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Message-ID: <Z93NW3za1ilzVxLK@lei>
Date: Fri, 21 Mar 2025 20:34:35 +0000
From: sergeh@...nel.org
To: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@...e.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, paul@...l-moore.com,
serge@...lyn.com, kees@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com, linux-coco@...ts.linux.dev
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] lockdown: Switch implementation to using bitmap
On Fri, Mar 21, 2025 at 12:24:20PM +0200, Nikolay Borisov wrote:
> Tracking the lockdown at the depth granularity rather than at the
> individual is somewhat inflexible as it provides an "all or nothing"
> approach. Instead there are use cases where it will be useful to be
> able to lockdown individual features - TDX for example wants to disable
> access to just /dev/mem.
>
> To accommodate this use case switch the internal implementation to using
> a bitmap so that individual lockdown features can be turned on. At the
> same time retain the existing semantic where
> INTEGRITY_MAX/CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX are treated as wildcards meaning "lock
> everything below me".
>
> Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@...e.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <sergeh@...nel.org>
but one comment below
> ---
> security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 19 ++++++++++++-------
> 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
> index cf83afa1d879..5014d18c423f 100644
> --- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
> +++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
> @@ -10,12 +10,13 @@
> * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
> */
>
> +#include <linux/bitmap.h>
> #include <linux/security.h>
> #include <linux/export.h>
> #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
> #include <uapi/linux/lsm.h>
>
> -static enum lockdown_reason kernel_locked_down;
> +static DECLARE_BITMAP(kernel_locked_down, LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX);
>
> static const enum lockdown_reason lockdown_levels[] = {LOCKDOWN_NONE,
> LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX,
> @@ -26,10 +27,15 @@ static const enum lockdown_reason lockdown_levels[] = {LOCKDOWN_NONE,
> */
> static int lock_kernel_down(const char *where, enum lockdown_reason level)
> {
> - if (kernel_locked_down >= level)
> - return -EPERM;
>
> - kernel_locked_down = level;
> + if (level > LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + if (level == LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX || level == LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX)
> + bitmap_set(kernel_locked_down, 1, level);
> + else
> + bitmap_set(kernel_locked_down, level, 1);
> +
> pr_notice("Kernel is locked down from %s; see man kernel_lockdown.7\n",
> where);
> return 0;
> @@ -62,13 +68,12 @@ static int lockdown_is_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what)
> "Invalid lockdown reason"))
> return -EPERM;
>
> - if (kernel_locked_down >= what) {
> + if (test_bit(what, kernel_locked_down)) {
> if (lockdown_reasons[what])
> pr_notice_ratelimited("Lockdown: %s: %s is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7\n",
> current->comm, lockdown_reasons[what]);
> return -EPERM;
> }
> -
> return 0;
> }
>
> @@ -105,7 +110,7 @@ static ssize_t lockdown_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t count,
Context here is:
static ssize_t lockdown_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t count,
loff_t *ppos)
{
char temp[80] = "";
int i, offset = 0;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(lockdown_levels); i++) {
enum lockdown_reason level = lockdown_levels[i];
...
> if (lockdown_reasons[level]) {
> const char *label = lockdown_reasons[level];
>
> - if (kernel_locked_down == level)
> + if (test_bit(level, kernel_locked_down))
Right now this is still just looping over the lockdown_levels, and so
it can't get longer than "none [integrity] [confidentiality]" which fits
easily into the 80 chars of temp. But I'm worried that someone will
change this loop i a way that violates that. Could you just switch
this to a snprintf that checks its result for < 0 and >= n , or some
other sanity check?
> offset += sprintf(temp+offset, "[%s] ", label);
> else
> offset += sprintf(temp+offset, "%s ", label);
> --
> 2.43.0
>
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