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Message-ID: <Z-bhczXA6aHdCYHq@kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2025 19:50:43 +0200
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
To: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>
Cc: dave.hansen@...el.com, linux-sgx@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, x86@...nel.org,
asit.k.mallick@...el.com, vincent.r.scarlata@...el.com,
chongc@...gle.com, erdemaktas@...gle.com, vannapurve@...gle.com,
dionnaglaze@...gle.com, bondarn@...gle.com, scott.raynor@...el.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] x86/sgx: Implement EUPDATESVN and
opportunistically call it during first EPC page alloc
On Fri, Mar 28, 2025 at 02:57:41PM +0200, Elena Reshetova wrote:
> SGX architecture introduced a new instruction called EUPDATESVN
> to Ice Lake. It allows updating security SVN version, given that EPC
> is completely empty. The latter is required for security reasons
> in order to reason that enclave security posture is as secure as the
> security SVN version of the TCB that created it.
>
> Additionally it is important to ensure that while ENCLS[EUPDATESVN]
> runs, no concurrent page creation happens in EPC, because it might
> result in #GP delivered to the creator. Legacy SW might not be prepared
> to handle such unexpected #GPs and therefore this patch introduces
> a locking mechanism to ensure no concurrent EPC allocations can happen.
>
> It is also ensured that ENCLS[EUPDATESVN] is not called when running
> in a VM since it does not have a meaning in this context (microcode
> updates application is limited to the host OS) and will create
> unnecessary load.
>
> This patch is based on previous submision by Cathy Zhang
> https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220520103904.1216-1-cathy.zhang@intel.com/
>
> Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h | 41 +++++++++++++--------
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h | 6 ++++
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h | 1 +
> 4 files changed, 95 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h
> index 6a0069761508..5caf5c31ebc6 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h
> @@ -26,23 +26,26 @@
> #define SGX_CPUID_EPC_SECTION 0x1
> /* The bitmask for the EPC section type. */
> #define SGX_CPUID_EPC_MASK GENMASK(3, 0)
> +/* EUPDATESVN presence indication */
> +#define SGX_CPUID_EUPDATESVN BIT(10)
>
> enum sgx_encls_function {
> - ECREATE = 0x00,
> - EADD = 0x01,
> - EINIT = 0x02,
> - EREMOVE = 0x03,
> - EDGBRD = 0x04,
> - EDGBWR = 0x05,
> - EEXTEND = 0x06,
> - ELDU = 0x08,
> - EBLOCK = 0x09,
> - EPA = 0x0A,
> - EWB = 0x0B,
> - ETRACK = 0x0C,
> - EAUG = 0x0D,
> - EMODPR = 0x0E,
> - EMODT = 0x0F,
> + ECREATE = 0x00,
> + EADD = 0x01,
> + EINIT = 0x02,
> + EREMOVE = 0x03,
> + EDGBRD = 0x04,
> + EDGBWR = 0x05,
> + EEXTEND = 0x06,
> + ELDU = 0x08,
> + EBLOCK = 0x09,
> + EPA = 0x0A,
> + EWB = 0x0B,
> + ETRACK = 0x0C,
> + EAUG = 0x0D,
> + EMODPR = 0x0E,
> + EMODT = 0x0F,
> + EUPDATESVN = 0x18,
> };
>
> /**
> @@ -73,6 +76,11 @@ enum sgx_encls_function {
> * public key does not match IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH.
> * %SGX_PAGE_NOT_MODIFIABLE: The EPC page cannot be modified because it
> * is in the PENDING or MODIFIED state.
> + * %SGX_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY: Insufficient entropy in RNG.
> + * %SGX_EPC_NOT_READY: EPC is not ready for SVN update.
> + * %SGX_NO_UPDATE: EUPDATESVN was successful, but CPUSVN was not
> + * updated because current SVN was not newer than
> + * CPUSVN.
