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Message-ID: <CAHC9VhTi6+CHD9OtWj5=pPDrtwF+S9yfBOKqghe=9wXmd7jrxA@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 23 Apr 2025 11:10:29 -0400
From: Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
To: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>,
Blaise Boscaccy <bboscaccy@...ux.microsoft.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,
David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
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Nathan Chancellor <nathan@...nel.org>, Nicolas Schier <nicolas@...sle.eu>, Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>,
Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>,
Günther Noack <gnoack@...gle.com>,
Nick Desaulniers <nick.desaulniers+lkml@...il.com>, Bill Wendling <morbo@...gle.com>,
Justin Stitt <justinstitt@...gle.com>, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@...nel.org>,
Jan Stancek <jstancek@...hat.com>, Neal Gompa <neal@...pa.dev>,
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Matteo Croce <teknoraver@...a.com>, Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@...wei.com>,
Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 security-next 1/4] security: Hornet LSM
On Wed, Apr 23, 2025 at 10:12 AM James Bottomley
<James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com> wrote:
> On Mon, 2025-04-21 at 13:12 -0700, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> [...]
> > Calling bpf_map_get() and
> > map->ops->map_lookup_elem() from a module is not ok either.
>
> I don't understand this objection. The program just got passed in to
> bpf_prog_load() as a set of attributes which, for a light skeleton,
> directly contain the code as a blob and have the various BTF
> relocations as a blob in a single element array map. I think everyone
> agrees that the integrity of the program would be compromised by
> modifications to the relocations, so the security_bpf_prog_load() hook
> can't make an integrity determination without examining both. If the
> hook can't use the bpf_maps.. APIs directly is there some other API it
> should be using to get the relocations, or are you saying that the
> security_bpf_prog_load() hook isn't fit for purpose and it should be
> called after the bpf core has loaded the relocations so they can be
> provided to the hook as an argument?
>
> The above, by the way, is independent of signing, because it applies to
> any determination that might be made in the security_bpf_prog_load()
> hook regardless of purpose.
I've also been worrying that some of the unspoken motivation behind
the objection is simply that Hornet is not BPF. If/when we get to a
point where Hornet is sent up to Linus and Alexei's objection to the
Hornet LSM inspecting BPF maps stands, it seems as though *any* LSM,
including BPF LSMs, would need to be prevented from accessing BPF
maps. I'm fairly certain no one wants to see it come to that.
--
paul-moore.com
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