service Module (SVSM)
> > + * in the guest context, but at a more privileged level (usually VMPL0).
> > + *
> > + * The vTPM is emulated through the TCG reference implementation, so this
> > + * driver leverages tpm_tcgsim.h to fill commands and parse responses.
> > + *
> > + * [1] "Secure VM Service Module for SEV-SNP Guests"
> > + * Publication # 58019 Revision: 1.00
> > + * https://www.amd.com/content/dam/amd/en/documents/epyc-technical-docs/specifications/58019.pdf
> > + */
> > +
> > +#include <asm/sev.h>
> > +#include <linux/module.h>
> > +#include <linux/kernel.h>
> > +#include <linux/platform_device.h>
> > +#include <linux/tpm_tcgsim.h>
> > +
> > +#include "tpm.h"
> > +
> > +struct tpm_svsm_priv {
> > + u8 buffer[TPM_TCGSIM_MAX_BUFFER];
> > + u8 locality;
> > +};
> > +
> > +static int tpm_svsm_send_recv(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t buf_len,
> > + size_t to_send)
> > +{
> > + struct tpm_svsm_priv *priv = dev_get_drvdata(&chip->dev);
> > + int ret;
> > +
> > + ret = tpm_tcgsim_fill_send_cmd((struct tpm_send_cmd_req *)priv->buffer,
> > + priv->locality, buf, to_send);
> > + if (ret)
> > + return ret;
> > +
> > + ret = snp_svsm_vtpm_send_command(priv->buffer);
> > + if (ret)
> > + return ret;
> > +
> > + return tpm_tcgsim_parse_send_cmd((struct tpm_send_cmd_resp *)priv->buffer,
> > + buf, buf_len);
> > +}
> > +
> > +static struct tpm_class_ops tpm_chip_ops = {
> > + .flags = TPM_OPS_AUTO_STARTUP,
> > + .send_recv = tpm_svsm_send_recv,
> > +};
> > +
> > +static int __init tpm_svsm_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
> > +{
> > + struct device *dev = &pdev->dev;
> > + struct tpm_svsm_priv *priv;
> > + struct tpm_chip *chip;
> > + int err;
> > +
> > + if (!snp_svsm_vtpm_probe())
> > + return -ENODEV;
> > +
> > + priv = devm_kmalloc(dev, sizeof(*priv), GFP_KERNEL);
> > + if (!priv)
> > + return -ENOMEM;
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * FIXME: before implementing locality we need to agree what it means
> > + * for the SNP SVSM vTPM
> > + */
> > + priv->locality = 0;
> > +
> > + chip = tpmm_chip_alloc(dev, &tpm_chip_ops);
> > + if (IS_ERR(chip))
> > + return PTR_ERR(chip);
> > +
> > + dev_set_drvdata(&chip->dev, priv);
> > +
> > + err = tpm2_probe(chip);
> > + if (err)
> > + return err;
> > +
> > + err = tpm_chip_register(chip);
> > + if (err)
> > + return err;
> > +
> > + dev_info(dev, "SNP SVSM vTPM %s device\n",
> > + (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) ? "2.0" : "1.2");
> > +
> > + return 0;
> > +}
> > +
> > +static void __exit tpm_svsm_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
> > +{
> > + struct tpm_chip *chip = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
> > +
> > + tpm_chip_unregister(chip);
> > +}
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * tpm_svsm_remove() lives in .exit.text. For drivers registered via
> > + * module_platform_driver_probe() this is ok because they cannot get unbound
> > + * at runtime. So mark the driver struct with __refdata to prevent modpost
> > + * triggering a section mismatch warning.
> > + */
> > +static struct platform_driver tpm_svsm_driver __refdata = {
> > + .remove = __exit_p(tpm_svsm_remove),
> > + .driver = {
> > + .name = "tpm-svsm",
> > + },
> > +};
> > +
> > +module_platform_driver_probe(tpm_svsm_driver, tpm_svsm_probe);
> > +
> > +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("SNP SVSM vTPM Driver");
> > +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
> > +MODULE_ALIAS("platform:tpm-svsm");
> > diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
> > index 0fc9a510e059..fc3f1d10d31d 100644
> > --- a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
> > +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig
> > @@ -225,5 +225,15 @@ config TCG_FTPM_TEE
> > help
> > This driver proxies for firmware TPM running in TEE.
> >
> > +config TCG_SVSM
> > + tristate "SNP SVSM vTPM interface"
> > + depends on AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
> > + help
> > + This is a driver for the AMD SVSM vTPM protocol that a SEV-SNP guest
> > + OS can use to discover and talk to a vTPM emulated by the Secure VM
> > + Service Module (SVSM) in the guest context, but at a more privileged
> > + level (usually VMPL0). To compile this driver as a module, choose M
> > + here; the module will be called tpm_svsm.
> > +
> > source "drivers/char/tpm/st33zp24/Kconfig"
> > endif # TCG_TPM
> > diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile
> > index 9bb142c75243..52d9d80a0f56 100644
> > --- a/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile
> > +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Makefile
> > @@ -44,3 +44,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_XEN) += xen-tpmfront.o
> > obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_CRB) += tpm_crb.o
> > obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_VTPM_PROXY) += tpm_vtpm_proxy.o
> > obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_FTPM_TEE) += tpm_ftpm_tee.o
> > +obj-$(CONFIG_TCG_SVSM) += tpm_svsm.o
> > --
> > 2.48.1
> >
>
> OK, so this is like ARM's driver architecture using SMC, and I think
> tpm_ftpm_tee is probably one great reflection for this overall. Is this
> correct analysis, or not?
Using ftpm is really obtuse, at least with my attempt
https://github.com/deeglaze/amdese-linux/tree/svsmftpm
I don't really know how to cleanly bind the platform_driver to the one device.
I don't think that this is any way better than what this patch series proposes.
>
> BR, Jarkko
--
-Dionna Glaze, PhD, CISSP, CCSP (she/her)
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