linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v12 10/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel late boot stub

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Message-ID: <Z8qaEdBD8wZLo-yb@kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 7 Mar 2025 09:02:41 +0200
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
To: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@...cle.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
	linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, kexec@...ts.infradead.org,
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	dpsmith@...rtussolutions.com, tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com,
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	baolu.lu@...ux.intel.com, kanth.ghatraju@...cle.com,
	andrew.cooper3@...rix.com, trenchboot-devel@...glegroups.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v12 10/19] x86: Secure Launch kernel late boot stub

On Thu, Dec 19, 2024 at 11:42:07AM -0800, Ross Philipson wrote:
> The routine slaunch_setup is called out of the x86 specific setup_arch()
> routine during early kernel boot. After determining what platform is
> present, various operations specific to that platform occur. This
> includes finalizing setting for the platform late launch and verifying
> that memory protections are in place.
> 
> Intel VT-d/IOMMU hardware provides special registers called Protected
> Memory Regions (PMRs) that allow all memory to be protected from
> DMA during a TXT DRTM launch. This coverage is validated during the

Hair cutting again. Check through patch set:

1. D-RTM
2. DRTM

Pick one and use it consistently. Small details like this in the end
make the overall thing less exhausting to read.


BR, Jarkko