linux-kernel - Re: [PATCH v3] tpm: Mask TPM RC in tpm2_start_auth

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Message-ID: <2mjtwprr3dujf4wbu5licb3jtzxujimcz5iahrgqymu6znwbbq@cslxwt7ejva3>
Date: Mon, 7 Apr 2025 10:04:09 +0200
From: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@...hat.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
Cc: keyrings@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org, 
	Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, 
	Lukas Wunner <lukas@...ner.de>, Ignat Korchagin <ignat@...udflare.com>, 
	"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>, Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@....de>, Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@...pe.ca>, 
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@...nel.org>, James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com>, 
	linux-crypto@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] tpm: Mask TPM RC in tpm2_start_auth_session()

On Mon, Apr 07, 2025 at 10:20:57AM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
>tpm2_start_auth_session() does not mask TPM RC correctly from the callers:
>
>[   28.766528] tpm tpm0: A TPM error (2307) occurred start auth session
>
>Process TPM RCs inside tpm2_start_auth_session(), and map them to POSIX
>error codes.
>
>Cc: stable@...r.kernel.org # v6.10+
>Fixes: 699e3efd6c64 ("tpm: Add HMAC session start and end functions")
>Reported-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>
>Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/Z_NgdRHuTKP6JK--@gondor.apana.org.au/
>Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>
>---
>v3:
>- rc > 0
>v2:
>- Investigate TPM rc only after destroying tpm_buf.
>---
> drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++--------------
> include/linux/tpm.h              |  1 +
> 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
>
>diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
>index 3f89635ba5e8..abd54fb0a45a 100644
>--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
>+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c
>@@ -40,11 +40,6 @@
>  *
>  * These are the usage functions:
>  *
>- * tpm2_start_auth_session() which allocates the opaque auth structure
>- *	and gets a session from the TPM.  This must be called before
>- *	any of the following functions.  The session is protected by a
>- *	session_key which is derived from a random salt value
>- *	encrypted to the NULL seed.
>  * tpm2_end_auth_session() kills the session and frees the resources.
>  *	Under normal operation this function is done by
>  *	tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(), so this is only to be used on
>@@ -963,16 +958,13 @@ static int tpm2_load_null(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 *null_key)
> }
>
> /**
>- * tpm2_start_auth_session() - create a HMAC authentication session with the TPM
>- * @chip: the TPM chip structure to create the session with
>+ * tpm2_start_auth_session() - Create an a HMAC authentication session
>+ * @chip:	A TPM chip
>  *
>- * This function loads the NULL seed from its saved context and starts
>- * an authentication session on the null seed, fills in the
>- * @chip->auth structure to contain all the session details necessary
>- * for performing the HMAC, encrypt and decrypt operations and
>- * returns.  The NULL seed is flushed before this function returns.
>+ * Loads the ephemeral key (null seed), and starts an HMAC authenticated
>+ * session. The null seed is flushed before the return.
>  *
>- * Return: zero on success or actual error encountered.
>+ * Returns zero on success, or a POSIX error code.
>  */
> int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip)
> {
>@@ -1024,7 +1016,7 @@ int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip)
> 	/* hash algorithm for session */
> 	tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, TPM_ALG_SHA256);
>
>-	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "start auth session");
>+	rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 0, "StartAuthSession");
> 	tpm2_flush_context(chip, null_key);
>
> 	if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS)
>@@ -1032,6 +1024,17 @@ int tpm2_start_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip)
>
> 	tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
>
>+	if (rc > 0) {

To avoid the nesting blocks, can we include `TPM2_RC_SUCCESS` case in 
the switch or move the `if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS)` before it?

Thanks,
Stefano

>+		switch (rc) {
>+		case TPM2_RC_SESSION_MEMORY:
>+			rc = -ENOMEM;
>+			goto out;
>+		default:
>+			rc = -EFAULT;
>+			goto out;
>+		}
>+	}
>+
> 	if (rc == TPM2_RC_SUCCESS) {
> 		chip->auth = auth;
> 		return 0;
>diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h
>index 6c3125300c00..c1d3d60b416f 100644
>--- a/include/linux/tpm.h
>+++ b/include/linux/tpm.h
>@@ -257,6 +257,7 @@ enum tpm2_return_codes {
> 	TPM2_RC_TESTING		= 0x090A, /* RC_WARN */
> 	TPM2_RC_REFERENCE_H0	= 0x0910,
> 	TPM2_RC_RETRY		= 0x0922,
>+	TPM2_RC_SESSION_MEMORY	= 0x0903,
> };
>
> enum tpm2_command_codes {
>-- 
>2.39.5
>
>