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Message-ID: <174262865140.14745.9326438938807692123.tip-bot2@tip-bot2>
Date: Sat, 22 Mar 2025 07:30:51 -0000
From: "tip-bot2 for Namhyung Kim" <tip-bot2@...utronix.de>
To: linux-tip-commits@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Matteo Rizzo <matteorizzo@...gle.com>, Namhyung Kim <namhyung@...nel.org>,
Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@....com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, x86@...nel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject:
[tip: perf/urgent] perf/amd/ibs: Prevent leaking sensitive data to userspace
The following commit has been merged into the perf/urgent branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 50a53b60e141d7e31368a87e222e4dd5597bd4ae
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/50a53b60e141d7e31368a87e222e4dd5597bd4ae
Author: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@...nel.org>
AuthorDate: Sat, 22 Mar 2025 08:13:01 +01:00
Committer: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
CommitterDate: Sat, 22 Mar 2025 08:18:24 +01:00
perf/amd/ibs: Prevent leaking sensitive data to userspace
Although IBS "swfilt" can prevent leaking samples with kernel RIP to the
userspace, there are few subtle cases where a 'data' address and/or a
'branch target' address can fall under kernel address range although RIP
is from userspace. Prevent leaking kernel 'data' addresses by discarding
such samples when {exclude_kernel=1,swfilt=1}.
IBS can now be invoked by unprivileged user with the introduction of
"swfilt". However, this creates a loophole in the interface where an
unprivileged user can get physical address of the userspace virtual
addresses through IBS register raw dump (PERF_SAMPLE_RAW). Prevent this
as well.
This upstream commit fixed the most obvious leak:
65a99264f5e5 perf/x86: Check data address for IBS software filter
Follow that up with a more complete fix.
Fixes: d29e744c7167 ("perf/x86: Relax privilege filter restriction on AMD IBS")
Suggested-by: Matteo Rizzo <matteorizzo@...gle.com>
Co-developed-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@....com>
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@...nel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@....com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250321161251.1033-1-ravi.bangoria@amd.com
---
arch/x86/events/amd/ibs.c | 84 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 78 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/events/amd/ibs.c b/arch/x86/events/amd/ibs.c
index c465005..e36c9c6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/amd/ibs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/amd/ibs.c
@@ -941,6 +941,8 @@ static void perf_ibs_get_mem_lock(union ibs_op_data3 *op_data3,
data_src->mem_lock = PERF_MEM_LOCK_LOCKED;
}
+/* Be careful. Works only for contiguous MSRs. */
+#define ibs_fetch_msr_idx(msr) (msr - MSR_AMD64_IBSFETCHCTL)
#define ibs_op_msr_idx(msr) (msr - MSR_AMD64_IBSOPCTL)
static void perf_ibs_get_data_src(struct perf_ibs_data *ibs_data,
@@ -1036,6 +1038,67 @@ static int perf_ibs_get_offset_max(struct perf_ibs *perf_ibs, u64 sample_type,
return 1;
}
+static bool perf_ibs_is_kernel_data_addr(struct perf_event *event,
+ struct perf_ibs_data *ibs_data)
+{
+ u64 sample_type_mask = PERF_SAMPLE_ADDR | PERF_SAMPLE_RAW;
+ union ibs_op_data3 op_data3;
+ u64 dc_lin_addr;
+
+ op_data3.val = ibs_data->regs[ibs_op_msr_idx(MSR_AMD64_IBSOPDATA3)];
+ dc_lin_addr = ibs_data->regs[ibs_op_msr_idx(MSR_AMD64_IBSDCLINAD)];
