linux-kernel - [PATCH bpf-next v4 1/3] bpf, sockmap: avoid using sk

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Message-ID: <20250408073033.60377-2-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev>
Date: Tue,  8 Apr 2025 15:29:52 +0800
From: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@...ux.dev>
To: bpf@...r.kernel.org
Cc: mrpre@....com,
	Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@...ux.dev>,
	Michal Luczaj <mhal@...x.co>,
	John Fastabend <john.fastabend@...il.com>,
	Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@...udflare.com>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>,
	Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>,
	Jakub Kicinski <kuba@...nel.org>,
	Paolo Abeni <pabeni@...hat.com>,
	Simon Horman <horms@...nel.org>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,
	Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@...nel.org>,
	Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@...ux.dev>,
	Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@...il.com>,
	Song Liu <song@...nel.org>,
	Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@...ux.dev>,
	KP Singh <kpsingh@...nel.org>,
	Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@...ichev.me>,
	Hao Luo <haoluo@...gle.com>,
	Jiri Olsa <jolsa@...nel.org>,
	Mykola Lysenko <mykolal@...com>,
	Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>,
	Cong Wang <cong.wang@...edance.com>,
	Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@...hat.com>,
	netdev@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH bpf-next v4 1/3] bpf, sockmap: avoid using sk_socket after free when sending

The sk->sk_socket is not locked or referenced, and during the call to
skb_send_sock(), there is a race condition with the release of sk_socket.
All types of sockets(tcp/udp/unix/vsock) will be affected.

Race conditions:
'''
CPU0                               CPU1
skb_send_sock
  sendmsg_unlocked
    sock_sendmsg
      sock_sendmsg_nosec
                                   close(fd):
                                     ...
                                   ops->release()
                                     sock_map_close()
                                   sk_socket->ops = NULL
                                   free(socket)
      sock->ops->sendmsg
            ^
            panic here
'''

The ref of psock become 0 after sock_map_close() executed.
'''
void sock_map_close()
{
    ...
    if (likely(psock)) {
    ...
    // !!here we remove psock and the ref of psock become 0
    sock_map_remove_links(sk, psock)
    psock = sk_psock_get(sk);
    if (unlikely(!psock))
        goto no_psock; <=== Control jumps here via goto
        ...
        cancel_delayed_work_sync(&psock->work); <=== not executed
        sk_psock_put(sk, psock);
        ...
}
'''

Based on the fact that we already wait for the workqueue to finish in
sock_map_close() if psock is held, we simply increase the psock
reference count to avoid race conditions.

With this patch, if the backlog thread is running, sock_map_close() will
wait for the backlog thread to complete and cancel all pending work.
Any pending work that hasn't started by then will fail when invoked by
sk_psock_get(), as the psock reference count have been zeroed, and
sk_psock_drop() will cancel all jobs via cancel_delayed_work_sync.

In summary, we require synchronization to coordinate the backlog thread
and close() thread.

The panic I catched:
'''
Workqueue: events sk_psock_backlog
RIP: 0010:sock_sendmsg+0x21d/0x440
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc9000521fad8 RCX: 0000000000000001
...
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ? die_addr+0x40/0xa0
 ? exc_general_protection+0x14c/0x230
 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30
 ? sock_sendmsg+0x21d/0x440
 ? sock_sendmsg+0x3e0/0x440
 ? __pfx_sock_sendmsg+0x10/0x10
 __skb_send_sock+0x543/0xb70
 sk_psock_backlog+0x247/0xb80
...
'''

Reported-by: Michal Luczaj <mhal@...x.co>
Fixes: 799aa7f98d53 ("skmsg: Avoid lock_sock() in sk_psock_backlog()")
Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@...ux.dev>

---
Some approach I tried
1. add rcu:
   - RCU conflicts with mutex_lock in Unix socket send path.
   - Race conditions still exist when reading sk->sk_socket->ops for in
     current sock_sendmsg implementation.

2. Increased the reference of sk_socket->file:
   - If the user calls close(fd), we will do nothing because the reference
     count is not set to 0. It's unexpected.
   - prev discussion:
     https://lore.kernel.org/all/f2bd7e45b327d7b190edef4916d5b9e6dc83e87a@linux.dev/

3. Use sock_lock when calling skb_send_sock:
   - skb_send_sock itself already do the locking.
   - If we call skb_send_sock_locked instead, we have to implement
     sendmsg_locked for each protocol, which is not easy for UDP or Unix,
     as the sending process involves frequent locking and unlocking, which
     makes it challenging to isolate the locking logic.
---
 net/core/skmsg.c | 9 +++++++++
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/core/skmsg.c b/net/core/skmsg.c
index 0ddc4c718833..6101c1bb279a 100644
--- a/net/core/skmsg.c
+++ b/net/core/skmsg.c
@@ -655,6 +655,14 @@ static void sk_psock_backlog(struct work_struct *work)
 	bool ingress;
 	int ret;
 
+	/* Increment the psock refcnt to synchronize with close(fd) path in
+	 * sock_map_close(), ensuring we wait for backlog thread completion
+	 * before sk_socket freed. If refcnt increment fails, it indicates
+	 * sock_map_close() completed with sk_socket potentially already freed.
+	 */
+	if (!sk_psock_get(psock->sk))
+		return;
+
 	mutex_lock(&psock->work_mutex);
 	if (unlikely(state->len)) {
 		len = state->len;
@@ -702,6 +710,7 @@ static void sk_psock_backlog(struct work_struct *work)
 	}
 end:
 	mutex_unlock(&psock->work_mutex);
+	sk_psock_put(psock->sk, psock);
 }
 
 struct sk_psock *sk_psock_init(struct sock *sk, int node)
-- 
2.47.1