linux-kernel - Re: [RFC PATCH v3 00/13] Clavis LSM

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Message-ID: <CAHC9VhRMUkzLVT5GT5c5hgpfaaKubzcPOTWFDpOmhNne0sswPA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 4 Mar 2025 19:23:03 -0500
From: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
To: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@...cle.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, 
	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>, 
	"open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM" <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>, 
	David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>, 
	"herbert@...dor.apana.org.au" <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>, "davem@...emloft.net" <davem@...emloft.net>, 
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, 
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>, Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>, 
	Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@...il.com>, Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>, 
	"casey@...aufler-ca.com" <casey@...aufler-ca.com>, Stefan Berger <stefanb@...ux.ibm.com>, 
	"ebiggers@...nel.org" <ebiggers@...nel.org>, Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@...radead.org>, 
	open list <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, 
	"keyrings@...r.kernel.org" <keyrings@...r.kernel.org>, 
	"linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org" <linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org>, 
	"linux-efi@...r.kernel.org" <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>, 
	"linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org" <linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 00/13] Clavis LSM

On Tue, Mar 4, 2025 at 9:47 AM Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@...cle.com> wrote:
> > On Mar 3, 2025, at 3:40 PM, Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com> wrote:
> > On Fri, Feb 28, 2025 at 12:52 PM Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@...cle.com> wrote:
> >>> On Feb 28, 2025, at 9:14 AM, Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com> wrote:
> >>> On Fri, Feb 28, 2025 at 9:09 AM Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com> wrote:
> >>>> On Thu, 2025-02-27 at 17:22 -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> >>>>>
> >>>>> I'd still also like to see some discussion about moving towards the
> >>>>> addition of keyrings oriented towards usage instead of limiting
> >>>>> ourselves to keyrings that are oriented on the source of the keys.
> >>>>> Perhaps I'm missing some important detail which makes this
> >>>>> impractical, but it seems like an obvious improvement to me and would
> >>>>> go a long way towards solving some of the problems that we typically
> >>>>> see with kernel keys.
> >>
> >> The intent is not to limit ourselves to the source of the key.  The main
> >> point of Clavis is to allow the end-user to determine what kernel keys
> >> they want to trust and for what purpose, irrespective of the originating
> >> source (.builtin_trusted, .secondary, .machine, or .platform). If we could
> >> go back in time, individual keyrings could be created that are oriented
> >> toward usage.   The idea for introducing Clavis is to bridge what we
> >> have today with kernel keys and allow them to be usage based.
> >
> > While it is unlikely that the current well known keyrings could be
> > removed, I see no reason why new usage oriented keyrings could not be
> > introduced.  We've seen far more significant shifts in the kernel over
> > the years.
>
> Could you further clarify how a usage oriented keyring would work?  For
> example, if a kernel module keyring was added, how would the end-user
> add keys to it while maintaining a root of trust?

Consider it an exercise left to the reader :)

I imagine there are different ways one could do that, either using
traditional user/group/capability permissions and/or LSM permissions,
it would depend on the environment and the security goals of the
overall system.

-- 
paul-moore.com