+
+ return unlikely((event->attr.sample_type & sample_type_mask) &&
+ op_data3.dc_lin_addr_valid && kernel_ip(dc_lin_addr));
+}
+
+static bool perf_ibs_is_kernel_br_target(struct perf_event *event,
+ struct perf_ibs_data *ibs_data,
+ int br_target_idx)
+{
+ union ibs_op_data op_data;
+ u64 br_target;
+
+ op_data.val = ibs_data->regs[ibs_op_msr_idx(MSR_AMD64_IBSOPDATA)];
+ br_target = ibs_data->regs[br_target_idx];
+
+ return unlikely((event->attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_RAW) &&
+ op_data.op_brn_ret && kernel_ip(br_target));
+}
+
+static bool perf_ibs_swfilt_discard(struct perf_ibs *perf_ibs, struct perf_event *event,
+ struct pt_regs *regs, struct perf_ibs_data *ibs_data,
+ int br_target_idx)
+{
+ if (perf_exclude_event(event, regs))
+ return true;
+
+ if (perf_ibs != &perf_ibs_op || !event->attr.exclude_kernel)
+ return false;
+
+ if (perf_ibs_is_kernel_data_addr(event, ibs_data))
+ return true;
+
+ if (br_target_idx != -1 &&
+ perf_ibs_is_kernel_br_target(event, ibs_data, br_target_idx))
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+static void perf_ibs_phyaddr_clear(struct perf_ibs *perf_ibs,
+ struct perf_ibs_data *ibs_data)
+{
+ if (perf_ibs == &perf_ibs_op) {
+ ibs_data->regs[ibs_op_msr_idx(MSR_AMD64_IBSOPDATA3)] &= ~(1ULL << 18);
+ ibs_data->regs[ibs_op_msr_idx(MSR_AMD64_IBSDCPHYSAD)] = 0;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ibs_data->regs[ibs_fetch_msr_idx(MSR_AMD64_IBSFETCHCTL)] &= ~(1ULL << 52);
+ ibs_data->regs[ibs_fetch_msr_idx(MSR_AMD64_IBSFETCHPHYSAD)] = 0;
+}
+
static int perf_ibs_handle_irq(struct perf_ibs *perf_ibs, struct pt_regs *iregs)
{
struct cpu_perf_ibs *pcpu = this_cpu_ptr(perf_ibs->pcpu);
@@ -1048,6 +1111,7 @@ static int perf_ibs_handle_irq(struct perf_ibs *perf_ibs, struct pt_regs *iregs)
int offset, size, check_rip, offset_max, throttle = 0;
unsigned int msr;
u64 *buf, *config, period, new_config = 0;
+ int br_target_idx = -1;
if (!test_bit(IBS_STARTED, pcpu->state)) {
fail:
@@ -1102,6 +1166,7 @@ fail:
if (perf_ibs == &perf_ibs_op) {
if (ibs_caps & IBS_CAPS_BRNTRGT) {
rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_IBSBRTARGET, *buf++);
+ br_target_idx = size;
size++;
}
if (ibs_caps & IBS_CAPS_OPDATA4) {
@@ -1128,16 +1193,20 @@ fail:
regs.flags |= PERF_EFLAGS_EXACT;
}
- if (perf_ibs == &perf_ibs_op)
- perf_ibs_parse_ld_st_data(event->attr.sample_type, &ibs_data, &data);
-
if ((event->attr.config2 & IBS_SW_FILTER_MASK) &&
- (perf_exclude_event(event, ®s) ||
- ((data.sample_flags & PERF_SAMPLE_ADDR) &&
- event->attr.exclude_kernel && kernel_ip(data.addr)))) {
+ perf_ibs_swfilt_discard(perf_ibs, event, ®s, &ibs_data, br_target_idx)) {
throttle = perf_event_account_interrupt(event);
goto out;
}
+ /*
+ * Prevent leaking physical addresses to unprivileged users. Skip
+ * PERF_SAMPLE_PHYS_ADDR check since generic code prevents it for
+ * unprivileged users.
+ */
+ if ((event->attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_RAW) &&
+ perf_allow_kernel(&event->attr)) {
+ perf_ibs_phyaddr_clear(perf_ibs, &ibs_data);
+ }
if (event->attr.sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_RAW) {
raw = (struct perf_raw_record){
@@ -1149,6 +1218,9 @@ fail:
perf_sample_save_raw_data(&data, event, &raw);
}
+ if (perf_ibs == &perf_ibs_op)
+ perf_ibs_parse_ld_st_data(event->attr.sample_type, &ibs_data, &data);
+
/*
* rip recorded by IbsOpRip will not be consistent with rsp and rbp
* recorded as part of interrupt regs. Thus we need to use rip from
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