> * %SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT: An unmasked event, e.g. INTR, was received
> */
> enum sgx_return_code {
> @@ -81,6 +89,9 @@ enum sgx_return_code {
> SGX_CHILD_PRESENT = 13,
> SGX_INVALID_EINITTOKEN = 16,
> SGX_PAGE_NOT_MODIFIABLE = 20,
> + SGX_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY = 29,
> + SGX_EPC_NOT_READY = 30,
> + SGX_NO_UPDATE = 31,
> SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT = 128,
> };
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h
> index 99004b02e2ed..3d83c76dc91f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h
> @@ -233,4 +233,10 @@ static inline int __eaug(struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo, void *addr)
> return __encls_2(EAUG, pginfo, addr);
> }
>
> +/* Update CPUSVN at runtime. */
> +static inline int __eupdatesvn(void)
> +{
> + return __encls_ret_1(EUPDATESVN, "");
> +}
> +
> #endif /* _X86_ENCLS_H */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c
> index b61d3bad0446..24563110811d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c
> @@ -32,6 +32,11 @@ static DEFINE_XARRAY(sgx_epc_address_space);
> static LIST_HEAD(sgx_active_page_list);
> static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sgx_reclaimer_lock);
>
> +/* This lock is held to prevent new EPC pages from being created
> + * during the execution of ENCLS[EUPDATESVN].
> + */
> +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sgx_epc_eupdatesvn_lock);
> +
> static atomic_long_t sgx_nr_used_pages = ATOMIC_LONG_INIT(0);
> static unsigned long sgx_nr_total_pages;
>
> @@ -457,7 +462,17 @@ static struct sgx_epc_page *__sgx_alloc_epc_page_from_node(int nid)
> page->flags = 0;
>
> spin_unlock(&node->lock);
> - atomic_long_inc(&sgx_nr_used_pages);
> +
> + if (!atomic_long_inc_not_zero(&sgx_nr_used_pages)) {
> + spin_lock(&sgx_epc_eupdatesvn_lock);
> + /* Only call sgx_updatesvn() once the first enclave's
> + * page is allocated from EPC
> + */
> + if (atomic_long_read(&sgx_nr_used_pages) == 0)
> + sgx_updatesvn();
> + atomic_long_inc(&sgx_nr_used_pages);
> + spin_unlock(&sgx_epc_eupdatesvn_lock);
> + }
>
> return page;
> }
> @@ -970,3 +985,49 @@ static int __init sgx_init(void)
> }
>
> device_initcall(sgx_init);
> +
> +/**
> + * sgx_updatesvn() - Issue ENCLS[EUPDATESVN]
> + * If EPC is ready, this instruction will update CPUSVN to the currently
> + * loaded microcode update SVN and generate new cryptographic assets.
> + */
> +void sgx_updatesvn(void)
> +{
> + int retry = 10;
> + int ret;
> +
> + lockdep_assert_held(&sgx_epc_eupdatesvn_lock);
> +
> + if (!(cpuid_eax(SGX_CPUID) & SGX_CPUID_EUPDATESVN))
> + return;
> +
> + /* Do not execute ENCLS[EUPDATESVN] if running in a VM since
> + * microcode updates are only meaningful to be applied on the host.
> + */
> + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
> + return;
> +
> + do {
> + ret = __eupdatesvn();
> + if (ret != SGX_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY)
> + break;
> +
> + } while (--retry);
> +
> + switch (ret) {
> + case 0:
> + pr_info("EUPDATESVN: success\n");
> + break;
> + case SGX_EPC_NOT_READY:
> + case SGX_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY:
> + case SGX_EPC_PAGE_CONFLICT:
> + pr_err("EUPDATESVN: error %d\n", ret);
> + break;
> + case SGX_NO_UPDATE:
> + break;
> + default:
> + pr_err("EUPDATESVN: unknown error %d\n", ret);
> + break;
> + }
Overall, I think you're right in that "inversion" does make sense,
now that other stuff is better aligned.
At least when there is spurious error, I think ioctl's should stop
responding and driver should not do anything useful anymore. I.e.,
it should go out-of-service.
I don't think the driver should tear-down, just stop servicing
VM's and responding ioctl's.
Possibly thish should be also right action for other errors than
"insufficient entropy" but I'm open for comments for this.
BR, Jarkko
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