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Message-Id: <D9OYWFEXSA55.OUUXFPIGGBZV@ventanamicro.com>
Date: Tue, 06 May 2025 11:24:33 +0200
From: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@...tanamicro.com>
To: "Atish Patra" <atishp@...osinc.com>, "Anup Patel" <anup@...infault.org>,
"Atish Patra" <atishp@...shpatra.org>, "Paul Walmsley"
<paul.walmsley@...ive.com>, "Palmer Dabbelt" <palmer@...belt.com>,
"Alexandre Ghiti" <alex@...ti.fr>
Cc: <kvm@...r.kernel.org>, <kvm-riscv@...ts.infradead.org>,
<linux-riscv@...ts.infradead.org>, <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
"linux-riscv" <linux-riscv-bounces@...ts.infradead.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/5] Enable hstateen bits lazily for the KVM RISC-V
Guests
2025-05-05T14:39:25-07:00, Atish Patra <atishp@...osinc.com>:
> This series adds support for enabling hstateen bits lazily at runtime
> instead of statically at bootime. The boot time enabling happens for
> all the guests if the required extensions are present in the host and/or
> guest. That may not be necessary if the guest never exercise that
> feature. We can enable the hstateen bits that controls the access lazily
> upon first access. This providers KVM more granular control of which
> feature is enabled in the guest at runtime.
>
> Currently, the following hstateen bits are supported to control the access
> from VS mode.
>
> 1. BIT(58): IMSIC : STOPEI and IMSIC guest interrupt file
> 2. BIT(59): AIA : SIPH/SIEH/STOPI
> 3. BIT(60): AIA_ISEL : Indirect csr access via siselect/sireg
> 4. BIT(62): HSENVCFG : SENVCFG access
> 5. BIT(63): SSTATEEN0 : SSTATEEN0 access
>
> KVM already support trap/enabling of BIT(58) and BIT(60) in order
> to support sw version of the guest interrupt file.
I don't think KVM toggles the hstateen bits at runtime, because that
would mean there is a bug even in current KVM.
> This series extends
> those to enable to correpsonding hstateen bits in PATCH1. The remaining
> patches adds lazy enabling support of the other bits.
The ISA has a peculiar design for hstateen/sstateen interaction:
For every bit in an hstateen CSR that is zero (whether read-only zero
or set to zero), the same bit appears as read-only zero in sstateen
when accessed in VS-mode.
This means we must clear bit 63 in hstateen and trap on sstateen
accesses if any of the sstateen bits are not supposed to be read-only 0
to the guest while the hypervisor wants to have them as 0.
Thanks.
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