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Message-Id: <20250502190129.246328-1-kees@kernel.org>
Date: Fri, 2 May 2025 12:01:24 -0700
From: Kees Cook <kees@...nel.org>
To: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <kees@...nel.org>,
x86@...nel.org,
"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@...nel.org>,
linux-doc@...r.kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org,
kvmarm@...ts.linux.dev,
linux-riscv@...ts.infradead.org,
linux-s390@...r.kernel.org,
linux-efi@...r.kernel.org,
linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kbuild@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,
sparclinux@...r.kernel.org,
kasan-dev@...glegroups.com,
llvm@...ts.linux.dev
Subject: [PATCH RFC 1/4] stackleak: Rename CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK to CONFIG_STACKLEAK
In preparation for adding Clang sanitizer coverage stack depth
tracking that can support stack depth callbacks, remove "GCC_PLUGIN"
from "CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK" and remove "PLUGIN" from
"DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN". Rearrange the Kconfig to have a top-level
CONFIG_STACKLEAK that will depend on either GCC plugins or Clang soon.
While here, also split "prev_lowest_stack" into CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS,
since that's the only place it is referenced from.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@...nel.org>
---
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>
Cc: <x86@...nel.org>
Cc: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@...nel.org>
Cc: <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org>
Cc: <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>
Cc: <kvmarm@...ts.linux.dev>
Cc: <linux-riscv@...ts.infradead.org>
Cc: <linux-s390@...r.kernel.org>
Cc: <linux-efi@...r.kernel.org>
Cc: <linux-hardening@...r.kernel.org>
Cc: <linux-kbuild@...r.kernel.org>
Cc: <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>
Cc: <linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org>
---
Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst | 2 +-
Documentation/security/self-protection.rst | 2 +-
arch/arm/boot/compressed/Makefile | 2 +-
arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S | 2 +-
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 2 +-
arch/arm64/kernel/pi/Makefile | 2 +-
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/Makefile | 2 +-
arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S | 2 +-
arch/riscv/kernel/pi/Makefile | 2 +-
arch/riscv/purgatory/Makefile | 2 +-
arch/s390/kernel/entry.S | 2 +-
arch/x86/entry/calling.h | 4 ++--
arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile | 2 +-
drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile | 6 +++---
drivers/misc/lkdtm/stackleak.c | 8 ++++----
include/linux/sched.h | 4 +++-
include/linux/stackleak.h | 4 ++--
kernel/Makefile | 4 ++--
lib/Makefile | 2 +-
scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins | 4 ++--
security/Kconfig.hardening | 18 +++++++++++-------
tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/config | 2 +-
22 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
index dd49a89a62d3..c94475661a80 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
@@ -1465,7 +1465,7 @@ stack_erasing
=============
This parameter can be used to control kernel stack erasing at the end
-of syscalls for kernels built with ``CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK``.
+of syscalls for kernels built with ``CONFIG_STACKLEAK``.
That erasing reduces the information which kernel stack leak bugs
can reveal and blocks some uninitialized stack variable attacks.
diff --git a/Documentation/security/self-protection.rst b/Documentation/security/self-protection.rst
index 910668e665cb..67a266d38172 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/self-protection.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/self-protection.rst
@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ Memory poisoning
When releasing memory, it is best to poison the contents, to avoid reuse
attacks that rely on the old contents of memory. E.g., clear stack on a
-syscall return (``CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK``), wipe heap memory on a
+syscall return (``CONFIG_STACKLEAK``), wipe heap memory on a
free. This frustrates many uninitialized variable attacks, stack content
exposures, heap content exposures, and use-after-free attacks.
