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Message-ID: <aAco0cdikKNlbIEN@hu-jiangenj-sha.qualcomm.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Apr 2025 13:27:45 +0800
From: Joey Jiao <quic_jiangenj@...cinc.com>
To: Marco Elver <elver@...gle.com>
CC: Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>, <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
<kasan-dev@...glegroups.com>, <x86@...nel.org>,
Aleksandr Nogikh
<nogikh@...gle.com>,
Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...il.com>,
Borislav Petkov
<bp@...en8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov
<dvyukov@...gle.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf
<jpoimboe@...nel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Thomas Gleixner
<tglx@...utronix.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/7] kcov: x86: introduce CONFIG_KCOV_ENABLE_GUARDS
On Thu, Apr 17, 2025 at 09:43:20PM +0200, Marco Elver wrote:
> On Wed, 16 Apr 2025 at 10:55, Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com> wrote:
> >
> > The new config switches coverage instrumentation to using
> > __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc_guard(u32 *guard)
> > instead of
> > __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc(void)
> >
> > Each callback receives a unique 32-bit guard variable residing in the
> > __sancov_guards section. Those guards can be used by kcov to deduplicate
> > the coverage on the fly.
> >
> > As a first step, we make the new instrumentation mode 1:1 compatible with
> > the old one.
> >
> > Cc: x86@...nel.org
> > Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>
> > ---
> > arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 1 +
> > include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h | 14 ++++++-
> > include/linux/kcov.h | 2 +
> > kernel/kcov.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++----------
> > lib/Kconfig.debug | 16 ++++++++
> > scripts/Makefile.kcov | 4 ++
> > scripts/module.lds.S | 23 ++++++++++++
> > tools/objtool/check.c | 1 +
> > 8 files changed, 101 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
> > index 0deb4887d6e96..2acfbbde33820 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
> > @@ -390,6 +390,7 @@ SECTIONS
> > . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE);
> > __bss_stop = .;
> > }
> > + SANCOV_GUARDS_BSS
>
> Right now this will be broken on other architectures, right?
I did a test on arm64, after adding SANCOV_GUARDS_BSS, it reports
missing support for R_AARCH64_ADR_GOT_PAGE and
R_AARCH64_LD64_GOT_LO12_NC.
>
> > /*
> > * The memory occupied from _text to here, __end_of_kernel_reserve, is
> > diff --git a/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h b/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h
> > index 0d5b186abee86..3ff150f152737 100644
> > --- a/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h
> > +++ b/include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h
> > @@ -102,7 +102,8 @@
> > * sections to be brought in with rodata.
> > */
> > #if defined(CONFIG_LD_DEAD_CODE_DATA_ELIMINATION) || defined(CONFIG_LTO_CLANG) || \
> > -defined(CONFIG_AUTOFDO_CLANG) || defined(CONFIG_PROPELLER_CLANG)
> > + defined(CONFIG_AUTOFDO_CLANG) || defined(CONFIG_PROPELLER_CLANG) || \
> > + defined(CONFIG_KCOV_ENABLE_GUARDS)
> > #define TEXT_MAIN .text .text.[0-9a-zA-Z_]*
> > #else
> > #define TEXT_MAIN .text
> > @@ -121,6 +122,17 @@ defined(CONFIG_AUTOFDO_CLANG) || defined(CONFIG_PROPELLER_CLANG)
> > #define SBSS_MAIN .sbss
> > #endif
> >
> > +#if defined(CONFIG_KCOV_ENABLE_GUARDS)
> > +#define SANCOV_GUARDS_BSS \
> > + __sancov_guards(NOLOAD) : { \
> > + __start___sancov_guards = .; \
> > + *(__sancov_guards); \
> > + __stop___sancov_guards = .; \
> > + }
> > +#else
> > +#define SANCOV_GUARDS_BSS
> > +#endif
> > +
> > /*
> > * GCC 4.5 and later have a 32 bytes section alignment for structures.
> > * Except GCC 4.9, that feels the need to align on 64 bytes.
