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Message-ID: <20250424203110.GCaAqfjnr-fogRgnt7@renoirsky.local>
Date: Thu, 24 Apr 2025 22:31:10 +0200
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@...gle.com>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@...x.de>, Sasha Levin <sashal@...nel.org>,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org,
Max Grobecker <max@...becker.info>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
tglx@...utronix.de, mingo@...hat.com, dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com,
x86@...nel.org, thomas.lendacky@....com, perry.yuan@....com,
mario.limonciello@....com, riel@...riel.com, mjguzik@...il.com,
darwi@...utronix.de, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: CONFIG_X86_HYPERVISOR (was: Re: [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.10 2/6]
x86/cpu: Don't clear X86_FEATURE_LAHF_LM flag in init_amd_k8() on AMD when
running in a virtual machine)
On Thu, Apr 24, 2025 at 12:18:50PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> Not quite. KVM supports all of those seamlessly, with some caveats. E.g. if
> host userspace and guest kernel are trying to use the same DRx, the guest will
> "lose" and not get its #DBs.
Pff, so cloud providers have big fat signs over their workstations
saying: you're not allowed to use breakpoints on production systems?
With my silly thinking, I'd prefer to reglement this more explicitly and
actually have the kernel enforce policy:
HV userspace has higher prio with #DB or guests do. But the "losing" bit
sounds weird and not nice.
> Definitely not. All I was thinking was something like:
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/debugreg.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/debugreg.h
> index fdbbbfec745a..a218c5170ecd 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/debugreg.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/debugreg.h
> @@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ static __always_inline unsigned long local_db_save(void)
> {
> unsigned long dr7;
>
> - if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) && !hw_breakpoint_active())
> + if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_DRS_MAY_VMEXIT) && !hw_breakpoint_active())
> return 0;
>
> get_debugreg(dr7, 7);
>
> Where X86_FEATURE_DRS_MAY_VMEXIT is set if HYPERVISOR is detected, but then
> cleared by SEV-ES+ and TDX guests with guaranteed access to DRs. That said,
> even that much infrastructure probably isn't worth the marginal benefits.
Btw you can replace that X86_FEATURE_DRS_MAY_VMEXIT with a cc_platform
flag which gets properly set on all those coco guest types as those
flags are exactly for that stuff.
In any case, I don't see why not. It is easy enough and doesn't make
things worse, API-wise.
Care to send a proper patch with rationale why?
Thx.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
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