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/compressed/Makefile b/arch/arm/boot/compressed/Makefile
index 945b5975fce2..2da39e41e5c0 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/compressed/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/compressed/Makefile
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ OBJS =
HEAD = head.o
OBJS += misc.o decompress.o
-CFLAGS_decompress.o += $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN)
+CFLAGS_decompress.o += $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK)
ifeq ($(CONFIG_DEBUG_UNCOMPRESS),y)
OBJS += debug.o
AFLAGS_head.o += -DDEBUG
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S
index f379c852dcb7..9921898d29a1 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ no_work_pending:
ct_user_enter save = 0
-#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK
bl stackleak_erase_on_task_stack
#endif
restore_user_regs fast = 0, offset = 0
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
index 5ae2a34b50bd..c5456ff920d3 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
@@ -614,7 +614,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(ret_to_kernel)
SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(ret_to_user)
ldr x19, [tsk, #TSK_TI_FLAGS] // re-check for single-step
enable_step_tsk x19, x2
-#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK
bl stackleak_erase_on_task_stack
#endif
kernel_exit 0
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/pi/Makefile b/arch/arm64/kernel/pi/Makefile
index 4d11a8c29181..77159298f3c6 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/pi/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/pi/Makefile
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
# Copyright 2022 Google LLC
KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(subst $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE),,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) -fpie \
- -Os -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN) \
+ -Os -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK) \
$(DISABLE_LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN) \
$(call cc-option,-mbranch-protection=none) \
-I$(srctree)/scripts/dtc/libfdt -fno-stack-protector \
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/Makefile b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/Makefile
index b43426a493df..4e00a2a8ad0c 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/Makefile
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ asflags-y := -D__KVM_NVHE_HYPERVISOR__ -D__DISABLE_EXPORTS
ccflags-y := -D__KVM_NVHE_HYPERVISOR__ -D__DISABLE_EXPORTS -D__DISABLE_TRACE_MMIO__
ccflags-y += -fno-stack-protector \
-DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING \
- $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN)
+ $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK)
hostprogs := gen-hyprel
HOST_EXTRACFLAGS += -I$(objtree)/include
diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S b/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S
index 33a5a9f2a0d4..d6e9903817f7 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S
+++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(ret_from_exception)
#endif
bnez s0, 1f
-#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK
call stackleak_erase_on_task_stack
#endif
diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/pi/Makefile b/arch/riscv/kernel/pi/Makefile
index 81d69d45c06c..40238ed13ea1 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/kernel/pi/Makefile
+++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/pi/Makefile
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
# This file was copied from arm64/kernel/pi/Makefile.
KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(subst $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE),,$(KBUILD_CFLAGS)) -fpie \
- -Os -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN) \
+ -Os -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK) \
$(call cc-option,-mbranch-protection=none) \
-I$(srctree)/scripts/dtc/libfdt -fno-stack-protector \
-include $(srctree)/include/linux/hidden.h \
diff --git a/arch/riscv/purgatory/Makefile b/arch/riscv/purgatory/Makefile
index fb9c917c9b45..af8fa4aded5c 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/purgatory/Makefile
+++ b/arch/riscv/purgatory/Makefile
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ targets += purgatory.ro purgatory.chk
PURGATORY_CFLAGS_REMOVE := -mcmodel=kernel
PURGATORY_CFLAGS := -mcmodel=medany -ffreestanding -fno-zero-initialized-in-bss
-PURGATORY_CFLAGS += $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN) -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING
+PURGATORY_CFLAGS += $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK) -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING
PURGATORY_CFLAGS += -fno-stack-protector -g0
# Default KBUILD_CFLAGS can have -pg option set when FTRACE is enabled. That
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/entry.S b/arch/s390/kernel/entry.S
index dd291c9ad6a6..6b43318dc0cc 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/entry.S
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/entry.S
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ _LPP_OFFSET = __LC_LPP
#endif
.macro STACKLEAK_ERASE
-#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK
brasl %r14,stackleak_erase_on_task_stack
#endif
.endm
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