> > diff --git a/include/linux/kcov.h b/include/linux/kcov.h
> > index e1f7d793c1cb3..7ec2669362fd1 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/kcov.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/kcov.h
> > @@ -107,6 +107,8 @@ typedef unsigned long long kcov_u64;
> > #endif
> >
> > void __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc(void);
> > +void __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc_guard(u32 *guard);
> > +void __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc_guard_init(uint32_t *start, uint32_t *stop);
> > void __sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp1(u8 arg1, u8 arg2);
> > void __sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp2(u16 arg1, u16 arg2);
> > void __sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp4(u32 arg1, u32 arg2);
> > diff --git a/kernel/kcov.c b/kernel/kcov.c
> > index 8fcbca236bec5..b97f429d17436 100644
> > --- a/kernel/kcov.c
> > +++ b/kernel/kcov.c
> > @@ -193,27 +193,15 @@ static notrace unsigned long canonicalize_ip(unsigned long ip)
> > return ip;
> > }
> >
> > -/*
> > - * Entry point from instrumented code.
> > - * This is called once per basic-block/edge.
> > - */
> > -void notrace __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc(void)
> > +static void sanitizer_cov_write_subsequent(unsigned long *area, int size,
>
> notrace is missing.
>
> Can we give this a more descriptive name? E.g. "kcov_append" ?
>
> > + unsigned long ip)
> > {
> > - struct task_struct *t;
> > - unsigned long *area;
> > - unsigned long ip = canonicalize_ip(_RET_IP_);
> > - unsigned long pos;
> > -
> > - t = current;
> > - if (!check_kcov_mode(KCOV_MODE_TRACE_PC, t))
> > - return;
> > -
> > - area = t->kcov_state.s.area;
> > /* The first 64-bit word is the number of subsequent PCs. */
> > - pos = READ_ONCE(area[0]) + 1;
> > - if (likely(pos < t->kcov_state.s.size)) {
> > - /* Previously we write pc before updating pos. However, some
> > - * early interrupt code could bypass check_kcov_mode() check
> > + unsigned long pos = READ_ONCE(area[0]) + 1;
> > +
> > + if (likely(pos < size)) {
> > + /*
> > + * Some early interrupt code could bypass check_kcov_mode() check
> > * and invoke __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc(). If such interrupt is
> > * raised between writing pc and updating pos, the pc could be
> > * overitten by the recursive __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc().
> > @@ -224,7 +212,40 @@ void notrace __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc(void)
> > area[pos] = ip;
> > }
> > }
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * Entry point from instrumented code.
> > + * This is called once per basic-block/edge.
> > + */
> > +#ifndef CONFIG_KCOV_ENABLE_GUARDS
>
> Negation makes it harder to read - just #ifdef, and swap the branches below.
>
> > +void notrace __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc(void)
> > +{
> > + if (!check_kcov_mode(KCOV_MODE_TRACE_PC, current))
> > + return;
> > +
> > + sanitizer_cov_write_subsequent(current->kcov_state.s.area,
> > + current->kcov_state.s.size,
> > + canonicalize_ip(_RET_IP_));
> > +}
> > EXPORT_SYMBOL(__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc);
> > +#else
> > +void notrace __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc_guard(u32 *guard)
> > +{
> > + if (!check_kcov_mode(KCOV_MODE_TRACE_PC, current))
> > + return;
> > +
> > + sanitizer_cov_write_subsequent(current->kcov_state.s.area,
> > + current->kcov_state.s.size,
> > + canonicalize_ip(_RET_IP_));
> > +}
> > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc_guard);
> > +
> > +void notrace __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc_guard_init(uint32_t *start,
> > + uint32_t *stop)
> > +{
> > +}
> > +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc_guard_init);
> > +#endif
> >
> > #ifdef CONFIG_KCOV_ENABLE_COMPARISONS
> > static void notrace write_comp_data(u64 type, u64 arg1, u64 arg2, u64 ip)
> > @@ -252,7 +273,7 @@ static void notrace write_comp_data(u64 type, u64 arg1, u64 arg2, u64 ip)
> > start_index = 1 + count * KCOV_WORDS_PER_CMP;
> > end_pos = (start_index + KCOV_WORDS_PER_CMP) * sizeof(u64);
> > if (likely(end_pos <= max_pos)) {
> > - /* See comment in __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc(). */
> > + /* See comment in sanitizer_cov_write_subsequent(). */
> > WRITE_ONCE(area[0], count + 1);
> > barrier();
> > area[start_index] = type;
> > diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.debug b/lib/Kconfig.debug
> > index 35796c290ca35..a81d086b8e1ff 100644
> > --- a/lib/Kconfig.debug
> > +++ b/lib/Kconfig.debug
> > @@ -2135,6 +2135,8 @@ config ARCH_HAS_KCOV
> > config CC_HAS_SANCOV_TRACE_PC
> > def_bool $(cc-option,-fsanitize-coverage=trace-pc)
> >
> > +config CC_HAS_SANCOV_TRACE_PC_GUARD
> > + def_bool $(cc-option,-fsanitize-coverage=trace-pc-guard)
> >
> > config KCOV
> > bool "Code coverage for fuzzing"
> > @@ -2151,6 +2153,20 @@ config KCOV
> >
> > For more details, see Documentation/dev-tools/kcov.rst.
