linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH 4/4] KVM: TDX: Always honor guest PAT on TDX enabled platforms

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Message-ID: <338901b6-4d10-480d-bd0a-0db8ec4afad5@intel.com>
Date: Mon, 3 Mar 2025 01:03:53 +0800
From: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@...el.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
 kvm@...r.kernel.org
Cc: seanjc@...gle.com, yan.y.zhao@...el.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/4] KVM: TDX: Always honor guest PAT on TDX enabled
 platforms

On 3/1/2025 3:34 PM, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> From: Yan Zhao <yan.y.zhao@...el.com>
> 
> Always honor guest PAT in KVM-managed EPTs on TDX enabled platforms by
> making self-snoop feature a hard dependency for TDX and making quirk
> KVM_X86_QUIRK_EPT_IGNORE_GUEST_PAT not a valid quirk once TDX is enabled.
> 
> The quirk KVM_X86_QUIRK_EPT_IGNORE_GUEST_PAT only affects memory type of
> KVM-managed EPTs. For the TDX-module-managed private EPT, memory type is
> always forced to WB now.
> 
> Honoring guest PAT in KVM-managed EPTs ensures KVM does not invoke
> kvm_zap_gfn_range() when attaching/detaching non-coherent DMA devices;
> this would cause mirrored EPTs for TDs to be zapped, as well as incorrect
> zapping of the private EPT that is managed by the TDX module.
> 
> As a new platform, TDX always comes with self-snoop feature supported and has
> no worry to break old not-well-written yet unmodifiable guests. So, simply
> force-disable the KVM_X86_QUIRK_EPT_IGNORE_GUEST_PAT quirk for TDX VMs.
> 
> Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
> Signed-off-by: Yan Zhao <yan.y.zhao@...el.com>
> Message-ID: <20250224071039.31511-1-yan.y.zhao@...el.com>
> [Use disabled_quirks instead of supported_quirks. - Paolo]
> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
> ---
>   arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 6 ++++++
>   1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> index b6f6f6e2f02e..4450fd99cb4c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
> @@ -624,6 +624,7 @@ int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
>   
>   	kvm->arch.has_protected_state = true;
>   	kvm->arch.has_private_mem = true;
> +	kvm->arch.disabled_quirks |= KVM_X86_QUIRK_EPT_IGNORE_GUEST_PAT;

This doesn't present userspace from dropping the 
KVM_X86_QUIRK_EPT_IGNORE_GUEST_PAT bit by updating
kvm->arch.disabled_quirk via KVM_CAP_DISABLE_QUIRKS.

I think we can make inapplicable_quirks per VM in Patch 1 and set

     kvm->arch.inapplicable_quirks |= KVM_X86_QUIRK_EPT_IGNORE_GUEST_PAT;

for TDX VMs.

>   
>   	/*
>   	 * Because guest TD is protected, VMM can't parse the instruction in TD.
> @@ -3470,6 +3471,11 @@ int __init tdx_bringup(void)
>   		goto success_disable_tdx;
>   	}
>   
> +	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SELFSNOOP)) {
> +		pr_err("Self-snoop is required for TDX\n");
> +		goto success_disable_tdx;
> +	}
> +
>   	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TDX_HOST_PLATFORM)) {
>   		pr_err("tdx: no TDX private KeyIDs available\n");
>   		goto success_disable_tdx;