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Message-ID: <Z8Ju_j8XSIsAu0XA@kernel.org>
Date: Sat, 1 Mar 2025 04:20:46 +0200
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
To: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@...cle.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
"open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM" <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>,
"herbert@...dor.apana.org.au" <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
"davem@...emloft.net" <davem@...emloft.net>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
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Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>,
Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>,
Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>,
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Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>,
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Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 00/13] Clavis LSM
On Thu, Feb 27, 2025 at 05:22:22PM -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 27, 2025 at 3:41 PM Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com> wrote:
> > On Mon, 2025-01-06 at 17:15 +0000, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> > > > On Jan 5, 2025, at 8:40 PM, Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com> wrote:
> > > > On Fri, Jan 3, 2025 at 11:48 PM Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com> wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > Regardless, back to Clavis ... reading quickly through the cover
> > > > > letter again, I do somewhat wonder if this isn't better integrated
> > > > > into the keyring proper; have you talked to both David and Jarkko
> > > > > about this?
> > > >
> > > > I realize I should probably expand on my thinking a bit, especially
> > > > since my comment a while regarding LSMs dedicated to enforcing access
> > > > control on keys is what was given as a reason for making Clavis a LSM.
> > > >
> > > > I still stand by my comment from over a year ago that I see no reason
> > > > why we couldn't support a LSM that enforces access controls on
> > > > keyrings/keys. What gives me pause with the Clavis LSM is that so
> > > > much of Clavis is resident in the keyrings themselves, e.g. Clavis
> > > > policy ACLs and authorization keys, that it really feels like it
> > > > should be part of the keys subsystem and not a LSM. Yes, existing
> > > > LSMs do have LSM specific data that resides outside of the LSM and in
> > > > an object's subsystem, but that is usually limited to security
> > > > identifiers and similar things, not the LSM's security policy.
> >
> > Hi Jarkko, David,
> >
> > Both Paul's and my main concerns with this patch set is storing policy in the
> > keyring. We would appreciate your chiming in here about storing key policy in
> > the keyring itself.
>
> I'd still also like to see some discussion about moving towards the
> addition of keyrings oriented towards usage instead of limiting
> ourselves to keyrings that are oriented on the source of the keys.
> Perhaps I'm missing some important detail which makes this
> impractical, but it seems like an obvious improvement to me and would
> go a long way towards solving some of the problems that we typically
> see with kernel keys.
I get the theoretical concern but cannot see anything obvious in the
patch set that would nail into practical concerns.
>
> --
> paul-moore.com
BR, Jarkko
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