> >
> > +config KCOV_ENABLE_GUARDS
>
> The "ENABLE" here seems redundant.
> Just KCOV_GUARDS should be clear enough.
>
> > + depends on KCOV
> > + depends on CC_HAS_SANCOV_TRACE_PC_GUARD
> > + bool "Use fsanitize-coverage=trace-pc-guard for kcov"
>
> The compiler option is an implementation detail - it might be more
> helpful to have this say "Use coverage guards for kcov".
>
> > + help
> > + Use coverage guards instrumentation for kcov, passing
> > + -fsanitize-coverage=trace-pc-guard to the compiler.
> > +
> > + Every coverage callback is associated with a global variable that
> > + allows to efficiently deduplicate coverage at collection time.
> > +
> > + This comes at a cost of increased binary size (4 bytes of .bss
> > + per basic block, plus 1-2 instructions to pass an extra parameter).
> > +
> > config KCOV_ENABLE_COMPARISONS
> > bool "Enable comparison operands collection by KCOV"
> > depends on KCOV
> > diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.kcov b/scripts/Makefile.kcov
> > index 67e8cfe3474b7..ec63d471d5773 100644
> > --- a/scripts/Makefile.kcov
> > +++ b/scripts/Makefile.kcov
> > @@ -1,5 +1,9 @@
> > # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
> > +ifeq ($(CONFIG_KCOV_ENABLE_GUARDS),y)
> > +kcov-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANCOV_TRACE_PC_GUARD) += -fsanitize-coverage=trace-pc-guard
>
> This can just be kcov-flags-y, because CONFIG_KCOV_ENABLE_GUARDS
> implies CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANCOV_TRACE_PC_GUARD.
>
> > +else
> > kcov-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANCOV_TRACE_PC) += -fsanitize-coverage=trace-pc
> > +endif
> > kcov-flags-$(CONFIG_KCOV_ENABLE_COMPARISONS) += -fsanitize-coverage=trace-cmp
> > kcov-flags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_SANCOV) += -fplugin=$(objtree)/scripts/gcc-plugins/sancov_plugin.so
> >
> > diff --git a/scripts/module.lds.S b/scripts/module.lds.S
> > index 450f1088d5fd3..ec7e9247f8de6 100644
> > --- a/scripts/module.lds.S
> > +++ b/scripts/module.lds.S
> > @@ -64,6 +64,29 @@ SECTIONS {
> > MOD_CODETAG_SECTIONS()
> > }
> > #endif
> > +
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_KCOV_ENABLE_GUARDS
> > + __sancov_guards(NOLOAD) : {
> > + __start___sancov_guards = .;
> > + *(__sancov_guards);
> > + __stop___sancov_guards = .;
> > + }
> > +
> > + .text : {
> > + *(.text .text.[0-9a-zA-Z_]*)
> > + *(.text..L*)
> > + }
> > +
> > + .init.text : {
> > + *(.init.text .init.text.[0-9a-zA-Z_]*)
> > + *(.init.text..L*)
> > + }
> > + .exit.text : {
> > + *(.exit.text .exit.text.[0-9a-zA-Z_]*)
> > + *(.exit.text..L*)
> > + }
> > +#endif
> > +
> > MOD_SEPARATE_CODETAG_SECTIONS()
> > }
> >
> > diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c
> > index ce973d9d8e6d8..a5db690dd2def 100644
> > --- a/tools/objtool/check.c
> > +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
> > @@ -1149,6 +1149,7 @@ static const char *uaccess_safe_builtin[] = {
> > "write_comp_data",
> > "check_kcov_mode",
> > "__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc",
> > + "__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc_guard",
> > "__sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp1",
> > "__sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp2",
> > "__sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp4",
> > --
> > 2.49.0.604.gff1f9ca942-goog
> >
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