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Message-ID: <20250304182421.05b6a12f.alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 4 Mar 2025 18:24:21 -0700
From: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@...hat.com>
To: Wathsala Wathawana Vithanage <wathsala.vithanage@....com>
Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...pe.ca>, "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org"
<linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, nd <nd@....com>, Kevin Tian
<kevin.tian@...el.com>, Philipp Stanner <pstanner@...hat.com>, Yunxiang Li
<Yunxiang.Li@....com>, "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <linux@...blig.org>, Ankit
Agrawal <ankita@...dia.com>, "open list:VFIO DRIVER" <kvm@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] vfio/pci: add PCIe TPH to device feature ioctl
On Tue, 4 Mar 2025 22:38:16 +0000
Wathsala Wathawana Vithanage <wathsala.vithanage@....com> wrote:
> > > Linux v6.13 introduced the PCIe TLP Processing Hints (TPH) feature for
> > > direct cache injection. As described in the relevant patch set [1],
> > > direct cache injection in supported hardware allows optimal platform
> > > resource utilization for specific requests on the PCIe bus. This feature
> > > is currently available only for kernel device drivers. However,
> > > user space applications, especially those whose performance is sensitive
> > > to the latency of inbound writes as seen by a CPU core, may benefit from
> > > using this information (E.g., DPDK cache stashing RFC [2] or an HPC
> > > application running in a VM).
> > >
> > > This patch enables configuring of TPH from the user space via
> > > VFIO_DEVICE_FEATURE IOCLT. It provides an interface to user space
> > > drivers and VMMs to enable/disable the TPH feature on PCIe devices and
> > > set steering tags in MSI-X or steering-tag table entries using
> > > VFIO_DEVICE_FEATURE_SET flag or read steering tags from the kernel using
> > > VFIO_DEVICE_FEATURE_GET to operate in device-specific mode.
> >
> > What level of protection do we expect to have here? Is it OK for
> > userspace to make up any old tag value or is there some security
> > concern with that?
> >
> Shouldn't be allowed from within a container.
> A hypervisor should have its own STs and map them to platform STs for
> the cores the VM is pinned to and verify any old ST is not written to the
> device MSI-X, ST table or device specific locations.
And how exactly are we mediating device specific steering tags when we
don't know where/how they're written to the device. An API that
returns a valid ST to userspace doesn't provide any guarantees relative
to what userspace later writes. MSI-X tables are also writable by
userspace. I could have missed it, but I also didn't note any pinning
requirement in this proposal. Thanks,
Alex
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