linux-kernel - [PATCH] KVM: nVMX: Check MSR load/store list counts during VM-Enter consistency checks

lists.openwall.net		lists / announce owl-users owl-dev john-users john-dev passwdqc-users yescrypt popa3d-users / oss-security kernel-hardening musl sabotage tlsify passwords / crypt-dev xvendor / Bugtraq Full-Disclosure linux-kernel linux-netdev linux-ext4 linux-hardening linux-cve-announce PHC
Open Source and information security mailing list archives

Hash Suite: Windows password security audit tool. GUI, reports in PDF.

[<prev] [next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]

Message-ID: <20250315024402.2363098-1-seanjc@google.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Mar 2025 19:44:02 -0700
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Cc: kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, 
	Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...aro.org>
Subject: [PATCH] KVM: nVMX: Check MSR load/store list counts during VM-Enter
 consistency checks

Explicitly verify the MSR load/store list counts are below the advertised
limit as part of the initial consistency checks on the lists, so that code
that consumes the count doesn't need to worry about extreme edge cases.
Enforcing the limit during the initial checks fixes a flaw on 32-bit KVM
where a sufficiently high @count could lead to overflow:

	arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c:834 nested_vmx_check_msr_switch()
	warn: potential user controlled sizeof overflow 'addr + count * 16' '0-u64max + 16-68719476720'

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
    827 static int nested_vmx_check_msr_switch(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
    828                                        u32 count, u64 addr)
    829 {
    830         if (count == 0)
    831                 return 0;
    832
    833         if (!kvm_vcpu_is_legal_aligned_gpa(vcpu, addr, 16) ||
--> 834             !kvm_vcpu_is_legal_gpa(vcpu, (addr + count * sizeof(struct vmx_msr_entry) - 1)))
                                                         ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

While the SDM doesn't explicitly state an illegal count results in VM-Fail,
the SDM states that exceeding the limit may result in undefined behavior.
I.e. the SDM gives hardware, and thus KVM, carte blanche to do literally
anything in response to a count that exceeds the "recommended" limit.

  If the limit is exceeded, undefined processor behavior may result
  (including a machine check during the VMX transition).

KVM already enforces the limit when processing the MSRs, i.e. already
signals a late VM-Exit Consistency Check for VM-Enter, and generates a
VMX Abort for VM-Exit.  I.e. explicitly checking the limits simply means
KVM will signal VM-Fail instead of VM-Exit or VMX Abort.

Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...aro.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/44961459-2759-4164-b604-f6bd43da8ce9@stanley.mountain
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
index d06e50d9c0e7..64ea387a14a1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
@@ -824,12 +824,30 @@ static int nested_vmx_check_apicv_controls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static u32 nested_vmx_max_atomic_switch_msrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	u64 vmx_misc = vmx_control_msr(vmx->nested.msrs.misc_low,
+				       vmx->nested.msrs.misc_high);
+
+	return (vmx_misc_max_msr(vmx_misc) + 1) * VMX_MISC_MSR_LIST_MULTIPLIER;
+}
+
 static int nested_vmx_check_msr_switch(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 				       u32 count, u64 addr)
 {
 	if (count == 0)
 		return 0;
 
+	/*
+	 * Exceeding the limit results in architecturally _undefined_ behavior,
+	 * i.e. KVM is allowed to do literally anything in response to a bad
+	 * limit.  Immediately generate a consistency check so that code that
+	 * consumes the count doesn't need to worry about extreme edge cases.
+	 */
+	if (count > nested_vmx_max_atomic_switch_msrs(vcpu))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	if (!kvm_vcpu_is_legal_aligned_gpa(vcpu, addr, 16) ||
 	    !kvm_vcpu_is_legal_gpa(vcpu, (addr + count * sizeof(struct vmx_msr_entry) - 1)))
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -940,15 +958,6 @@ static int nested_vmx_store_msr_check(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static u32 nested_vmx_max_atomic_switch_msrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
-	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
-	u64 vmx_misc = vmx_control_msr(vmx->nested.msrs.misc_low,
-				       vmx->nested.msrs.misc_high);
-
-	return (vmx_misc_max_msr(vmx_misc) + 1) * VMX_MISC_MSR_LIST_MULTIPLIER;
-}
-
 /*
  * Load guest's/host's msr at nested entry/exit.
  * return 0 for success, entry index for failure.
@@ -965,7 +974,7 @@ static u32 nested_vmx_load_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 gpa, u32 count)
 	u32 max_msr_list_size = nested_vmx_max_atomic_switch_msrs(vcpu);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
-		if (unlikely(i >= max_msr_list_size))
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(i >= max_msr_list_size))
 			goto fail;
 
 		if (kvm_vcpu_read_guest(vcpu, gpa + i * sizeof(e),
@@ -1053,7 +1062,7 @@ static int nested_vmx_store_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 gpa, u32 count)
 	u32 max_msr_list_size = nested_vmx_max_atomic_switch_msrs(vcpu);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
-		if (unlikely(i >= max_msr_list_size))
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(i >= max_msr_list_size))
 			return -EINVAL;
 
 		if (!read_and_check_msr_entry(vcpu, gpa, i, &e))

base-commit: c9ea48bb6ee6b28bbc956c1e8af98044618fed5e
-- 
2.49.0.rc1.451.g8f38331e32-goog