index d83236b96f22..790e63df94a2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with
.endm
.macro STACKLEAK_ERASE_NOCLOBBER
-#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK
PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS
call stackleak_erase
POP_REGS
@@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with
#endif /* !CONFIG_X86_64 */
.macro STACKLEAK_ERASE
-#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK
call stackleak_erase
#endif
.endm
diff --git a/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile b/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile
index ebdfd7b84feb..5450d5f7fd88 100644
--- a/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ targets += purgatory.ro purgatory.chk
PURGATORY_CFLAGS_REMOVE := -mcmodel=kernel
PURGATORY_CFLAGS := -mcmodel=small -ffreestanding -fno-zero-initialized-in-bss -g0
PURGATORY_CFLAGS += -fpic -fvisibility=hidden
-PURGATORY_CFLAGS += $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN) -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING
+PURGATORY_CFLAGS += $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK) -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING
PURGATORY_CFLAGS += -fno-stack-protector
# Default KBUILD_CFLAGS can have -pg option set when FTRACE is enabled. That
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
index d23a1b9fed75..1cfdde43da02 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
@@ -22,15 +22,15 @@ cflags-$(CONFIG_X86) += -m$(BITS) -D__KERNEL__ -std=gnu11 \
# arm64 uses the full KBUILD_CFLAGS so it's necessary to explicitly
# disable the stackleak plugin
-cflags-$(CONFIG_ARM64) += -fpie $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN) \
+cflags-$(CONFIG_ARM64) += -fpie $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK) \
-fno-unwind-tables -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables
cflags-$(CONFIG_ARM) += -DEFI_HAVE_STRLEN -DEFI_HAVE_STRNLEN \
-DEFI_HAVE_MEMCHR -DEFI_HAVE_STRRCHR \
-DEFI_HAVE_STRCMP -fno-builtin -fpic \
$(call cc-option,-mno-single-pic-base) \
- $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN)
+ $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK)
cflags-$(CONFIG_RISCV) += -fpic -DNO_ALTERNATIVE -mno-relax \
- $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN)
+ $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK)
cflags-$(CONFIG_LOONGARCH) += -fpie
cflags-$(CONFIG_EFI_PARAMS_FROM_FDT) += -I$(srctree)/scripts/dtc/libfdt
diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/stackleak.c b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/stackleak.c
index f1d022160913..ab8c690a039a 100644
--- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/stackleak.c
+++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/stackleak.c
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
#include "lkdtm.h"
#include <linux/stackleak.h>
-#if defined(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK)
+#if defined(CONFIG_STACKLEAK)
/*
* Check that stackleak tracks the lowest stack pointer and erases the stack
* below this as expected.
@@ -129,16 +129,16 @@ static void lkdtm_STACKLEAK_ERASING(void)
check_stackleak_irqoff();
local_irq_restore(flags);
}
-#else /* defined(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK) */
+#else /* defined(CONFIG_STACKLEAK) */
static void lkdtm_STACKLEAK_ERASING(void)
{
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK)) {
- pr_err("XFAIL: stackleak is not enabled (CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK=n)\n");
+ pr_err("XFAIL: stackleak is not enabled (CONFIG_STACKLEAK=n)\n");
} else {
pr_err("XFAIL: stackleak is not supported on this arch (HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK=n)\n");
}
}
-#endif /* defined(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK) */
+#endif /* defined(CONFIG_STACKLEAK) */
static struct crashtype crashtypes[] = {
CRASHTYPE(STACKLEAK_ERASING),
diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index f96ac1982893..f323a4d9f0ef 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -1599,8 +1599,10 @@ struct task_struct {
/* Used by BPF for per-TASK xdp storage */
struct bpf_net_context *bpf_net_context;
-#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK
unsigned long lowest_stack;
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS
unsigned long prev_lowest_stack;
#endif
diff --git a/include/linux/stackleak.h b/include/linux/stackleak.h
index 3be2cb564710..71e8242fd8f2 100644
--- a/include/linux/stackleak.h
+++ b/include/linux/stackleak.h
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
#define STACKLEAK_POISON -0xBEEF
#define STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH 128
-#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK
#include <asm/stacktrace.h>
#include <linux/linkage.h>
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ asmlinkage void noinstr stackleak_erase_on_task_stack(void);
asmlinkage void noinstr stackleak_erase_off_task_stack(void);
void __no_caller_saved_registers noinstr stackleak_track_stack(void);
-#else /* !CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK */
+#else /* !CONFIG_STACKLEAK */
static inline void stackleak_task_init(struct task_struct *t) { }
#endif
diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
index 434929de17ef..79583e3501b4 100644
--- a/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/Makefile
@@ -137,8 +137,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE) += watch_queue.o
