linux-kernel - [PATCH AUTOSEL 6.14 24/34] x86/bugs: Don't fill RSB on VMEXIT with eIBRS+retpoline

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Message-Id: <20250414132610.677644-24-sashal@kernel.org>
Date: Mon, 14 Apr 2025 09:26:00 -0400
From: Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
	stable@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>,
	Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
	Amit Shah <amit.shah@....com>,
	Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@...e.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
	Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>,
	Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>,
	tglx@...utronix.de,
	bp@...en8.de,
	peterz@...radead.org,
	mingo@...hat.com,
	dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com,
	x86@...nel.org
Subject: [PATCH AUTOSEL 6.14 24/34] x86/bugs: Don't fill RSB on VMEXIT with eIBRS+retpoline

From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>

[ Upstream commit 18bae0dfec15b24ec14ca17dc18603372f5f254f ]

eIBRS protects against guest->host RSB underflow/poisoning attacks.
Adding retpoline to the mix doesn't change that.  Retpoline has a
balanced CALL/RET anyway.

So the current full RSB filling on VMEXIT with eIBRS+retpoline is
overkill.  Disable it or do the VMEXIT_LITE mitigation if needed.

Suggested-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...nel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>
Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@...ux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Amit Shah <amit.shah@....com>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@...e.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@...hat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@...radead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/84a1226e5c9e2698eae1b5ade861f1b8bf3677dc.1744148254.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index a5d0998d76049..41b4d9018633e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1604,20 +1604,20 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(enum spectre_v2_
 	case SPECTRE_V2_NONE:
 		return;
 
-	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE:
 	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS:
+	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE:
+	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE:
 		if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB)) {
-			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE);
 			pr_info("Spectre v2 / PBRSB-eIBRS: Retire a single CALL on VMEXIT\n");
+			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE);
 		}
 		return;
 
-	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE:
 	case SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE:
 	case SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE:
 	case SPECTRE_V2_IBRS:
-		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT);
 		pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB : Filling RSB on VMEXIT\n");
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT);
 		return;
 	}
 
-- 
2.39.5