obj-$(CONFIG_RESOURCE_KUNIT_TEST) += resource_kunit.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL_KUNIT_TEST) += sysctl-test.o
-CFLAGS_stackleak.o += $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN)
-obj-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK) += stackleak.o
+CFLAGS_stackleak.o += $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK)
+obj-$(CONFIG_STACKLEAK) += stackleak.o
KASAN_SANITIZE_stackleak.o := n
KCSAN_SANITIZE_stackleak.o := n
KCOV_INSTRUMENT_stackleak.o := n
diff --git a/lib/Makefile b/lib/Makefile
index f07b24ce1b3f..720c4846d255 100644
--- a/lib/Makefile
+++ b/lib/Makefile
@@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_UBSAN) += ubsan.o
UBSAN_SANITIZE_ubsan.o := n
KASAN_SANITIZE_ubsan.o := n
KCSAN_SANITIZE_ubsan.o := n
-CFLAGS_ubsan.o := -fno-stack-protector $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN)
+CFLAGS_ubsan.o := -fno-stack-protector $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK)
obj-$(CONFIG_SBITMAP) += sbitmap.o
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins b/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins
index e4deaf5fa571..e3ed92e20d16 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins
@@ -32,9 +32,9 @@ gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK) \
gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK_VERBOSE) \
+= -fplugin-arg-stackleak_plugin-verbose
ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
- DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN += -fplugin-arg-stackleak_plugin-disable
+ DISABLE_STACKLEAK += -fplugin-arg-stackleak_plugin-disable
endif
-export DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN
+export DISABLE_STACKLEAK
gcc-plugin-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_ARM_SSP_PER_TASK) += arm_ssp_per_task_plugin.so
ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_ARM_SSP_PER_TASK
diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening
index 3fe9d7b945c4..8aa5c1d4794d 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig.hardening
+++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening
@@ -158,10 +158,10 @@ config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_VERBOSE
initialized. Since not all existing initializers are detected
by the plugin, this can produce false positive warnings.
-config GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+config STACKLEAK
bool "Poison kernel stack before returning from syscalls"
- depends on GCC_PLUGINS
depends on HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK
+ depends on GCC_PLUGINS
help
This option makes the kernel erase the kernel stack before
returning from system calls. This has the effect of leaving
@@ -179,6 +179,10 @@ config GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
are advised to test this feature on your expected workload before
deploying it.
+config GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+ def_bool STACKLEAK
+ depends on GCC_PLUGINS
+ help
This plugin was ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at:
* https://grsecurity.net/
* https://pax.grsecurity.net/
@@ -197,9 +201,9 @@ config STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE
int "Minimum stack frame size of functions tracked by STACKLEAK"
default 100
range 0 4096
- depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+ depends on STACKLEAK
help
- The STACKLEAK gcc plugin instruments the kernel code for tracking
+ The STACKLEAK options instruments the kernel code for tracking
the lowest border of the kernel stack (and for some other purposes).
It inserts the stackleak_track_stack() call for the functions with
a stack frame size greater than or equal to this parameter.
@@ -207,7 +211,7 @@ config STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE
config STACKLEAK_METRICS
bool "Show STACKLEAK metrics in the /proc file system"
- depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+ depends on STACKLEAK
depends on PROC_FS
help
If this is set, STACKLEAK metrics for every task are available in
@@ -219,11 +223,11 @@ config STACKLEAK_METRICS
config STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE
bool "Allow runtime disabling of kernel stack erasing"
- depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
+ depends on STACKLEAK
help
This option provides 'stack_erasing' sysctl, which can be used in
runtime to control kernel stack erasing for kernels built with
- CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK.
+ CONFIG_STACKLEAK.
config INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON
bool "Enable heap memory zeroing on allocation by default"
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/config b/tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/config
index 7afe05e8c4d7..b9b1275c07e8 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/config
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/lkdtm/config
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ CONFIG_LKDTM=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST=y
CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED=y
CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y
-CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK=y
+CONFIG_STACKLEAK=y
CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y
CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET_DEFAULT=y
CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON=y
--
2.34.1
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